Piwonski v. Choe

38 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 1999 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 212
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Bucks County
DecidedJanuary 13, 1999
Docketno. 93-6263
StatusPublished

This text of 38 Pa. D. & C.4th 449 (Piwonski v. Choe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Bucks County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Piwonski v. Choe, 38 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 1999 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).

Opinion

GARB, J.,

— Plaintiffs sue for damages allegedly incurred as the result of a motor vehicle accident. Defendant has moved for partial summary judgment based upon the limited tort option of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.1 We determine [450]*450that partial summary judgment should be granted for the defendant.

Section 7501(a)(1) of the Act provides essentially that each insurer shall notify each named insured of the latter’s right to choose the limited or full tort option with the understanding that a premium benefit is derived from the limited tort option. That section further provides for a mandatory notice to named insured which must state that “under the limited tort” option, the insured may seek recovery for all medical and out-of-pocket expenses, but not for pain and suffering or other nonmonetary damages unless the injuries suffered fall within the definition of “serious injury.” Section 1705(d) provides that each person who elects the limited tort alternative remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person pursuant to applicable tort law. “Unless the injury sustained is a serious injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort election shall be precluded from maintaining an action for any noneconomic loss, . . . .” (emphasis added)

In view of the fact that the plaintiffs have admittedly chosen the limited tort option, the question for disposition is whether, on this record, Joseph Piwonski has demonstrated that he suffered “serious injury” in the context of a summary judgment analysis.

Dodson v. Elvey, 445 Pa. Super. 479, 665 A.2d 1223 (1995), allocatur granted, 544 Pa. 608, 674 A.2d 1072 (1996) held, inter alia, that the resolution of whether a limited tort plaintiff has sustained “serious injury” is one for the court to be made in advance of trial, not an issue for the jury, and may be determined where there is an adequate record by summary judgment. Re[451]*451gardless of whether Dodson v. Elvey, supra, can be construed to have decided that the issue of “serious injury” is always one of law for the court, pretrial, that issue has now been set to rest by our Supreme Court in Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1998) which held that the issue of determination of “serious injury” may be determined by summary judgment upon the application of summary judgment principles. That court held that the traditional summary judgment standard is to be followed and that the threshold determination was not to be made routinely by a trial court judge, but rather, must be left to a jury “unless reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of whether a serious injury had been sustained.” Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d at 740. Therefore, in the context of summary judgment, the court must determine initially (1) whether the plaintiff as moving party has established that he or she has suffered serious impairment of a bodily function; (2) whether the defense as moving party has established that he or she has not suffered serious impairment of a bodily function; or (3) whether there remains a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to decide. Curran v. Children’s Service Center of Wyoming County Inc., 396 Pa. Super. 29, 578 A.2d 8 (1990), allocatur denied, 526 Pa. 648, 585 A.2d 468 (1991). As stated more succinctly in Washington v. Baxter, supra at 740, whether “reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of whether a serious injury had been sustained.”

In addressing the question of whether there is a serious impairment of body function, the court in Dodson adopted the standard established in Michigan in virtually identical language and as explicated in DiFranco v. Pickard, 427 Mich. 32, 398 N.W.2d 896 (1986). In [452]*452this regard, in footnote 11, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Baxter affirms Dodson and restates the DiFranco standard. The court in DiFranco v. Pickard provided as follows:

“The ‘serious impairment of body function’ threshold contains two inquiries:

“(a) what body function, if any, was impaired because of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident?

“(b) was the impairment of body function serious?

“The focus on these injuries is not on the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected a particular body function. Generally, medical testimony will be needed to establish the existence, extent and permanency of impairment ... In determining whether the impairment was serious, several factors must be considered: the extent of the impairment, the particular body function impaired, the length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant factors. An impairment need not be permanent to be serious.” 427 Mich. at 39, 398 N.W.2d at 901.

“An impairment involves more than the injury itself. The consequences of the injury must involve a serious impact for an extended period of time on a plaintiff’s life.” Dodson v. Elvey, supra at 499, 665 A.2d at 1234, citing Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 318, 609 A.2d 415, 429 (1992). “It must interfere substantially with the plaintiff’s normal activities and not impose only a mild or slight limitation.” Dodson v. Elvey, supra, citing Licari v. Elliott, 57 N.Y.2d 230, 236, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570, 573-74, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (1982). See also, McClung v. