[Cite as P.L. v. M.C., 2024-Ohio-5238.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
P.L. : : Appellee : C.A. No. 30139 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 02245 : M.C. : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on November 1, 2024
M.C., Pro Se Appellant
P.L., Pro Se Appellee
.............
WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, M.C., appeals pro se from a judgment granting a civil
stalking protection order (“CSPO”) in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, P.L. According to M.C.,
the judgment was based on false statements, and no evidence was submitted to support -2-
the accusations against her. However, because M.C. failed to file objections to the
magistrate’s decision, we cannot consider her arguments. The judgment of the trial court
will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On April 17, 2024, P.L. filed a petition in the trial court seeking a CSPO
against M.C. In the petition, P.L. alleged that M.C. had threatened her with violence on
April 13, 2024, and had then physically attacked P.L. and P.L.’s cousin on April 16, 2024.
P.L. further alleged that M.C. had caused her to have two mini-strokes and multiple panic
attacks. After issuing an ex parte CSPO, the magistrate set a full hearing for May 2,
2024. The case was then consolidated with another case involving an ex parte
protection order against M.C. See T.A. v. M.C., Montgomery C.P. No. 2024 CV 02242.
{¶ 3} Following the full hearing at which both P.L. and M.C. were present, the
magistrate filed a final CSPO, to be effective from May 3, 2024, until April 16, 2026.
According to the findings of fact, the magistrate concluded that P.L.’s testimony was more
credible than M.C.’s. The magistrate further found that M.C. had “knowingly engaged in
a pattern of conduct being defined as two or more instances close in time,” and that P.L.
reasonably feared being physically harmed by M.C. CSPO (May 6, 2024), p. 2. The
trial judge then signed the CSPO. M.C. did not file objections to the magistrate’s
decision; instead, M.C. filed a notice of appeal with our court on May 9, 2024. Shortly
thereafter, we issued an order setting deadlines for the appeal. We also instructed the
parties to address whether relief could be granted due to the apparent lack of objections -3-
to the magistrate’s decision. See Order (May 31, 2024), p. 2.
{¶ 4} After receiving an extension of time to file her brief, M.C. filed a pro se
document on July 5, 2024. This document says (verbatim): “Now comes [M.C.], and
hereby gives notice that he/she is appealing . . . THE CIVIL STALKING ORDER JUDGES
DECISION entered by said trial court on the MAY2ND of 2024, to the Second District
Court of Appeals.” The document also contains a handwritten caption labeled: “Briefs.”
As noted, the rest of the document asserts that there were false statements and a lack of
evidence to support the trial court’s decision. In light of the “brief’s” content, we find that
M.C. failed to comply with our May 31, 2024 order, which required her to address her lack
of objections to the magistrate’s decision.
{¶ 5} On July 31, 2024, we issued a show cause order to Appellee, P.L., because
the time for filing her brief had expired. We ordered P.L. to either file a brief or show
cause why we should not submit the matter without her brief. Because P.L. failed to
respond to the show cause order, the case has now been submitted for decision.
{¶ 6} Requests for CSPOs are controlled by statute and a specific Ohio Civil Rule.
Under R.C. 2903.214(C), a person may seek a protection order against anyone over the
age of 18 who has engaged in menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211. That
particular criminal offense (menacing by stalking) includes “engaging in a pattern of
conduct” that knowingly causes “another person to believe that the offender will cause
physical harm to the other person . . . or cause mental distress to the other person. . . .”
R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).
{¶ 7} Civ.R. 65.1, which governs civil protection orders, allows trial courts to refer -4-
the special statutory proceeding in R.C. 2903.214 to magistrates. See R.C. 65.1(F)(1).
If a matter is referred for a full hearing and decision, “the magistrate shall conduct the full
hearing and, upon conclusion of the hearing, deny or grant a protection order.” Civ.R.
65(F)(3)(a). Further, the rule states that “[a] magistrate’s denial or granting of a
protection order after a full hearing shall comply with the statutory requirements relating
to such orders and is not effective unless adopted by the court.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(i).
“When a magistrate has denied or granted a protection order after a full hearing, the court
may adopt the magistrate's denial or granting of the protection order upon review of the
order and a determination that there is no error of law or other defect evident on the face
of the order.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(ii). In addition, “[a] court's adoption . . . of a
magistrate's denial or granting of a protection order after a full hearing shall be effective
when signed by the court and filed with the clerk.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(v).
