Platt v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., Dist. 12

2011 Ohio 3536
CourtOhio Court of Claims
DecidedApril 5, 2011
Docket2010-11447-AD
StatusPublished

This text of 2011 Ohio 3536 (Platt v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., Dist. 12) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Platt v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., Dist. 12, 2011 Ohio 3536 (Ohio Super. Ct. 2011).

Opinion

[Cite as Platt v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., Dist. 12, 2011-Ohio-3536.]

Court of Claims of Ohio The Ohio Judicial Center 65 South Front Street, Third Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 www.cco.state.oh.us

CHARLES JASON PLATT

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, DIST. 12

Defendant

Case No. 2010-11447-AD

Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert

MEMORANDUM DECISION

{¶ 1} Plaintiff, Charles Platt, filed this action against defendant, Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT), contending his 2005 Ford Focus was damaged as a proximate cause of negligence on the part of ODOT in maintaining a hazardous condition on Interstate 71 in Cuyahoga County. Specifically, plaintiff asserted the tire, rim, lugnuts, and wheel alignment on his car were damaged when the vehicle struck a piece of wood in the traveled portion of the roadway. Plaintiff described his damage incident occurred in the following manner, “after we passed the West 150th exit I hit a 4 X 4 that was lying in the middle of the freeway.” Plaintiff recalled his damage event occurred on May 7, 2010, at approximately 9:00 p.m. In his complaint, plaintiff requested damages in the amount of $390.80, the total cost of replacement parts and related expense associated with having his car repaired. The $25.00 filing fee was paid and plaintiff requested reimbursement of that cost along with his damage claim. {¶ 2} Defendant denied liability based on the contention that no ODOT personnel had any knowledge of the damage-causing debris condition prior to plaintiff’s incident. Defendant located the debris at milepost 240.6 on I-71 in Cuyahoga County and advised ODOT did not receive any calls or complaints for debris at that location despite the fact the particular “section of roadway has an average daily traffic count between 94,750 and 98,330 vehicles.” Defendant suggested, “that the debris existed in that location for only a relatively short amount of time before plaintiff’s incident.” Defendant asserted plaintiff failed to establish the length of time the debris existed on the roadway prior to his property damage event. Defendant insisted no ODOT personnel had any knowledge of a wooden object at milepost 240.6 on I-71 prior to the described incident forming the basis of this claim. Defendant contended plaintiff failed to establish the damage-causing debris condition was attributable to any conduct on the part of ODOT. Defendant related the ODOT “Cuyahoga County Manager conducts roadway inspections on all state roadways within the county on a routine basis, at least one to two times a month.” Apparently, no debris was discovered at milepost 240.6 on I-71 the last time that section of roadway was inspected before May 7, 2010. The claim file is devoid of any inspection record. Defendant did submit a six-month maintenance history of the specific roadway area in question which recorded thirty-nine litter patrol operations were performed in the relevant area of I-71 during the time frame covered. According to the submitted maintenance history, the last time ODOT personnel were working in the area was on May 5, 2010, when litter was removed from the area. Defendant stated “if ODOT personnel had found any debris it would have been picked up.” Defendant argued plaintiff failed to produce evidence to show his property damage was proximately caused by negligent maintenance on the part of ODOT. {¶ 3} For plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, he must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant owed him a duty, that it breached that duty, and that the breach proximately caused his injuries. Armstrong v. Best Buy Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St. 3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573,¶8 citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 75, 77, 15 OBR 179, 472 N.E. 2d 707. Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he suffered a loss and that this loss was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Barnum v. Ohio State University (1977), 76-0368-AD. However, “[i]t is the duty of a party on whom the burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only a basis for a choice among different possibilities as to any issue in the case, he fails to sustain such burden.” Paragraph three of the syllabus in Steven v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 145 Ohio St. 198, 30 O.O. 415, 61 N.E. 2d 198, approved and followed. {¶ 4} Defendant has the duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition for the motoring public. Knickel v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 335, 3 O.O. 3d 413, 361 N.E. 2d 486. However, defendant is not an insurer of the safety of its highways. See Kniskern v. Township of Somerford (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 189, 678 N.E. 2d 273; Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 67 Ohio App. 3d 723, 588 N.E. 2d 864. {¶ 5} In order to prove a breach of the duty to maintain the highways, plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the precise condition or defect alleged to have caused the accident. McClellan v. ODOT (1986), 34 Ohio App. 3d 247, 517 N.E. 2d 1388. Defendant is only liable for roadway conditions of which it has notice but fails to reasonably correct. Bussard v. Dept. of Transp. (1986), 31 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 31 OBR 64, 507 N.E. 2d 1179. {¶ 6} Defendant professed liability cannot be established when requisite notice of the damage-causing conditions cannot be proven. However, proof of notice of a dangerous condition is not necessary when defendant’s own agents actively caused such condition. See Bello v. City of Cleveland (1922), 106 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. 526, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Sexton v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1996), 94- 13861. Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to prove that his property damage was caused by a defective condition created by ODOT or that defendant knew about the particular debris condition prior to 9:00 p.m. on May 7, 2010. {¶ 7} Ordinarily, to recover in any suit involving injury proximately caused by roadway conditions including debris, plaintiff must prove that either: 1) defendant had actual or constructive notice of the debris condition and failed to respond in a reasonable time or responded in a negligent manner, or 2) that defendant, in a general sense, maintains its highways negligently. Denis v. Department of Transportation (1976), 75-0287-AD. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to prove that ODOT had actual notice of the damage-causing condition. Therefore, in order to recover plaintiff must offer proof of defendant’s constructive notice of the condition as evidence to establish negligent maintenance. {¶ 8} “[C]onstructive notice is that which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice or knowledge.” In re Estate of Fahle (1950), 90 Ohio App. 195, 197-198, 48 O.O. 231, 105 N.E. 2d 429. “A finding of constructive notice is a determination the court must make on the fact of each case not simply by applying a pre-set time standard for the discovery of certain road hazards.” Bussard, at 4. “Obviously, the requisite length of time sufficient to constitute constructive notice varies with each specific situation.” Danko v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (Feb. 4, 1993), Franklin App. 92AP-1183. In order for there to be a finding of constructive notice, plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that sufficient time has elapsed after the dangerous condition appears, so that under the circumstances defendant should have acquired knowledge of its existence. Guiher v. Dept. of Transportation (1978), 78-0126-AD; Gelarden v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., Dist. 4, Ct. of Cl. No. 2007-02521-AD, 2007-Ohio-3047.

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Related

Knickel v. Department of Transportation
361 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1976)
McClellan v. Ohio Department of Transportation
517 N.E.2d 1388 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1986)
Kniskern v. Township of Somerford
678 N.E.2d 273 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1996)
Rhodus v. Ohio Department of Transportation
588 N.E.2d 864 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1990)
In Re Estate of Fahle
105 N.E.2d 429 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1950)
Stevens v. Industrial Commission
61 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1945)
Bello v. Cleveland
138 N.E. 526 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1922)
Bussard v. Ohio Department of Transportation
507 N.E.2d 1179 (Ohio Court of Claims, 1986)
Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc.
472 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1984)
Armstrong v. Best Buy Co.
788 N.E.2d 1088 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
2011 Ohio 3536, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/platt-v-ohio-dept-of-transp-dist-12-ohioctcl-2011.