FRIEDMAN, Judge.
Robert E. Plank; Robert E. Plank, Jr.; Steven D. Gladstone and M.A. Swift (collectively, Purchasers), successful bidders at a tax sale, appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court) which denied their Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale. We affirm.
In 1990, Edward and Marianne Avosso (Avossos) purchased the property at issue, subject to a mortgage.
(R.R. Exhibit A.) As a result of the Avossos’ failure to pay real estate taxes on their property, the Monroe County Tax Claim Bureau (Bureau) exposed the Avossos’ property to an upset sale on October 19, 1994, under section 601 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (Law).
(Exhibit A to Bureau’s Petition for Rule to Show Cause.) The property was not sold at the upset sale and, as a result, on January 16, 1998, the Bureau filed a “Consolidated Petition to Sell Properties at Judicial Sale”
(Petition for Tax Sale), petitioning the trial court for a “free and clear” judicial tax sale of the property in accordance with section 610 of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.610.
(O.R. No. 10.) In its Petition for Tax Sale, the Bureau identified a mortgage against the property held by Bankers Trust Company (Bankers Trust). Pursuant to the Petition for Tax Sale, the trial court issued a Rule to Show Cause why the property “should not be sold free and clear of all taxes and municipal claims, liens, or mortgages, ground rents, charges and estates of whatsoever kind.” (O.R. No. 10.) The Rule, which was served upon Bankers Trust, (O.R. No. 10), was returnable on April 7, 1998; on April 7,1998, the trial court made the Rule absolute and scheduled the sale. (O.R. No. 11.)
At the judicial tax sale, held on May 18, 1998, Purchasers purchased the property for $21,200. (R.R. Exhibit G.) The Bureau issued a deed to Purchasers on May 20, 1998, and recorded the deed on June 11, 1998. (R.R. Exhibit G.) At the time of the purchase, neither the Bureau nor Purchasers were aware that Bankers Trust had reassigned its mortgage to Altegra Credit Company (Altegra) on November 4, 1997 and that Altegra held the mortgage
on the property.
Consequently, although the Bureau notified Bankers Trust of the judicial tax sale, the Bureau did not give notice to the current mortgagee, Altegra.
On September 3, 1998, after learning that they had purchased the property subject to Altegra’s mortgage, Purchasers filed their Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale, alleging that the Bureau erred by: (1) failing to identify Altegra as a lienholder, or serve the Rule to Show Cause on Alteg-ra; and (2) failing to serve prior owner Edward Avosso with the Rule to Show Cause or with notice of the judicial tax sale. In the Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale, Purchasers requested that the sale be declared void and that the Bureau refund $23,128.12 to Purchasers. (R.R. Exhibit H.)
On September 4, 1998, the trial court entered a rale returnable on October 5, 1998. On October 7, 1998, after the Bureau had failed to respond to this rule, Purchasers filed a motion to make the rule absolute. By Order of October 9, 1998, the trial court dismissed Purchasers’ Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale. Reasoning that the Bureau owed no duty to provide title information to purchasers at a judicial sale, (op. at 3), the trial court held that the Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale disclosed “no basis for the
purchaser
at the Judicial Sale to set aside the sale ..(Op. at 2.) (Emphasis in original.)
On appeal,
Purchasers assert three allegations of error. First, they argue that the Bureau’s failure to notify Edward Avosso and Altegra requires that the tax sale be voided. Second, they argue that, because the Bureau’s Petition for Tax Sale was not accompanied by a full and complete title search which identified all lienholders, the Petition for Tax Sale was defective on its face, and the trial court erred in issuing the Rule scheduling the tax sale based on that defective Petition for Tax Sale. Third, Purchasers argue that, because the Bureau did not file an answer to Purchasers’ Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale, the trial court should have granted Purchasers’ October 7, 1998 motion for a rule absolute. However, none of Purchasers’ arguments entitles them to have the tax sale set aside.
The Bureau’s failure to notify the prior owner of the sale
Even if the Bureau failed to notify Edward Avosso of the tax sale, Purchasers lack standing to attack the validity of the tax sale based on that lack of notice. The procedure for contesting tax sales is set out in section 607 of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.607. Under section 607(b), 72 P.S. § 5860.607(b), “owners” or “lien creditors” may file objections or exceptions to a tax sale within thirty days after the court has made a confirmation nisi of the sale. Because here Purchasers were not owners or lien creditors at the time of the tax sale, they lack standing to file objections or exceptions under section 607(b) of the Law.
