FIRST DIVISION December 14, 2009
No. 1-08-1510
PAMELA PLEASANCE, as Special ) Appeal from the Administrator of the Estate of ) Circuit Court of Michael Pleasance, Deceased, ) Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 04 L 1343 ) THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal ) Corporation, and ALVIN WEEMS, ) Individually and as Employee of ) the City Of Chicago, ) The Honorable ) William Taylor, Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Pamela Pleasance, as special administrator of the
estate of her son, Michael Pleasance, was issued a $12.5 million
jury award in her wrongful death action. Defendants, the City of
Chicago (the City) and Alvin Weems, appeal the trial court’s
order denying their posttrial motion challenging that verdict.
Defendants contend a new trial is warranted because the
underlying trial was fundamentally unfair where plaintiff’s
counsel repeatedly made improper comments not based on evidence,
and the trial court improperly issued jury instructions.
Defendants also contend the trial court erred in denying their
remittitur request. We reverse and remand for a new trial. 1-08-1510
FACTS
Defendant Weems, a Chicago police officer, shot and killed
Michael on March 8, 2003. On April 18, 2005, plaintiff filed her
second amended complaint alleging wrongful death, survival, and
responsibility for funeral, burial, and medical expenses against
defendants. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for
funeral, burial, and medical expenses for failing to state a
cause of action upon which relief may be granted pursuant to
section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 2002)). Plaintiff later withdrew her survival
action.
On May 3, 2007, defendants filed a section 2-610(d) (735
ILCS 5/2-610(d) (West 2006)) responsive pleading demonstrating
their “desire to contest only the amount of damages to which
plaintiff may be entitled.” Plaintiff filed a response, alleging
defendants’ section 2-610(d) pleading admitting liability was
insufficient. Defendants filed a reply conceding their section
2-610(d) request was insufficient. To cure the procedural
defect, defendants filed Weems’ amended answer and the City’s
answer to plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Specifically,
defendants admitted Michael’s death was a result of Weems
unintentionally discharging his weapon in the course of arresting
someone else, constituting willful and wanton conduct under the
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law as stated in Medina v. City of Chicago, 238 Ill. App. 3d 385,
392-93, 606 N.E.2d 490 (1992), despite being unintentional.
Defendants expressly denied “that in disregarding his duty
[defendant Weems] engaged in a course of action which showed an
actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not
intentional, showed an utter indifference to or conscious
disregard for the safety of others and was then and there guilty
of one or more *** willful and wanton acts or omissions.”
A hearing was held on defendants’ section 2-610(d) request.
The court granted the request. In so ruling, the court said:
“[T]he City has answered enough so that I can have
a trial only [sic] damages only. They will not be able
to bring up willful and wanton before the jury. There
won’t be any conduct in term[s] of whether the officer
killed [Michael]. It’s just going to be straight on
damages, and I’m not going to let them play any games
based on that. So, whatever they tell the jury, the
jury’s only going to decide what the amount of damages
they’re going to give that plaintiff or the heirs for
the death of [Michael].”
When plaintiff’s counsel asked whether he would be allowed to say
“the City has admitted willful and wanton conduct with respect to
the death –- the cause of death of Michael,” the court replied:
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“We are going to say that the City admits that
[Michael] was killed by [Weems] and that we’re here to
decide damages on his death. And we’ll let the jury
decide.”
Prior to trial, both parties filed several motions in
limine. In relevant part, defendants filed a motion in limine to
bar “any undue argument, testimony, or excessive reference to
willful and wanton conduct,” argument and comment urging the jury
to “send a message” with its verdict, and “any testimony,
reference, or argument that the shooting was ‘murder,’
‘unjustified,’ ‘shocking,’ and all other descriptions of outrage
or prejudicial characterizations of the incident.” A hearing was
held on December 7, 2007. Plaintiff’s counsel objected to
limiting his ability to argue that “this case involves willful
and wanton conduct, which has been admitted.” Defendants’
counsel replied:
“We do understand that willful and wanton is part
of the instructions,1 and that they will be permitted
to discuss that in closing argument.
Our concern is excessive and prejudicial use of
1 During a pretrial instructions conference, the court ruled,
over defendants’ objection, that an instruction defining willful
and wanton was admissible.
