Plaugher v. American Viscose Corp.

30 A.2d 376, 151 Pa. Super. 401, 1943 Pa. Super. LEXIS 303
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 17, 1942
DocketAppeal 190
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 30 A.2d 376 (Plaugher v. American Viscose Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Plaugher v. American Viscose Corp., 30 A.2d 376, 151 Pa. Super. 401, 1943 Pa. Super. LEXIS 303 (Pa. Ct. App. 1942).

Opinion

Keller, P. J.,

Opinion by

This appeal is from a judgment on an award for compensation arising under the Occupational Disease Compensation Act of July 2, 1937, P. L. 2714, 77 PS §1101. The matter first came before us in an appeal by the claimant upon a procedural matter, 147 Pa. Superior Ct. 372, 24 A. 2d 698. The present appeal by the employer is on the merits. The Commonwealth, which was ordered to pay nine-tenths of the award, pursuant to section 7 of said Act, has not appealed.

The Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1937 is a supplement to the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1915, P. L. 736, and the procedure prescribed in that Act is made applicable to the supplement, unless clearly inconsistent (sec. 3). But it must not be overlooked that there is a basic and vital distinction between the two statutes. The Workmen’s Compensation Act is restricted to disability or death resulting from injury received by the employee, by accident, while in the course of his employment. An accident, within the meaning of that Act, is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event: Lacey v. Washburn & Williams Co., 309 Pa. 574, 577, 164 A. 724. It involves a sudden, occurrence. But the Occupational Disease Compensation Act contemplates as well disease or injury resulting to the employee from the slow and gradual effects of certain named poisons or other deleterious substances in any occupation involving direct contact with them, or exposure to them — among them, poisoning by carbon bisulphide, or the same thing, carbon disulphide (sec. 2(c)); see 147 Pa. Superior Ct. 372, p. 377, 24 A. 2d 698, p. 701. In fact, certain provisions *403 of the Act contemplate an exposure of five or more years before the injurious effects to the employee de-t velop to the point of disablement or death due to such occupational diseases, (sec. 7), in which event the compensation awarded is to be payable jointly by the Commonwealth and the employer, in certain prescribed proportions. Hence those decisions under the Workmen’s Compensation Act which are based on the sudden or accidental nature of the injury resulting in the employee’s disability or death have no application to the statute now under consideration.

Furthermore, the Act expressly provided in (sec. 6), “(’a) If it shall be shown that the employe, at or immediately before the date of disability, was employed in any process or employment set forth in section two [ivhich includes exposure to carbon disulphide], it shall be presumed that the occupational disease is due to the nature of that employment. This presumption, however, shall not be conclusive.” 1

“(b) An employer shall be liable for the payments prescribed by this act for the occupational diseases described in section 2 hereof when disability of an employe resulting in loss of earnings, shall be due to an employment in a hazardous occupation in which he Avas employed and such disability results Avithih íavo years after the last exposure in such employment, or in case of death resulting from such exposure, if such death occurs within five years following disability from such disease.” (Italics supplied).

The evidence clearly established that the claimant’s *404 husband, Thompson Plaugher, was employed by the defendant as a spinner for seven years; 2 that during all that time the defendant in its process of manufacturing rayon used, and still uses, carbon disulphide, which is a deadly poison; that claimant’s husband worked, exposed to the fumes of carbon disulphide, until February 2, 1938 when he became totally disabled, and that he died on February 19, 1939, without having gone back to work.

The present claim for compensation was heard as a companion case to six others, three of which were heard by Referee Alessandroni, who considered this case, and three others by Referee Patterson in Lewistown, against the same employer for disability and death resulting from carbon disulphide poisoning, some of which were determined by the board in favor of the claimants and some in favor of the defendant. Testimony taken in the companion case of James R. Nichols v. American Viscose Company was by stipulation (p. 153a) incorporated into the record of this case.

The testimony so incorporated into the record in this case includes the following testimony by Dr. Max Trumper, a bio-chemist and toxicologist, author of a book on Toxicology and a book on Biochemistry in Internal Medicine, who was familiar with the process of making viscose, which he described as follows:

“The viscose process is the method of converting short cellulose fibers or cotton lint and wood into a continuous filament which is known as rayon.”

He further testified that carbon’ disulphide is used in the process and is the chemical which converts the alkalized cellulose or crumbs into the viscose material, and that: “Carbon disulphide is one of the most dangerous chemicals, that is both from the standpoint of *405 poisonous qualities and also from the standpoint of its explosive qualities, that is used in the industry”; and that carbon disulphide vaporizes into a gaseous state at room temperature, and that as soon as carbon disulphide in liquid form strikes the air, it becomes a gas.

He inspected the Marcus Hook plant of the defendant — where Plaugher had worked — with Dr. Gordy, who attended the employee and was a physician called as a witness for the claimant, spending about three hours at such plant.

He did not make a quantitative test to determine the amount of carbon disulphide in any of the rooms because he thought it would be useless to make an isolated determination, and that isolated chemical analyses of the air are misleading and of no practical value. He, however, smelled the presence of carbon disulphide in every room, including the spinning rooms where decedent worked. The quantity .of the gases given off varies, depending on the quality of the material that is being made as well as the quantity of the material. He was familiar with the duties of the workmen in the spinning room and said their duties involved a fume exposure, not sufficient to cause poisoning in a few weeks or a month but sufficient to poison a man who has been working in that spinning room for many years.

He testified as to the effect of carbon disulphide fumes on the human' body, as follows:

“Yes, it is common knowledge among toxicologists and more recently among an increasing number of other professional men that carbon disulphide can give rise to a variety of symptoms. If we bear in mind it has fundamentally a chemical use in industry, namely that it is an unusually good lipoid 3 solvent and for that reason it has been used in the rubber industry and other industries because of its remarkable solvent properties. *406

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Readinger v. Gottschall
191 A.2d 694 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1963)
Stampone v. Anthony Dally & Sons, Inc.
149 A.2d 129 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1959)
Beale v. Hollimon
8 Pa. D. & C.2d 758 (Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 1956)
Powichka v. Glen Alden Coal Co.
83 Pa. D. & C. 528 (Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, 1952)
Rohner v. Fox Products
67 A.2d 605 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1949)
Watkins v. National Electric Products Corp.
165 F.2d 980 (Third Circuit, 1948)
Watkins v. National Electric Products Corp.
69 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1947)
McGarvey v. Butler Consolidated Coal Co.
43 A.2d 623 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1945)
Bowers v. Schell's Bakery
31 A.2d 442 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1943)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 A.2d 376, 151 Pa. Super. 401, 1943 Pa. Super. LEXIS 303, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/plaugher-v-american-viscose-corp-pasuperct-1942.