See In re Kidd,
73 Pa.Cmwlth. 85, 457 A.2d 231 (1983). If no exceptions or objections are timely filed or if they are overruled, the trial court shall enter a decree of absolute confirmation of the sale. Section 607(g) of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.607(g). Here, after finding that no exceptions or objections were filed, the trial court entered a decree of absolute
confirmation of the sale on December 8, 1998.
(O.R. No. 15.)
Once a tax sale has been absolutely confirmed, no person may, by judicial proceedings, inquire into a bureau’s proceedings with respect to the sale, except for the giving of notice under the Law. Section 607(g) of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.607(g). Under section 607(g), after the sale is confirmed absolutely, a successful bidder may file an action to quiet title.
In re Kidd,
24 Pa. D. & C. 3d 528 (1981),
aff'd,
73 Pa.Cmwlth. 85, 457 A.2d 231 (1983). However, section 607(g) does not permit a successful bidder to file a petition to set aside the sale based on a prior owner’s lack of notice of the sale. Only a person who has suffered an injury as a result of the claimed lack of notice may raise it.
See, e.g., C. Everett, Inc. v. Ayres,
22 Pa.Cmwlth. 422, 349 A.2d 514 (1975). Because section 607(b) precludes a successful bidder from raising a prior owner’s lack of notice prior to absolute confirmation of the sale, it necessarily follows that a successful bidder may not raise that same lack of notice after absolute confirmation.
Accordingly, Purchasers first argument must fail.
The Bureau’s failure to identify the mortgagee and notify the mortgagee of the tax sale
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FRIEDMAN, Judge.
Robert E. Plank; Robert E. Plank, Jr.; Steven D. Gladstone and M.A. Swift (collectively, Purchasers), successful bidders at a tax sale, appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court) which denied their Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale. We affirm.
In 1990, Edward and Marianne Avosso (Avossos) purchased the property at issue, subject to a mortgage.
(R.R. Exhibit A.) As a result of the Avossos’ failure to pay real estate taxes on their property, the Monroe County Tax Claim Bureau (Bureau) exposed the Avossos’ property to an upset sale on October 19, 1994, under section 601 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (Law).
(Exhibit A to Bureau’s Petition for Rule to Show Cause.) The property was not sold at the upset sale and, as a result, on January 16, 1998, the Bureau filed a “Consolidated Petition to Sell Properties at Judicial Sale”
(Petition for Tax Sale), petitioning the trial court for a “free and clear” judicial tax sale of the property in accordance with section 610 of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.610.
(O.R. No. 10.) In its Petition for Tax Sale, the Bureau identified a mortgage against the property held by Bankers Trust Company (Bankers Trust). Pursuant to the Petition for Tax Sale, the trial court issued a Rule to Show Cause why the property “should not be sold free and clear of all taxes and municipal claims, liens, or mortgages, ground rents, charges and estates of whatsoever kind.” (O.R. No. 10.) The Rule, which was served upon Bankers Trust, (O.R. No. 10), was returnable on April 7, 1998; on April 7,1998, the trial court made the Rule absolute and scheduled the sale. (O.R. No. 11.)
At the judicial tax sale, held on May 18, 1998, Purchasers purchased the property for $21,200. (R.R. Exhibit G.) The Bureau issued a deed to Purchasers on May 20, 1998, and recorded the deed on June 11, 1998. (R.R. Exhibit G.) At the time of the purchase, neither the Bureau nor Purchasers were aware that Bankers Trust had reassigned its mortgage to Altegra Credit Company (Altegra) on November 4, 1997 and that Altegra held the mortgage
on the property.
Consequently, although the Bureau notified Bankers Trust of the judicial tax sale, the Bureau did not give notice to the current mortgagee, Altegra.
On September 3, 1998, after learning that they had purchased the property subject to Altegra’s mortgage, Purchasers filed their Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale, alleging that the Bureau erred by: (1) failing to identify Altegra as a lienholder, or serve the Rule to Show Cause on Alteg-ra; and (2) failing to serve prior owner Edward Avosso with the Rule to Show Cause or with notice of the judicial tax sale. In the Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale, Purchasers requested that the sale be declared void and that the Bureau refund $23,128.12 to Purchasers. (R.R. Exhibit H.)