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the terms, you know, which could then be equated with
punishment and suggesting to the jury that the conduct
was, you know, willful and wanton and in such a manner
that it’s argued that the jury inflates their verdict.
That’s our concern.”
The court responded, “[t]he jury has no idea what willful and
wanton means. It’s just two W’s. They won’t get it to the point
that it means something extremely, extremely terrible.”
Defendants’ counsel restated her concern that willful and wanton
not be “overly emphasized.” The court granted the motion as to
“sending a message” and punishing defendant, and denied the
motion as to barring the use of willful and wanton conduct,
adding it would restrict plaintiff’s counsel from “a lot of
willful and wanton.”
Defendants also filed an in limine motion to bar testimony
regarding fault. The court denied the motion; however, it
instructed plaintiff’s counsel to caution plaintiff from
testifying defendants “murdered or killed” or “some other
pejorative [term],” limiting the testimony to “shot and he died.”
The only information related to Weems’ conduct was
introduced by the trial court prior to voir dire. The court
advised the potential jurors:
“The incident that gives rise to this lawsuit
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occurred [on] March 8, 2003. It took place at
approximately 6:30 a.m. at the CTA station located at
95th Street and the Dan Ryan Expressway. *** City of
Chicago police officer, Alvin Weems, while on duty
discharged his gun, which resulted in the death of
Michael Pleasance.
The only issue to be decided in this case is the
amount of damages that will fairly compensate the
decedent’s mother and brother for the loss that they
incurred because defendants are only contesting the
amount of damages resulting from the decedent’s death.
The circumstances underlying the incident are not
relevant to your decision because they are not relevant
to the case.”
The jury trial proceeded to determine damages for loss of
society.
During opening statements, plaintiff’s counsel said Michael
was never given the opportunity to secure employment after being
released from jail because he was “gunned down by a Chicago
police officer.” Plaintiff’s counsel said the City admitted
Michael was shot “with an utter indifference to and conscious
disregard for his safety.” Plaintiff’s counsel added that
Michael’s “life was taken by the admittedly wrongful conduct of
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the defendants.”
Defendants objected to the first two comments. The
objections were sustained. Defendants requested a mistrial,
adding they did not object to the comment regarding wrongful
conduct so as not to “draw unnecessary attention to it.” The
trial court took the request under advisement.2 The court
cautioned:
“If I hear any other utterances–-gunned down,
shot, killed, dragged through the streets, anything
that depicts how this person died, I will grant a
mistrial, all right?
So, Counsel, you are on notice that your [sic] to
say, yes, he was shot. *** But if you start to pass
‘shot,’ I am going to consider the mistrial.”
The testimony demonstrated Michael was 23 years old when he
died. Michael did not have a wife or children. He lived with
and had a close relationship with Pamela. Michael was not
employed and never held a consistent job. Michael was learning-
disabled. He dropped out of high school in the eleventh grade.
Michael spent almost two years in prison on a drug possession
conviction. When released from prison in 2002, Michael returned
2 The motion was denied after the jury instructions
conference.
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to living with plaintiff. Plaintiff financially supported
Michael. He regularly drank alcohol and smoked marijuana.
Michael was looking for a job when he died. He had a good
relationship with his half-brother, Maurice.
During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel argued:
“Those [juror] chairs protect all of us. They
protect all of us against injustice, and against abuse.
And it is through this system that we are allowed to
defend ourselves against abuse and against injustice.
So it is an awesome responsibility, indeed, and make no
mistake, this is a very significant manner.
Your verdict is going to tell your entire
community whether you’re willing to accept a police
officer’s willful and wanton killing of a member of our
society.”
No objection was made by the defense at that time. The
objection, however, was noted later.
Later, plaintiff’s counsel said:
“Society has to have rules. All civilized
societies have to have rules. Those rules govern all
of our conduct and those rules must be obeyed.
They must be obeyed in order for us to live
peacefully with one another. Without rules, there
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would be no order, and there is no greater perversion
in our rules of order in our society as when a police
officer, who is sworn to protect us, shoots and kills
an innocent member of our society.”
Defendants objected and the court overruled the objection.
Plaintiff’s counsel continued:
“We are conditioned, at an early age, about trust,
about trusting a policeman.
