10‐3586‐cv P.J., et al. v. CT Board of Ed., et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 3 City of New York, on the 23rd day of December, two thousand thirteen. 4 5 Present: 6 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 8 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 9 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 P.J., By & Through His Parents & Next 14 Friends Mr. & Mrs. W. J., et al., 15 16 Plaintiffs‐Appellants, No. 10‐3586‐cv 17 18 IAN IAN KATZ, by and through his parents and 19 next friends Mr. and Mrs. Mark Katz, et al., 20 21 Intervenors‐Plaintiffs‐ 22 Appellants, 23 1 v. 2 3 CT BOARD OF ED., EDUCATION, DEPT OF, 4 TIROZZI, GERALD, COMM., 5 6 Defendants‐Appellees. 7 _____________________________________ 8 9 For Plaintiffs‐Appellants: DAVID C. SHAW, Bloomfield, CT. 10 11 For Defendants‐Appellees: DARREN P. CUNNINGHAM, Assistant 12 Attorney General, for George Jepsen, 13 Attorney General of the State of 14 Connecticut, Hartford, CT. 15 16 Appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the District of
17 Connecticut (Robert N. Chatigny, J.) denying Appellants’ motion to compel
18 discovery and motion alleging substantial noncompliance.
19 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
20 AND DECREED that the orders of the district court are AFFIRMED.
21 In 2002, the parties to this action entered into a settlement agreement (the
22 “Agreement”) concerning Appellees’ alleged noncompliance with the Individuals
23 with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The Agreement
24 enumerated five goals intended to encourage Appellees’ compliance with IDEA as
25 it concerned students with “intellectual disabilities.” These goals were to “increase
2 1 . . . the percent” of students with intellectual disabilities placed in regular classes,
2 “reduc[e]” the discriminatory identification of students with intellectual disabilities,
3 “increase . . . the mean and median percent of the school day ” students with
4 intellectual disabilities spent with non‐disabled students, “increase . . . the percent”
5 of students with intellectual disabilities who attended the school they would attend
6 if not disabled, and “increase . . . the percent” of students with intellectual
7 disabilities who participated in extra‐curricular activities with non‐disabled
8 students. The Agreement also contained a number of provisions to facilitate
9 realization of the Agreement’s goals, including monitoring and parental outreach
10 requirements, and a section concerning the establishment of an expert advisory
11 panel. The Agreement finally provided that the district court would retain
12 jurisdiction “for enforcement” of the Agreement for five years, but limited the
13 court’s jurisdiction to reviewing “motions for substantial non‐compliance” in the
14 subsequent three years. The court’s jurisdiction would end after eight years, that is,
15 in 2010.
16 In 2009, Appellants filed a motion asserting that Appellees were in substantial
17 noncompliance with the Agreement.1 Appellants also sought discovery to press
1 Appellants filed their initial motion asserting substantial noncompliance in 2008, but the motion was denied “for administrative purposes” without prejudice to refiling. See, e.g., P.J., et al. v. Education, et al., No. 91 Civ. 180 (RNC) (D. Conn.), Doc. No. 571.
3 1 their claim. The district court denied Appellants’ motion to compel discovery,
2 finding that the Agreement only required Appellees to provide“existing data” in its
3 final three years. See P.J., et al., No. 91 Civ. 180 (D. Conn.), Doc. No. 593. The district
4 court later denied Appellants’ motions asserting substantial noncompliance on the
5 ground that Appellants failed to establish that Appellees had frustrated the essential
6 purposes of the Agreement. Id., Doc. Nos. 686, 706; see also Joseph A. by Wolfe v. New
7 Mexico Dep’t of Human Servs., 69 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he touchstone
8 of the substantial compliance inquiry is whether Defendants frustrated the purpose
9 of the consent decree — i.e. its essential requirements.”). Appellants now argue that
10 the district court erred in declining to order discovery and that it incorrectly applied
11 the standard announced in Joseph A. for finding substantial noncompliance. We
12 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
13 the case, and issues on appeal.
14 * * *
15 The Agreement operates as a consent decree given the district court’s
16 continuing jurisdiction over it. See Perez v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d
17 143, 151‐52 (2d Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, the ordinary rules of contract interpretation
18 apply. That is, when the language of a decree is unambiguous, deference is paid to
4 1 its plain meaning. When the language is ambiguous, however, a court may consider
2 extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc.,
3 683 F.3d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 2012). Finally, the rules of contract interpretation “do not
4 contemplate considering any provision of the contract in isolation but in the light of
5 the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby.”
