Placer County Water Agency v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: July 8, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00483
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PLACER COUNTY WATER AGENCY, No. 2:25-cv-0483-TLN-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to various Requests 19 for Production of Documents (“RFP”). ECF No. 19. The motion is before the undersigned 20 pursuant to Local Rule 302(b)(1). The parties submitted a joint statement on June 17, 2026 (ECF 21 No. 23), and the Court heard oral arguments on July 2, 2026. The Court now issues the following 22 order. 23 INTRODUCTION 24 This is an insurance dispute action concerning the aftermath of the Mosquito Fire of 2022. 25 This case was initially filed in the Placer County Superior Court before removal to this Court on 26 February 7, 2025. ECF No. 1. The complaint asserts that Defendant National Union Fire 27 Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”), which insures Plaintiff Placer County 28 Water Agency (“PCWA”), failed to defend PCWA when it was named a cross-defendant in 1 Placer County Water Agency v. Pacific Gas & Electric, San Francisco County Superior Court, 2 Case No. CJC-23-005272 (“PCWA I”).1 ECF No. 1-4 at 2-3. Defendant National Union invoked 3 a “Failure to Supply” exclusion in the insurance policy, which Plaintiff argues is inapplicable. 4 ECF No. 1-4 at 3. This exclusion was based on the fact that Defendant read cross-claimant 5 PG&E’s claims as being linked to PCWA’s alleged failure to adequately supply electricity. Id. at 6 7. Plaintiff responded that because PCWA does not supply electricity, the damages at issue could 7 not have arisen out of a purported failure to provide adequate electricity, which PG&E never 8 alleged anyway. Id. The cross-complaint instead alleges that PCWA’s failure to maintain and 9 repair its equipment, particularly circuit breaker 32, was a “substantial cause of the Mosquito 10 Fire.” Id. at 8. Defendant responded that under the insurance policy, there was no difference 11 between generating and supplying energy to the region for purposes of invoking the exclusion. 12 Id. Plaintiff disagrees and therefore seeks $2,000,000 for the defense fees and costs pertaining to 13 the cross-complaint, plus interest and punitive damages, based on claims for breach of contract, 14 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief. Id. at 9-12. 15 Defendant propounded the RFPs at issue in late 2025, after which the parties met and 16 conferred to narrow their scope. ECF No. 23 at 2. Plaintiff propounded initial responses on 17 February 25, 2026, and supplemental responses on March 5 and 26, 2026. Id. In between each 18 round of productions, Defendant informed Plaintiff of significant purported gaps like “the 19 absence of underlying litigation documents, PCWA operational materials, documents supporting 20 Plaintiff’s allegations, mediation and settlement materials, relevant contracts and agreements, and 21 billing invoices.” Id. On April 29, 2026, Plaintiff affirmed that it continued to object to the RFPs 22 discussed in this order. 23 LEGAL STANDARD 24 As a general rule, discovery may be obtained regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is 25 relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. 26 P. 26(b)(1). Courts can limit discovery when: 27 1 That case was originally filed in Placer County Superior Court before being coordinated with 28 other state court actions concerning the Mosquito Fire. 1 (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, 2 or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the 3 information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1). 4 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 6 RFPs ask a party to “produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to 7 inspect, copy, test, or sample … items in the responding party’s possession, custody, or 8 control[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). For such purposes, documents are in the responding party’s 9 “control” if the party has “the legal right, authority, or practical ability to obtain the materials 10 sought upon demand[,]” as from an affiliate corporation. U.S. Intern. Trade Commission v. 11 ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Camden Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Marubeni 12 America Corp., 138 F.R.D. 438, 441 (D.N.J. 1991)); SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 194 F.R.D. 13 469, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 14 Discoverable documents include “any designated documents or electronically stored 15 information … stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, 16 if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form[.]” Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A). In general, however, a party need not produce electronically stored 18 information from sources that are “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). If the responding party shows this to be the case, the court may still 20 order discovery and set conditions thereof if the propounding party shows good cause, in light of 21 the limitations in Rule 26(b)(2)(C). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 22 Any objections to a request must state whether any responsive materials were withheld as 23 a result, and the propounding party must permit inspection of any responsive documents not 24 withheld based on such objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 25 A propounding party may move for an order compelling a party to answer an 26 interrogatory or produce documents responsive to an RFP if it fails to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 27 37(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv). 28 //// 1 ANALYSIS 2 A. RFPs for all Discovery Documents in PCWA I (RFP Nos. 1-4) 3 In broad terms, RFP Nos. 1-4 initially sought all filings, discovery requests and responses 4 thereto, produced documents, and deposition transcripts from PCWA I. ECF No. 23 at 5-7. 5 Defendant subsequently agreed to limit the scope of each RFP in an October 3, 2025 email. Id. 6 For example, RFP No. 2’s request for all documents filed in PCWA I was limited to unredacted 7 versions of documents that are redacted on the public docket for the case. Id. at 6. RFP No. 4’s 8 request for deposition transcripts and exhibits was limited to a list of deponents, aside from 9 individual plaintiffs in the action, and their affiliations or roles. Id. at 7. 10 Despite the narrowing in scope, Plaintiff continued to object that these RFPs are 11 overbroad, burdensome, part of “a fishing expedition” unlikely to bolster any claim or defense, 12 and would require productions of documents designated as Confidential pursuant to PCWA I’s 13 Protective Order. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff clarified at the hearing that although its production in 14 response to other RFPs would necessarily have included documents responsive to these RFPs, it 15 has not provided Defendant with a list of such responsive documents. Plaintiff further argued that 16 without “targeted requests” based on a more concrete description of what Defendant hopes to 17 gain from such production, it cannot determine the appropriate scope of production. See ECF No. 18 23 at 11. 19 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it cannot order production to the extent that it would 20 violate the Protective Order in PCWA I. This only applies to production PCWA received from 21 other parties, however, and not to production that PCWA made in response to others’ discovery 22 requests. See ECF No. 23 at 11. Plaintiff has admitted to not producing all the documents it 23 produced in PCWA I. Meanwhile, Defendant is amenable in the abstract to subpoenaing PG&E 24 for its document production, or to having PCWA move for a modification of the Protective Order 25 by the court in PCWA I to permit PCWA to produce other parties’ documents in this action.2 26 //// 27

28 2 Such production would then be subject to the Protective Order in this action. 1 To the extent that PCWA was the party who produced documents in PCWA I that it has 2 not produced here, it argues that some of this information is confidential as a matter of state law. 3 ECF No. 23 at 10. Some of the information, for example, concerns Critical Energy/Electric 4 Infrastructure Information (“CEII”), the disclosure of which is strictly regulated to guard against 5 any attacks on infrastructure. Id. (citing 18 C.F.R. § 388.113). As for the deponents in PCWA I, 6 many of whom are living in the same community as those harmed by the Mosquito Fire, 7 disclosure of their personal identifying information (“PII”) could expose them to retaliation by 8 those who blame them for the damage. ECF No. 23 at 10. 9 The Court finds these concerns may be legitimate and believes that a partial disclosure of 10 the information discussed at the hearing would permit Defendant to craft more precise discovery 11 requests for Plaintiff or better justify its subpoena to PG&E. Accordingly, PCWA shall produce 12 (1) all discovery requests it propounded on other parties in PCWA I, (2) all discovery requests that 13 PG&E propounded on PCWA, and (3) all written responses thereto (i.e., all written responses to 14 discovery it propounded and all of its own written responses), except it may redact any CEII 15 contained within those responses. As to RFP No. 4, Plaintiff shall produce a list of the deponents, 16 which may exclude individual PCWA I plaintiffs pursuant to Defendants’ October 2025 17 modification. Following Defendant’s review of this production, the parties shall meet and confer 18 as to whether additional production—for example, documents produced in response to RFPs in 19 PCWA I—is appropriate to support specific theories of liability or affirmative defenses. These 20 partial disclosures shall be made within fourteen days of this order. The parties are informed that 21 any further dispute in relation to the disputed RFPs may be set through an informal discovery 22 conference (“IDC”) before the undersigned. 23 B. Response to the PCWA I Cross-Complaint (RFP No. 9) 24 RFP No. 9 asks for “[a]ll DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS, including internal 25 and external, RELATING TO the allegations” in select paragraphs of the April 24, 2024 cross- 26 complaint. ECF No. 23 at 11-12. Aside from repeating objections pertaining to the scope of the 27 RFP and its implications for the PCWA I Protective Order (see supra A), Plaintiff argued that 28 these documents were privileged, concerned documents Defendant should have obtained before 1 denying coverage, and requires Plaintiff to guess at PG&E’s factual basis for each allegation as 2 issue. ECF No. 23 at 11-12. Plaintiff further noted that the RFP cited a version of the cross- 3 complaint that was no longer operative as of the propoundment of the RFPs. 4 None of these justified Plaintiff’s complete lack of production. Although the Complaint 5 in this action asserts that the PCWA I cross-complaint was amended on July 26, 2024, it also 6 asserts that by then Defendant had invoked the Failure to Supply exclusion in two separate letters. 7 ECF No. 1-4 at 6-7. Whether the cross claims in fact fell under this exclusion at the time is 8 separate from whether Defendant performed its due diligence in so deciding. Both are relevant to 9 this action. 10 As to the nature of PG&E’s allegations, Plaintiff argued at the hearing that many of these 11 were unintelligible, conclusory, or generally reflected factual disputes between the parties. See 12 ECF No. 23 at 15 (noting the work required to respond to the RFP as to any one allegation in the 13 PCWA I cross-complaint “even when Plaintiff maintains there is no evidentiary basis for the 14 underlying allegations[.]”) In so arguing, Plaintiff seems to believe that by responding to this 15 RFP, it would be conceding the truth of these allegations. However, the term “relating to” 16 implicates documents that refute a particular point as well as those that support it. Plaintiff would 17 satisfy its duty to respond to the RFP by producing documents that contradict the allegations in 18 the cross-complaint, where intelligible. If, alternatively, Plaintiff believes that any specific 19 allegation is either too broad and conclusory to enable such a response or is so divorced from 20 reality as to not have any relevant documents, it may stand on that argument as to those 21 allegations only. 22 Plaintiff is hereby ordered to provide a supplemental response and produce documents 23 either supporting or refuting the allegations in paragraphs 6-13 and 34-53 of PG&E’s original 24 PCWA I cross-complaint, or alternatively to articulate why this is impossible as to specific 25 allegations. This supplemental response and additional production shall be made within 28 days 26 of this order. 27 //// 28 //// 1 C. The Word “Supply” (RFP No. 10) 2 RFP No. 10 seeks all documents and communications that used the word “supply” and 3 variations thereof in connection with the Middle Fork American River Project. ECF No. 23 at 12. 4 This is the one RFP for which Plaintiff’s objection as to the scope has merit. Between discovery 5 responses and the hearing, Plaintiff argued that as a water county agency specializing in 6 hydroelectricity, most of its documents would contain some variation of the word “supply[.]” See 7 ECF No. 23 at 12, 15-16. Both to reduce the burden on Plaintiff and to make any production 8 more useful and targeted for Defendant, it is clear that further limitations on this RFP are 9 necessary. 10 The parties are ordered to meet and confer on how they can narrow the scope of 11 documents responsive to RFP No. 10. Options include, but are not limited to, identifying specific 12 PCWA custodians of records who must search for documents within specific archives, or adding 13 keywords that documents must include aside from “supply” in order to be responsive. As with 14 RFP Nos. 1-4 (see supra A), the parties are invited to ask for further guidance through IDC if 15 necessary. 