We put our trust in them from the moment we start
understanding their role in our lives. What happens
when that trust is breached. How shall we, as a
society, address the breach of that trust.
It simply couldn’t be worse when that breach of
our sacred trust takes place.
It shocks us. It appalls, and it should.
It angers us when a police officer willfully and
wantonly takes the life of a member of our society. It
angers us and it should.”
Defendants objected. The court sustained the objection and
instructed counsel to “move on.”
Plaintiff’s counsel then said:
“Michael was handicapped. He was mentally
handicapped. He needed protection, not willful and
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wanton conduct.
I’m going to show you what I believe the Court
will instruct you on the definition of willful and
wanton conduct.
Here, again, these words are chosen carefully
through years of analysis as to define a level of
conduct.”
Plaintiff’s counsel read Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Civil, No. 14.01 (2005) (IPI Civil (2005) No. 14.01), defining
willful and wanton conduct, as follows:
“When I use the expression ‘willful and wanton
conduct,’ I mean a course of action which shows actual,
or deliberate intention to harm. Actual or deliberate
intention to harm or, which, if not intentional, shows
an utter indifference to, or conscious disregard for
the safety of others.”
Plaintiff’s counsel then added:
“Those are powerful words, indeed. This is the
admitted level of conduct in this case. Admitted
course of action which shows an actual, or deliberate,
intentional harm.”
Defendants objected and a sidebar was held. Defendants argued
that plaintiff’s counsel violated the in limine order and that
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the officer’s conduct was not an issue in the case. The court
overruled the objection, indicating that the court had allowed
plaintiff’s counsel to talk about the police officer “for a very
short period of time.” The court then said enough had been said
about the subject. The defense also noted for the record their
objection to plaintiff’s counsel’s earlier arguments about
sending a message to the community with their verdict.
Plaintiff’s counsel then continued:
“That is the admitted conduct in this case.
Again, these words are chosen carefully.
When you read them, they do not refer to conduct
that can be explained away or excused. Those words do
not refer to conduct that can be forgiven. They are
specific in their meaning.”
Further in closing, plaintiff’s counsel said “[w]illful and
wanton conduct has separated [Michael from his family],” adding
“this case calls on you to do something *** conceptually very
difficult, to examine willful and wanton admitted conduct and
translate this loss into a number.”
Then, in rebuttal, plaintiff’s counsel retorted:
“What we saw here was unmitigated character
assassination. It wasn’t enough for [defendants] to
kill Michael Pleasance, then they had to come in here
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and kick dirt on his grave.”
Plaintiff’s counsel concluded:
“I just want to share with you a quote from Martin
Luther King that I think about when I’m engaged in
trials like this one.
Dr. King said: ‘Injustice anywhere is a threat to
justice everywhere.’ Justice here requires a
substantial verdict for the Pleasance family for the
wrongful death of a loving and beloved son and
brother.” (Emphasis added.)
At the close of trial, the court issued a curative
instruction:
“Statements of the lawyers in this case are not
evidence. You should base your decision in this case
solely on the testimony and the exhibits admitted into
evidence. Any comment or characterization by the
attorneys about the officer’s conduct that is
inconsistent with the evidence should not be considered
by you in your decision.”
Defendants objected to the second sentence of the curative
instruction based on the fact that Weems’ conduct was “not
relevant, in any way, to [the jury’s] determination of damages.”
The jury was given Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
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Civil, No. 23.01B (2005) (IPI Civil (2005) No. 23.01B), which
admitted the City’s willful and wanton conduct was the proximate
cause of Michael’s death and instructed the jury to determine the
appropriate damages. The jury also received IPI Civil (2005) No.
14.01, defining willful and wanton conduct.
The jury returned a $12.5 million verdict in plaintiff’s
favor. The court entered the verdict and denied defendants’
motion for a new trial or a remittitur.
DECISION
I. Improper Comments
Defendants contend they are entitled to a new trial because
plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly remarked on the circumstances
surrounding Michael’s death in error. We agree.
Because defendants admitted liability, the trial proceeded
solely to determine damages for plaintiff’s loss of society.