On September 4, 1998, the trial court entered a rale returnable on October 5, 1998. On October 7, 1998, after the Bureau had failed to respond to this rule, Purchasers filed a motion to make the rule absolute. By Order of October 9, 1998, the trial court dismissed Purchasers’ Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale. Reasoning that the Bureau owed no duty to provide title information to purchasers at a judicial sale, (op. at 3), the trial court held that the Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale disclosed “no basis for the
purchaser
at the Judicial Sale to set aside the sale ..(Op. at 2.) (Emphasis in original.)
On appeal,
Purchasers assert three allegations of error. First, they argue that the Bureau’s failure to notify Edward Avosso and Altegra requires that the tax sale be voided. Second, they argue that, because the Bureau’s Petition for Tax Sale was not accompanied by a full and complete title search which identified all lienholders, the Petition for Tax Sale was defective on its face, and the trial court erred in issuing the Rule scheduling the tax sale based on that defective Petition for Tax Sale. Third, Purchasers argue that, because the Bureau did not file an answer to Purchasers’ Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale, the trial court should have granted Purchasers’ October 7, 1998 motion for a rule absolute. However, none of Purchasers’ arguments entitles them to have the tax sale set aside.
The Bureau’s failure to notify the prior owner of the sale
Even if the Bureau failed to notify Edward Avosso of the tax sale, Purchasers lack standing to attack the validity of the tax sale based on that lack of notice. The procedure for contesting tax sales is set out in section 607 of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.607. Under section 607(b), 72 P.S. § 5860.607(b), “owners” or “lien creditors” may file objections or exceptions to a tax sale within thirty days after the court has made a confirmation nisi of the sale. Because here Purchasers were not owners or lien creditors at the time of the tax sale, they lack standing to file objections or exceptions under section 607(b) of the Law.
See In re Kidd,
73 Pa.Cmwlth. 85, 457 A.2d 231 (1983). If no exceptions or objections are timely filed or if they are overruled, the trial court shall enter a decree of absolute confirmation of the sale. Section 607(g) of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.607(g). Here, after finding that no exceptions or objections were filed, the trial court entered a decree of absolute
confirmation of the sale on December 8, 1998.
(O.R. No. 15.)
Once a tax sale has been absolutely confirmed, no person may, by judicial proceedings, inquire into a bureau’s proceedings with respect to the sale, except for the giving of notice under the Law. Section 607(g) of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.607(g). Under section 607(g), after the sale is confirmed absolutely, a successful bidder may file an action to quiet title.
In re Kidd,
24 Pa. D. & C. 3d 528 (1981),
aff'd,
73 Pa.Cmwlth. 85, 457 A.2d 231 (1983). However, section 607(g) does not permit a successful bidder to file a petition to set aside the sale based on a prior owner’s lack of notice of the sale. Only a person who has suffered an injury as a result of the claimed lack of notice may raise it.
See, e.g., C. Everett, Inc. v. Ayres,
22 Pa.Cmwlth. 422, 349 A.2d 514 (1975). Because section 607(b) precludes a successful bidder from raising a prior owner’s lack of notice prior to absolute confirmation of the sale, it necessarily follows that a successful bidder may not raise that same lack of notice after absolute confirmation.
Accordingly, Purchasers first argument must fail.
The Bureau’s failure to identify the mortgagee and notify the mortgagee of the tax sale
For the reasons stated above, Purchasers also lack standing to raise the lack of notice to the mortgagee. Furthermore, failure of notice to a mortgagee does not vitiate a tax sale.
In re Tax Claim Bureau of Lehigh County,
96 Pa.Cmwlth. 452, 507 A.2d 1294 (1986),
appeal denied,
514 Pa. 640, 523 A.2d 346 (1987).
Thus, contrary to Purchaser’s contention, the Bureau’s failure to identify Altegra as a lienholder and to notify Altegra of the judicial tax sale does not require that the sale be set aside. Purchasers contend that the trial court violated sections 610 and 612 of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.610 and § 5860.612, by scheduling the judicial tax sale based upon the Bureau’s title search which did not disclose Altegra’s mortgage. We disagree.
Section 610 of the Law
requires that a bureau’s petition for a tax sale be accompanied by a search showing the state of the record before the court may issue a rule to show cause. Section 612 of the Law
provides that, if the court is satisfied that the facts stated in a bureau’s petition for tax sale are true, the court shall order the sale. Here, the trial court properly ruled that the Bureau owed Purchasers no duty to provide correct and current title information. “Clearly, the Law requires that a search showing all outstanding claims accompany the [bureau’s petition to the trial court....”
Capenos v. Lawrence County Tax Claim Bureau,
149 Pa.Cmwlth. 328, 613 A.2d 112, 115 (1992). The Law does not, however, require that that search be up-to-date as of the date the bureau files its petition for tax sale.
The risk that a tax bureau negligently performed the search or, as here, the risk that title status changed between the time the Bureau performed the search and the date of sale, must be borne by Purchasers. The rule of caveat emptor, i.e. let the buyer beware, applies to property sold at real estate tax sales.
In re Judicial Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Northampton County,
720 A.2d 818 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998). Our legislature has stated unequivocally its intention that the rule apply to such sales:
In all public sales of land hereafter made by the treasurer or commissioners of the several counties of this commonwealth, in pursuance of the laws of this commonwealth the rule of caveat emptor shall apply, except in cases of double assessment, or where the taxes on which the sale is made shall have been previously paid, or where the lands do not lie within the county; and neither said treasurer nor commissioners shall be required to refund the purchase money, costs or taxes paid upon any tract or tracts of land as sold as aforesaid.
Section 1 of the Act of April 21, 1856, P.L. 477,
as amended,
72 P.S. § 5931. It is well settled that land purchased at a tax sale comes with no guarantee of title.
Fulton County v. Tate,
47 Pa. 532 (1864). In
Fulton County,
the county treasurer sued defendants, successful bidders at a tax sale, when defendants failed to pay the bid price after the treasurer tendered the deed to them. Our supreme court gave short shrift to defendants’ argument that they did not have to follow through on their purchase because the property’s title was questionable; the court explained that the “treasurer or a sheriff or other person selling under the authority of the law, guarantees no title.”
Id.
at 534.
Purchasers’ argument would require the bureau and the trial court to be insurers of title, and this is not the law. Here, the trial court was satisfied that the Bureau’s petition was accompanied by a search of the record. The trial court was not required to do more. Any loss incurred by Purchasers results from their own failure to take reasonable steps to protect themselves prior to making their bid at the sale.
See Bankers Trust Co. v. Tax Claim Bureau,
723 A.2d 1092 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999).
Rule Absolute
Finally, Purchasers contend that, because the Bureau did not file an answer to Purchasers’ Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale in response to the Rule to Show Cause, entered on September 4, 1998 and made returnable on October 5, 1998, the trial court was required to enter a rule absolute on Purchasers’ Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale and erred when it did not do so. We disagree.
Pa.R.C.P. No. 206.1 sets out the procedure for rules to show cause.
Pa.R.C.P. No. 206.7(a), which governs the procedure when no answer to the rule is filed, provides that, “(i)f an answer is not filed, all averments of fact in the petition may be deemed admitted for the purposes of this subdivision and the court shall enter an appropriate order.” Significantly, that rule does not require that the court enter a rule absolute.
Here, the trial court’s decision not to make the rule absolute comported with Pa.R.C.P. No. 206.7. The trial court deemed admitted all of the
facts
of Purchaser’s Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale - the salient facts being the Bureau’s failure to identify Altegra’s mortgage interest in the property and the Bureau’s failure to notify Altegra or Edward Avosso of the judicial tax sale. Purchasers argue that the trial court should have treated their contention that the tax sale was void, which is a legal conclusion, in the same fashion. We disagree. The lack of a responsive pleading, where required, to a rule to show cause results only in the admission of factual averments, not legal conclusions.
Michener v. Montgomery County Tax Claim Bureau,
671 A.2d 285 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996).
By directing the court to enter “an appropriate order,” Rule 206.7 grants the trial court discretion to determine whether it is appropriate to make the rule absolute. Here, based upon the admitted facts of the Petition to Set Aside the Tax Sale, the trial court entered “an appropriate order.” The trial court properly found that, despite the deemed admitted facts, the law applying to real estate tax sales did not entitle Purchasers to have the tax sale declared void. Thus, the trial court was not required to make the Rule absolute.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of July, 1999, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, dated October 9, 1998, is hereby affirmed.