16 D. PCWA’s Cross-Complaint Allegation (RFP No. 40) 17 Plaintiff cross-complaint in PCWA I, filed December 20, 2022, asserts that “[o]n 18 September 6, 2022, PCWA’s critical supply of clean energy to Placer County residents ceased 19 when a massive wildfire, dubbed the Mosquito Fire, erupted in Placer County, causing 20 devastating harm to PCWA – and consequently many Placer County residents.” ECF No. 23-1 at 21 3. RFP No 40 asks for any documents relating to this allegation. ECF No. 23 at 16. Without 22 producing any documents, Plaintiff eventually responded that this fire “caused damage to 23 transmission facilities owned by PG&E” and made it impossible “to transmit energy generated by 24 PCWA into the CAISO-controlled transmission system[.]” Id. 25 Plaintiff argued at the hearing that this is in effect a Request for Admission of the 26 allegation in that paragraph of the cross-complaint, insofar as Defendant now asks Plaintiff to 27 support it. As discussed above, however, “relating to” is not limited to documents affirming the 28 validity of the statement. See supra B. Regardless, it is not clear why Plaintiff should not have to 1 produce documents to substantiate its own allegation in PCWA I. 2 Both in the joint statement and at the hearing, Plaintiff argues that it has produced 3 documents confirming its inability “to participate in energy markets as a result of the Mosquito 4 Fire [.]” RFP No. 23 at 18. It also explained, however, that this production was in response to 5 other RFPs with no indication that these documents were also responsive to RFP No. 40. 6 Defendant should not be required to guess at the factual and evidentiary overlap between different 7 discovery requests and responses. 8 Plaintiff is ordered to provide Defendant with a list of all documents produced thus far, by 9 Bates stamp number, that are also responsive to RFP No. 40. The parties are subsequently 10 ordered to meet and confer as to whether further production under this RFP is necessary, 11 including but not limited to a privilege log to justify any withheld documents or redactions. 12 E. Privilege as to Invoices (RFP No. 41) 13 Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has over-redacted attorneys’ fees invoices from 14 Buchalter, its litigation counsel in PCWA I. Plaintiff seeks compensation for those fees as 15 damages in the present action. An example of a heavily-redacted invoice from Buchalter to 16 Plaintiff is attached to the Joint Statement. ECF No. 23-6 (Attachment F). The information 17 Buchalter included in that and other invoices may be protected under the attorney-client privilege. 18 “To the extent that [such] billing information is conveyed ‘for the purpose of legal representation’ 19 – perhaps to inform the client of the nature or amount of work occurring in connection with a 20 pending legal issue – such information lies in the heartland of the attorney-client privilege.” AIG 21 Specialty Ins. Co. v. TRC Companies, Inc., No. CV 23-6413-FLA (EX), 2024 WL 5365052, at *1 22 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2024) (citation omitted). There is inconsistency in the case law as to whether 23 a plaintiff seeking to recover attorneys’ fees in a coverage dispute makes an implied waiver of 24 attorney-client privilege over relevant invoices or merely places “in issue” such records, without 25 effecting a waiver. Contrast id. (finding no waiver but finding records may be placed “in issue”), 26 with Byers v. Superior Ct., 101 Cal. App. 5th 1003, 1013 (2024) (finding implied waiver). 27 Regardless of whether there has been a waiver of the privilege, the redactions to ECF No. 28 23-6 are excessive. In their current form, they prevent Defendant from determining whether “the 1 | work performed ... falls within potentially recoverable versus non-recoverable charges,” and 2 || whether the charges “were reasonable and necessary.” Moore v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. CV 16- 3 || 2466-AB (PLA), 2017 WL 10605923, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2017) (citation omitted); see also 4 | Luna v. Sears Life Ins., No. 06cv2653 DMS (CAB), 2008 WL 2484596, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 5 || 2008) (“[p]laintiff cannot request attorneys’ fees and simultaneously argue the information 6 || supporting the claim is protected”) (citation omitted). Should Plaintiff wish to maintain its 7 || contention that the Buchalter invoices contain privileged information, the Court will require 8 | Plaintiff to (1) review all responsive billing invoices, (2) reproduce such invoices in a minimally 9 || redacted form, such that only information that is privileged is redacted, and (3) produce a 10 | privilege log that includes, beyond the conventional components of a privilege log, as to each 11 || redacted time entry (a) a notation as to whether such entry involved time spent on PG&E’s 12 || counter-claim against PCWA and (b) the general nature of the work done under such entry. 13 | Within 28 days of the date of this order, Plaintiff shall make a supplemental response and 14 | production consistent with this portion of the order. 15 IT is SO ORDERED. 16 | DATED: July 8, 2026

18 SEAN C. RIORDAN 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28