Loss of society includes “the deprivation of love, companionship,
and affection from the deceased person.” Turner v. Williams, 326
Ill. App. 3d 541, 548, 762 N.E.2d 70 (2001). The related
instruction given to the jury said:
“When I use the term ‘society,’ in these
instructions I mean the mutual benefits that each
family member receives from the other’s continued
existence, including love, affection, care, attention,
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companionship, comfort, guidance, and protection.”
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 31.11
(1995).
The manner in which Michael died was wholly immaterial to
the determination of loss of society. Defendants’ liability,
willful and wanton or otherwise, was not relevant to the love,
affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, guidance, and
protection Pamela lost as a result of Michael’s death. See
Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 519, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984)
(upholding the Fourth District’s holding that it was reversible
error to admit details surrounding the decedent’s death where the
defendants admitted liability).
Plaintiff’s counsel’s repeated improper and prejudicial
comments require the granting of a new trial. See Rutledge v.
St. Anne’s Hospital, 230 Ill. App. 3d 786, 794-95, 595 N.E.2d
1165 (1992) (a new trial was granted where the plaintiff was
prejudiced by the defense counsel’s improper closing arguments
and violations of an in limine order). Plaintiff’s counsel’s
comments were not based on the evidence presented at trial.
Lecroy v. Miller, 272 Ill. App. 3d 925, 933, 651 N.E.2d 617
(1995) (counsel may not argue facts not in evidence or
misrepresent the evidence). Indeed, there was no evidence
presented regarding Weems’ conduct or his state of mind. The
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only evidence the jury heard focused on determining damages for
loss of society. Therefore, plaintiff’s counsel was completely
improper in urging the jury to “examine willful and wanton
admitted conduct and translate this loss into a number.”
Additionally, it was not the jury’s duty to defend the legal
system from “abuse” and “injustice”; to send a message to the
community regarding police conduct in general; to decipher the
laws of society and how the police subverted them; to place the
entire police department on trial; or to rely on Officer Weems’
conduct or state of mind in any manner in order to determine
damages. Zoerner v. Iwan, 250 Ill. App. 3d 576, 586, 619 N.E.2d
892 (1993) (in a trial limited to determining proximate cause and
damages, the defense counsel’s closing argument improperly urged
the jury to send a message to drunk drivers and not provide a
reward to a drunk driver); Spyrka v. County of Cook, 366 Ill.
App. 3d 156, 170, 851 N.E.2d 800 (2006) (counsel’s improper open
and closing arguments appealed to emotion rather than evidence by
asking the jury to tap into its moral outrage and send a message
with its verdict); see also People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53,
76-77, 803 N.E.2d 405 (2003) (and cases cited therein).
Moreover, it was certainly not the jury’s duty to eradicate the
racial injustices described by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as
plaintiff’s counsel implied in his concluding remarks.
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This court has said:
“The province of the jury is the resolution of factual
issues in the narrow context of the case before them,
not the rendering of moral or social judgments in the
verdict form. The purpose of argument by counsel is to
assist the jury fairly, deliberately and impartially to
arrive at the truth of the facts submitted to them for
their decision. [Citation.] It is error for counsel
to indulge in assertions which appeal to the passions
of the jury and have no bearing or relation to the case
whatsoever. [Citation.]” Hansel v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 132 Ill. App. 2d 402, 407, 270 N.E.2d 553
(1971).
Here, the narrow facts were limited to how much plaintiff was
entitled to for her loss of society. Plaintiff’s counsel’s
comments had no place in the instant damages trial other than to
inflame the passion of the jury and influence its verdict. See
Hansel, 132 Ill. App. 2d at 407.
The court did not restrain plaintiff’s counsel from “a lot
of willful and wanton,” as indicated. Rather, the court denied
defendants’ request for a mistrial based on plaintiff’s counsel’s
excessive commentary regarding Weems’ willful and wanton conduct.
In addition, despite the court’s admonishment that a mistrial
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would be granted if plaintiff’s counsel referred to Weems’ having
“shot, killed, *** anything that depicts how this person died,”
plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly described Michael as being killed
by defendants’ willful and wanton conduct, by defendant police
officer shooting and killing an innocent member of society, and
willfully and wantonly taking the life of a member of our
society, by actual, deliberate, or intentional conduct, by
wrongful conduct, or by conduct that was with utter indifference
to Michael’s life. The court’s sustaining a number of the
objections was not sufficient to cure the prejudice inflicted,
especially where it failed to admonish the jury to disregard
those comments. Rutledge, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 792.
And, the court’s curative instruction did not cure
plaintiff’s counsel’s pervasive prejudicial comments. See
Prairie v. Snow Valley Health Resources, Inc., 324 Ill. App. 3d
568, 582, 755 N.E.2d 1021 (2001). Indeed, the curative
instruction itself was misleading because there was no evidence
of defendants’ conduct for the jury to consider in assessing
plaintiff’s counsel’s argument.
We recognize that some of the comments were not objected to
by defendants and that the failure to object generally results in
waiver. Zoerner, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 585. We, however, review
plaintiff’s counsel’s comments as plain error because they were
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“so egregious that they deprived [defendants] of a fair trial and
substantially impaired the integrity of the judicial process
itself.” Spyrka, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 170. Plaintiff’s counsel’s
comments were a base appeal to emotion and prejudice. They had
no place in this damages trial. Furthermore, plaintiff’s
counsel’s remarks and insinuations in his opening statements and
closing arguments were too pervasive and insidious to have had no
prejudicial effect on the jury. Rutledge, 230 Ill. App. 3d at
792.
II. Improper Jury Instructions
Defendants contend the trial court erred in issuing IPI
Civil (2005) No. 14.01 over their objection. Defendants
expressly take issue with that part of the instruction defining
willful and wanton conduct as “a course of action which shows
actual or deliberate intention to harm.”
It is within the trial court’s discretion to decide what
jury instructions should be given. Brady v. McNamara, 311 Ill.
App. 3d 542, 546, 724 N.E.2d 949 (1999). We will not disturb
that decision unless the court abuses its discretion. Brady, 311
Ill. App. 3d at 546. Error, however, will be found where an
instruction is given that is not supported by the evidence.
Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 100,
658 N.E.2d 450 (1995); Brady, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 546.
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IPI Civil (2005) No. 14.01 provides:
“When I use the expression ‘willful and wanton
conduct’ I mean a course of action, which [shows actual
or deliberate intention to harm] [or which, if not
intentional,] [shows an utter indifference to or
conscious disregard for (a person’s own safety) (and)
(the safety of others)].
The Notes on Use say:
“This instruction is to be given when an
accompanying instruction has indicated the consequences
of a finding of willful and wanton conduct in the given
case. The first bracketed phrase should be used only
when a deliberate intention to harm is alleged and is
supported by evidence sufficient to make a submissible
case. ***
If there is no issue as to the plaintiff’s
contributory fault, then there may be no need for a
jury to determine which form of willful and wanton
conduct was committed by the defendant.” IPI Civil
(2005) No. 14.01, Notes on Use, at 70.
The trial court gave IPI Civil (2005) No. 14.01 in its
entirety in error. Contrary to the Notes on Use, the first
bracketed phrase was used even though there was no evidence
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demonstrating Weems deliberately intended to harm Michael.
Moreover, the instruction was unnecessary altogether. There was
no consequence to the finding of willful and wanton conduct where
defendants already admitted the conduct which caused the death of
Michael and there was no issue regarding Michael’s contributory
fault. The instruction provided multiple definitions for willful
and wanton conduct while none of them were pertinent to the issue
at trial, namely, how much the estate should be compensated for
its loss of society. The instruction served only to focus the
jury on Weems’ conduct, of which there was no evidence. See
Brady, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 551 (giving a comparative negligence
instruction was prejudicial, reversible error where comparative
negligence was not at issue and there was no evidence to support
the instruction).
The error was compounded when plaintiff’s counsel read the
instruction and said:
“Those are powerful words, indeed. This is the
admitted level of conduct in this case. Admitted
course of action which shows an actual, or deliberate,
intentional harm.”
The error in giving the instruction was prejudicial and
entitles defendants to a new trial.
Because we are remanding this cause for a new trial, we
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address the form of IPI Civil (2005) No. 23.01B submitted to the
jury. We recognize defendants did not raise the issue in their
appellate brief; however, we address the issue in order to avoid
potential confusion to the jury on remand.