{¶ 8} As to objections, the rule also provides that “[a] party may file written
objections to a court's adoption, modification, or rejection of a magistrate's denial or
granting of a protection order after a full hearing, or any terms of such an order, within
fourteen days of the court's filing of the order. . . .” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). An objecting
party “has the burden of showing that an error of law or other defect is evident on the face
of the order, or that the credible evidence of record is insufficient to support the granting
or denial of the protection order, or that the magistrate abused the magistrate's discretion
in including or failing to include specific terms in the protection order.” Civ.R.
65.1(F)(3)(d)(iii).
{¶ 9} Regarding the objections, Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iv) additionally says that: -5-
Objections based upon evidence of record shall be supported by a transcript
of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate or an affidavit of that
evidence if a transcript is not available. . . . The objecting party shall file the
transcript or affidavit with the court within thirty days after filing objections
unless the court extends the time in writing for preparation of the transcript
or other good cause. . . .
{¶ 10} Most importantly, the rule stresses that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule, an order entered by the
court under division (F)(3)(c) . . . of this rule is a final, appealable order.
However, a party must timely file objections to such an order under division
(F)(3)(d) of this rule prior to filing an appeal, and the timely filing of such
objections shall stay the running of the time for appeal until the filing of the
court's ruling on the objections.
(Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 65.1(G).
{¶ 11} In 2016, Civ.R. 65.1 was amended “to preclude challenges to civil protection
orders when an appellant fails to object to a trial court decision.” Curry v. Bettison, 2023-
Ohio-1911, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). As noted, M.C. filed this appeal shortly after the court
adopted the magistrate’s decision granting the CSPO, and M.C. did not file objections in
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[Cite as P.L. v. M.C., 2024-Ohio-5238.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
P.L. : : Appellee : C.A. No. 30139 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 02245 : M.C. : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on November 1, 2024
M.C., Pro Se Appellant
P.L., Pro Se Appellee
.............
WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, M.C., appeals pro se from a judgment granting a civil
stalking protection order (“CSPO”) in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, P.L. According to M.C.,
the judgment was based on false statements, and no evidence was submitted to support -2-
the accusations against her. However, because M.C. failed to file objections to the
magistrate’s decision, we cannot consider her arguments. The judgment of the trial court
will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On April 17, 2024, P.L. filed a petition in the trial court seeking a CSPO
against M.C. In the petition, P.L. alleged that M.C. had threatened her with violence on
April 13, 2024, and had then physically attacked P.L. and P.L.’s cousin on April 16, 2024.
P.L. further alleged that M.C. had caused her to have two mini-strokes and multiple panic
attacks. After issuing an ex parte CSPO, the magistrate set a full hearing for May 2,
2024. The case was then consolidated with another case involving an ex parte
protection order against M.C. See T.A. v. M.C., Montgomery C.P. No. 2024 CV 02242.
{¶ 3} Following the full hearing at which both P.L. and M.C. were present, the
magistrate filed a final CSPO, to be effective from May 3, 2024, until April 16, 2026.
According to the findings of fact, the magistrate concluded that P.L.’s testimony was more
credible than M.C.’s. The magistrate further found that M.C. had “knowingly engaged in
a pattern of conduct being defined as two or more instances close in time,” and that P.L.
reasonably feared being physically harmed by M.C. CSPO (May 6, 2024), p. 2. The
trial judge then signed the CSPO. M.C. did not file objections to the magistrate’s
decision; instead, M.C. filed a notice of appeal with our court on May 9, 2024. Shortly
thereafter, we issued an order setting deadlines for the appeal. We also instructed the
parties to address whether relief could be granted due to the apparent lack of objections -3-
to the magistrate’s decision. See Order (May 31, 2024), p. 2.
{¶ 4} After receiving an extension of time to file her brief, M.C. filed a pro se
document on July 5, 2024. This document says (verbatim): “Now comes [M.C.], and
hereby gives notice that he/she is appealing . . . THE CIVIL STALKING ORDER JUDGES
DECISION entered by said trial court on the MAY2ND of 2024, to the Second District
Court of Appeals.” The document also contains a handwritten caption labeled: “Briefs.”
As noted, the rest of the document asserts that there were false statements and a lack of
evidence to support the trial court’s decision. In light of the “brief’s” content, we find that
M.C. failed to comply with our May 31, 2024 order, which required her to address her lack
of objections to the magistrate’s decision.