6 United States ex rel. Anti‐Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester
7 Cnty., 712 F.3d 761, 767 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
8 considering a district court’s interpretation of the terms of a consent decree, we
9 review conclusions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Broad. Music,
10 Inc., 683 F.3d at 43.
11 Following a review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that
12 Appellants failed to establish that Appellees were in substantial noncompliance with
13 the Agreement for largely the reasons set forth by the district court. Contrary to
14 Appellants’ argument, it is plain that the essential purposes of the Agreement were
15 limited to the five goals set forth in Section II. As an initial matter, Section II is
16 entitled “Goals and Outcomes.” To find that each section of the Agreement
17 contained “essential purposes” would be to ignore that terminology. Further, while
18 the other sections of the Agreement outline specific steps for Appellees to undertake,
5 1 each of those steps supports the realization of the goals in Section II; none is an end
2 in and of itself.
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10‐3586‐cv P.J., et al. v. CT Board of Ed., et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 3 City of New York, on the 23rd day of December, two thousand thirteen. 4 5 Present: 6 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 8 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 9 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 P.J., By & Through His Parents & Next 14 Friends Mr. & Mrs. W. J., et al., 15 16 Plaintiffs‐Appellants, No. 10‐3586‐cv 17 18 IAN IAN KATZ, by and through his parents and 19 next friends Mr. and Mrs. Mark Katz, et al., 20 21 Intervenors‐Plaintiffs‐ 22 Appellants, 23 1 v. 2 3 CT BOARD OF ED., EDUCATION, DEPT OF, 4 TIROZZI, GERALD, COMM., 5 6 Defendants‐Appellees. 7 _____________________________________ 8 9 For Plaintiffs‐Appellants: DAVID C. SHAW, Bloomfield, CT. 10 11 For Defendants‐Appellees: DARREN P. CUNNINGHAM, Assistant 12 Attorney General, for George Jepsen, 13 Attorney General of the State of 14 Connecticut, Hartford, CT. 15 16 Appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the District of
17 Connecticut (Robert N. Chatigny, J.) denying Appellants’ motion to compel
18 discovery and motion alleging substantial noncompliance.
19 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
20 AND DECREED that the orders of the district court are AFFIRMED.
21 In 2002, the parties to this action entered into a settlement agreement (the
22 “Agreement”) concerning Appellees’ alleged noncompliance with the Individuals
23 with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The Agreement
24 enumerated five goals intended to encourage Appellees’ compliance with IDEA as
25 it concerned students with “intellectual disabilities.” These goals were to “increase
2 1 . . . the percent” of students with intellectual disabilities placed in regular classes,
2 “reduc[e]” the discriminatory identification of students with intellectual disabilities,
3 “increase . . . the mean and median percent of the school day ” students with
4 intellectual disabilities spent with non‐disabled students, “increase . . . the percent”
5 of students with intellectual disabilities who attended the school they would attend
6 if not disabled, and “increase . . . the percent” of students with intellectual
7 disabilities who participated in extra‐curricular activities with non‐disabled
8 students. The Agreement also contained a number of provisions to facilitate
9 realization of the Agreement’s goals, including monitoring and parental outreach
10 requirements, and a section concerning the establishment of an expert advisory
11 panel. The Agreement finally provided that the district court would retain
12 jurisdiction “for enforcement” of the Agreement for five years, but limited the
13 court’s jurisdiction to reviewing “motions for substantial non‐compliance” in the
14 subsequent three years. The court’s jurisdiction would end after eight years, that is,
15 in 2010.
16 In 2009, Appellants filed a motion asserting that Appellees were in substantial
17 noncompliance with the Agreement.1 Appellants also sought discovery to press
1 Appellants filed their initial motion asserting substantial noncompliance in 2008, but the motion was denied “for administrative purposes” without prejudice to refiling. See, e.g., P.J., et al. v. Education, et al., No. 91 Civ. 180 (RNC) (D. Conn.), Doc. No. 571.
3 1 their claim. The district court denied Appellants’ motion to compel discovery,
2 finding that the Agreement only required Appellees to provide“existing data” in its
3 final three years. See P.J., et al., No. 91 Civ. 180 (D. Conn.), Doc. No. 593. The district
4 court later denied Appellants’ motions asserting substantial noncompliance on the
5 ground that Appellants failed to establish that Appellees had frustrated the essential
6 purposes of the Agreement. Id., Doc. Nos. 686, 706; see also Joseph A. by Wolfe v. New
7 Mexico Dep’t of Human Servs., 69 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he touchstone
8 of the substantial compliance inquiry is whether Defendants frustrated the purpose
9 of the consent decree — i.e. its essential requirements.”). Appellants now argue that
10 the district court erred in declining to order discovery and that it incorrectly applied
11 the standard announced in Joseph A. for finding substantial noncompliance. We
12 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
13 the case, and issues on appeal.