IPI Civil (2005) No. 23.01B provides:
“The defendant admits that [he] [she] [it] [was
negligent] [produced an unreasonably dangerous product]
[other fault conduct]. The defendant also admits that
[his] [her] [its] [negligence] [unreasonably dangerous
product] [other fault conduct] was a proximate cause of
[injuries] [damage] to the plaintiff. You need only
decide what amount of money will reasonably and fairly
compensate the plaintiff for those [injuries]
[damages].”
The Notes on Use section advises that admitted liability can mean
“different things to different people”; therefore, the
instructions must clearly state what is admitted and what must be
proved to avoid confusion. IPI Civil (2005) No. 23.01B, Notes on
Use, at 116.
During the instructions conference, defendants submitted the
following proposed IPI Civil (2005) No. 23.01B:
“The defendants, City of Chicago and Alvin
Weems[,] have admitted that Alvin Weems discharged his
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weapon and that this conduct was a proximate cause of
the death of the decedent. You need only decide what
amount of money will reasonably and fairly compensate
the Plaintiff for those injuries.”
The trial court ultimately rejected that instruction in favor of
plaintiff’s proposed IPI Civil (2005) No. 23.01B:
“The Defendants admit that they were willful and
wanton. The Defendants also admit that their willful
and wanton conduct was the proximate cause of the death
of the decedent. You need only decide what amount of
money will reasonably and fairly compensate the
Plaintiff for the decedent’s death.”
Plaintiff’s proposed IPI Civil (2005) No. 23.01B was submitted to
the jury over defendants’ objection.
As we have repeatedly stated, there was no evidence
presented regarding Weems’ conduct. The jury was merely advised
“City of Chicago police officer, Alvin Weems, while on duty
discharged his gun, which resulted in the death of Michael
Pleasance.” While defendants admitted liability pursuant to
section 2-610(d) of the Code in their answers to plaintiff’s
complaint, the substance of the answers was not presented as
evidence to the jury. And, the only discussion of willful and
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wanton conduct was contained within defendants’ answers, in that
Michael’s death resulted because Weems unintentionally discharged
his weapon in the course of arresting someone else, constituting
willful and wanton conduct under the law as stated in Medina.
The admission in defendants’ answer of willful and wanton
conduct as defined by Medina allowed the trial to proceed solely
on damages because defendants removed themselves from the
potential protection of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West
2002)). The Medina court, however, said willful and wanton
conduct need not be intentional, as here. Medina, 238 Ill. App.
3d at 392 (affirming the jury’s verdict finding the defendant’s
conduct was willful and wanton where he unholstered his handgun,
put his finger on the trigger, and approached the decedent
despite no evidence of criminal activity up until that time).
We conclude defendants’ proposed IPI Civil (2005) No. 23.01B
would have sufficiently informed the jury of the “other fault
conduct” admitted in this case. “Willful and wanton” is not
listed in the bracketed language and using that undefined,
legalistic language could confuse the jury. “The other fault”
conduct, to avoid confusion, should only state what is admitted
and what must be proved. See IPI Civil (2005) No. 23.01B, Notes
on Use, at 116. Instructing the jury that Weems discharged his
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weapon, proximately causing Michael’s death, would have clearly
told the jury what was being admitted. We note, however, that
the second sentence of defendants’ proposed IPI Civil (2005) No.
23.01B should have instructed the jury to “reasonably and fairly
compensate the Plaintiff for decedent’s loss of society,” instead
of for his “injuries,” as submitted.
III. Remittitur
We need not address defendants’ remittitur contention.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this
cause for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
GARCIA and PATTI, JJ., concur.
REPORTER OF DECISIONS - ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
PAMELA PLEASANCE, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Michael Pleasance, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, and ALVIN WEEMS, Individually and as Employee of the City of Chicago,
24 1-08-1510
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 1-08-1510
Appellate Court of Illinois First District, FIRST DIVISION
December 14, 2009
Justice Bertina E. Lampkin authored the opinion of the court:
Justice Garcia and Justice Patti concur.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. The Hon. William Taylor, Judge Presiding.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60602 OF COUNSEL: Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper and Kerrie Maloney Laytin
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE Michael W. Rathsack, Allen N. Schwartz and Craig P. Mannarino, Chicago, IL 60602