{¶ 5} On July 31, 2024, we issued a show cause order to Appellee, P.L., because
the time for filing her brief had expired. We ordered P.L. to either file a brief or show
cause why we should not submit the matter without her brief. Because P.L. failed to
respond to the show cause order, the case has now been submitted for decision.
{¶ 6} Requests for CSPOs are controlled by statute and a specific Ohio Civil Rule.
Under R.C. 2903.214(C), a person may seek a protection order against anyone over the
age of 18 who has engaged in menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211. That
particular criminal offense (menacing by stalking) includes “engaging in a pattern of
conduct” that knowingly causes “another person to believe that the offender will cause
physical harm to the other person . . . or cause mental distress to the other person. . . .”
R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).
{¶ 7} Civ.R. 65.1, which governs civil protection orders, allows trial courts to refer -4-
the special statutory proceeding in R.C. 2903.214 to magistrates. See R.C. 65.1(F)(1).
If a matter is referred for a full hearing and decision, “the magistrate shall conduct the full
hearing and, upon conclusion of the hearing, deny or grant a protection order.” Civ.R.
65(F)(3)(a). Further, the rule states that “[a] magistrate’s denial or granting of a
protection order after a full hearing shall comply with the statutory requirements relating
to such orders and is not effective unless adopted by the court.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(i).
“When a magistrate has denied or granted a protection order after a full hearing, the court
may adopt the magistrate's denial or granting of the protection order upon review of the
order and a determination that there is no error of law or other defect evident on the face
of the order.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(ii). In addition, “[a] court's adoption . . . of a
magistrate's denial or granting of a protection order after a full hearing shall be effective
when signed by the court and filed with the clerk.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(v).
{¶ 8} As to objections, the rule also provides that “[a] party may file written
objections to a court's adoption, modification, or rejection of a magistrate's denial or
granting of a protection order after a full hearing, or any terms of such an order, within
fourteen days of the court's filing of the order. . . .” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). An objecting
party “has the burden of showing that an error of law or other defect is evident on the face
of the order, or that the credible evidence of record is insufficient to support the granting
or denial of the protection order, or that the magistrate abused the magistrate's discretion
in including or failing to include specific terms in the protection order.” Civ.R.
65.1(F)(3)(d)(iii).
{¶ 9} Regarding the objections, Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iv) additionally says that: -5-
Objections based upon evidence of record shall be supported by a transcript
of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate or an affidavit of that
evidence if a transcript is not available. . . . The objecting party shall file the
transcript or affidavit with the court within thirty days after filing objections
unless the court extends the time in writing for preparation of the transcript
or other good cause. . . .
{¶ 10} Most importantly, the rule stresses that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule, an order entered by the
court under division (F)(3)(c) . . . of this rule is a final, appealable order.
However, a party must timely file objections to such an order under division
(F)(3)(d) of this rule prior to filing an appeal, and the timely filing of such
objections shall stay the running of the time for appeal until the filing of the
court's ruling on the objections.
(Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 65.1(G).
{¶ 11} In 2016, Civ.R. 65.1 was amended “to preclude challenges to civil protection
orders when an appellant fails to object to a trial court decision.” Curry v. Bettison, 2023-
Ohio-1911, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). As noted, M.C. filed this appeal shortly after the court
adopted the magistrate’s decision granting the CSPO, and M.C. did not file objections in
the trial court as required.
{¶ 12} Curry further discussed whether a plain error analysis applies in these
situations, noting that “Civ.R. 65.1, unlike Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), does not provide for plain
error review where a party fails to object to a decision in the trial court.” Id. at ¶ 2. After -6-
considering the rules in detail, Curry clarified and summarized the analysis that should
occur in Civ.R. 65.1 appeals. The required analysis is as follows:
(1) where litigants fail to comply with Civ.R. 65.1(G)'s requirement of filing
of objections, they cannot challenge the trial court's decision on appeal, and
the decision must be affirmed; (2) no issues that are raised, whether they
are phrased as error or plain error, can be considered; (3) this court should
not engage in any analysis that directly or indirectly involves the merits of
the trial court order; (4) where a litigant has objected in the trial court as
specified by Civ.R. 65.1, this court retains the ability to consider error that
is raised on appeal, including plain error, if the latter type of error is raised
by a party. . . ; and (5) when a party fails to file objections, the court of
appeals cannot consider or cite the content of the transcript.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 67.
{¶ 13} Because M.C. failed to file objections in the trial court before appealing, we
are precluded from considering her arguments. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
EPLEY, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.