Plechavicius v. Mendoza

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Plechavicius v. Mendoza

128 A.D.2d 763, 512 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 44448

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 23, 1987

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 128 A.D.2d 763 (Plechavicius v. Mendoza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Plechavicius v. Mendoza, 128 A.D.2d 763, 512 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 44448 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and conversion, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Burchell, J.), entered October 10, 1985, which granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Ordered that the order is reversed, with costs, and the motion is denied.

Taking all the allegations pleaded as true, the plaintiffs’ complaint makes out causes of action sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and conversion. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the complaint as failing to state a cause of action should not have been granted (see, Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391, 394; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275). We have considered the plaintiffs’ other contention and find it to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and conversion, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Burchell, J.), entered October 10, 1985, which granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Ordered that the order is reversed, with costs, and the motion is denied.

Taking all the allegations pleaded as true, the plaintiffs’ complaint makes out causes of action sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and conversion. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the complaint as failing to state a cause of action should not have been granted (see, Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391, 394; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275). We have considered the plaintiffs’ other contention and find it to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

128 A.D.2d 763, 512 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 44448, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/plechavicius-v-mendoza-nyappdiv-1987.

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