14 * * *
15 The Agreement operates as a consent decree given the district court’s
16 continuing jurisdiction over it. See Perez v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d
17 143, 151‐52 (2d Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, the ordinary rules of contract interpretation
18 apply. That is, when the language of a decree is unambiguous, deference is paid to
4 1 its plain meaning. When the language is ambiguous, however, a court may consider
2 extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc.,
3 683 F.3d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 2012). Finally, the rules of contract interpretation “do not
4 contemplate considering any provision of the contract in isolation but in the light of
5 the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby.”
6 United States ex rel. Anti‐Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester
7 Cnty., 712 F.3d 761, 767 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
8 considering a district court’s interpretation of the terms of a consent decree, we
9 review conclusions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Broad. Music,
10 Inc., 683 F.3d at 43.
11 Following a review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that
12 Appellants failed to establish that Appellees were in substantial noncompliance with
13 the Agreement for largely the reasons set forth by the district court. Contrary to
14 Appellants’ argument, it is plain that the essential purposes of the Agreement were
15 limited to the five goals set forth in Section II. As an initial matter, Section II is
16 entitled “Goals and Outcomes.” To find that each section of the Agreement
17 contained “essential purposes” would be to ignore that terminology. Further, while
18 the other sections of the Agreement outline specific steps for Appellees to undertake,
5 1 each of those steps supports the realization of the goals in Section II; none is an end
2 in and of itself. For instance, Appellees’ failure to improve disabled students’
3 placements in regular classes would be an obvious violation of the Agreement. By
4 contrast, their failure fully to institute a complaint resolution procedure while still
5 recording progress toward achieving Section II’s goals could be a comparatively
6 inconsequential breach. See Joseph A., 69 F.3d at 1086 (“To the extent that any
7 stipulated criteria has not been met, the court must determine whether that failure
8 is immaterial to the overall objectives or, on the other hand, whether it had a
9 material adverse impact upon the overall [objectives of the Decree].”). Finally, the
10 Agreement makes clear that the goals in Section II are quantitative and not
11 qualitative. Each of the five goals speaks to a numerical improvement in the
12 integration and classification of students with intellectual disabilities. The goals
13 nowhere touch upon the quality of education provided. While Appellants request
14 that we read such a requirement into the goals, we decline to do so where such a
15 reading is not supported by the language of the Agreement.
16 Next, Appellees made significant progress toward accomplishing Section II’s
17 goals, posting large percentage gains on the integration of students with intellectual
18 disabilities pursuant to the first, third, fourth, and fifth goals, and markedly
6 1 reducing discriminatory identification of such students pursuant to the second goal.
2 While this progress was not continuous across the life of the Agreement, blame for
3 that shortcoming cannot be placed on Appellees given their efforts to implement the
4 Agreement in its final years, even after Appellees believed that they were no longer
5 bound by the Agreement — a belief the district court deemed credible. In addition,
6 the district court credited testimony provided by Appellees that progress slowed
7 because the “easy” gains were made early in the life of the Agreement, a finding we
8 will not disturb on appeal. While additional efforts by Appellees might have
9 produced greater results, that alone is insufficient to support Appellants’ motion
10 where Appellees made great strides in achieving the Agreement’s goals. Because
11 Appellants have thus failed to establish that Appellees frustrated the essential
12 purposes of the Agreement, we conclude that the district court properly denied
13 Appellants’ motion asserting substantial noncompliance.
14 Appellants finally argue that they were denied the ability to fully prosecute
15 their motion when the district court denied them formal discovery. However, the
16 Agreement clearly limited Appellants’ discovery rights to “existing data” in the final
17 three years of the Agreement. Further, the district court encouraged informal
18 discovery between the parties and, as a result, Appellants were able to depose five
7 1 of Appellees’ employees. Appellants were also able to engage in school visits prior
2 to the evidentiary hearing on their motion. While Appellants may have preferred
3 greater access to Appellees’ records, they did not bargain for such access in the
4 Agreement. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Appellants’ motion to
5 compel discovery.
6 We have considered Appellants’ remaining arguments and find them to be
7 without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s orders denying
8 Appellants’ motion to compel discovery and motion alleging substantial
9 noncompliance.
10 11 FOR THE COURT: 12 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk