Platt v. Greenwood

69 P.2d 1032, 50 Ariz. 158, 1937 Ariz. LEXIS 168
CourtArizona Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 6, 1937
DocketCivil No. 3812.
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 69 P.2d 1032 (Platt v. Greenwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Platt v. Greenwood, 69 P.2d 1032, 50 Ariz. 158, 1937 Ariz. LEXIS 168 (Ark. 1937).

Opinion

ROSS, J.

This is an action for damages for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment. A. Hartley Greenwood, sheriff of Apache county, on September 23, 1935, between 6:30 and 7:00 o ’clock in the evening, without a warrant, arrested the plaintiff, Earl Platt, on the streets of St. Johns aiid took him to and locked him in the county jail, where he remained for some three hours, when he was released by the sheriff without any charge being laid against him. The United *160 States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is the sheriff’s official bondsman.

The defense is that plaintiff was, at the time he arrested him, interfering with the sheriff in an attempt to arrest one Spencer Nordyke, who was committing, or attempting to commit, a public offense.

The case was tried to a jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendants. The plaintiff has appealed assigning several grounds therefor.

The facts, stated most strongly against the plaintiff and in favor of defendants, are as follows: Tom Davis, the proprietor of a public place in St. Johns, known as the Apache Café, where both intoxicating liquors and food were served, called the defendant sheriff over the telephone, stating that there was some difficulty or trouble in the café. When the sheriff arrived at the café, he found that one Spencer Balcomb and Spencer Nordyke were under the influence of intoxicating liquors and had been quarreling and threatening to fight each other. It seems that the sheriff and others were able to induce Balcomb to leave the café and to go to his country home some miles away. Nordyke, although requested by the sheriff to get off the streets and go home, refused or neglected to do so. Someone telephoned plaintiff, who was an acquaintance of Nordyke’s and an old-time friend, that the latter ' was having some trouble, whereupon he went from his home to the Apache Café to look after Nordyke. At the time the defendant arrested the plaintiff the latter and Nordyke were standing on the street, between the Apache Café and the Jones restaurant and pool hall, and the defendant, who was motoring along the street, saw them. He stopped and went to where plaintiff and Nordyke were for the purpose of arresting Nordyke, he says. When asked why he was intending to arrest Nordyke, he said:

*161 “He was drunk and was disturbing the peace talking loudly and had caused this trouble in the Apache Café just prior to this time. ’ ’

He added that he was talking loud enough so that passers-by could hear him. When he reached plaintiff and Nordyke, according to his statement he did this:

“As I walked up to them I got hold of Nordyke’s coat collar, and told him that I had given him several chances to go home and get off the street, that you are drunk and that I did not want any more trouble and that it was about time that I was doing something. ’ ’

Plaintiff protested the arrest of Nordyke, insisted that he was doing no wrong nor anything for which he should be arrested, and told defendant that he would look after him and take care of him. Plaintiff did not use any physical force but, as defendant said,

“he just kept on arguing and getting between me and my man that I was after. . . . Just talking and interfering. ’ ’

According to the defendant, the reason he arrested the plaintiff was because he kept arguing with him and getting between him and Nordyke; that he got angry and arrested him.

The witnesses speak of what was said between the defendant and plaintiff as “arguing.” Just what the language was does not appear. It is quite clear, however, that the plaintiff did not use or threaten to use any physical force to prevent the defendant from taking Nordyke into his custody.

St. Johns is an unincorporated town and therefore if Nordyke was committing, or attempting to commit, any public offense, when defendant went where he and plaintiff were, it was an offense against some state law and not against any city or town ordinance. That Nordyke was intoxicated seems quite certain, and that *162 lie had earlier in the evening in the Apache Café, bnt not in the presence of the defendant, been guilty of disturbing the peace is not disputed.

The legislature has not made intoxication or the failure or refusal of one intoxicated to keep off the street or to obey the orders of the sheriff or peace officer to go home a public offense. The right of the sheriff to arrest the plaintiff without a warrant depended upon whether what the plaintiff did and said when the sheriff approached him and Nordyke constitute the crime of obstructing the sheriff in the discharge of, or attempt to discharge, a duty of his office. Section 4559, Revised Code of 1928, provides that one who wilfully resists, delays, or obstructs an officer in the discharge of a duty of his office is guilty of a felony.

This involves an inquiry as to what duty of his office the defendant was discharging, or attempting to discharge, at the time of the alleged obstruction. He says he was intending to arrest Nordyke, but he had no warrant for Nordyke and he had no right and was under no legal duty to arrest him unless he knew, or had reason to know, he had committed a felony; or unless in his presence Nordyke was committing, or attempting to commit, some public offense. Adair v. Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 Pac. 853, 26 A. L. R. 278. There is no suggestion that Nordyke had committed a felony. If he was guilty of anything for which an officer could lawfully arrest him without a warrant, it was disturbing the peace in the presence of the officer. It is true that the defendant states that Nordyke was drunk and disturbing the peace, and that he was talking loud enough to be heard by passers-by.

This offense occurs where a person maliciously and wilfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any neighborhood, family, or person by loud or unusual noise, *163 or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting, or who applies any violent, abusive, or obscene epithets to another. Section 4722, Id.; People v. Anderson, 117 Cal. App. (Supp.) 763, 1 Pac. (2d) 64.

When defendant approached plaintiff and Nordyke, the latter two were engaged in a private conversation. There is no evidence that Nordyke was using anything but the usual conversational tone of voice and language. Defendant says, speaking of the time he went to where plaintiff and Nordyke were:

“I believe that Earl (plaintiff) and Nordvke was talking about this case, but Nordyke was doing most of the talking. ... I heard Nordyke say, ‘if I make a charge against him, Tom Davis (café proprietor) will swear against me and Dodd Greer (county attorney) and Hartley Greenwood will because they are afraid of him.’ ” (Italics ours).
“This case” no doubt refers to the trouble in the café before defendant arrived.

It is true, defendant says Nordyke was talking loudly so that passers-by could hear him.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
69 P.2d 1032, 50 Ariz. 158, 1937 Ariz. LEXIS 168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/platt-v-greenwood-ariz-1937.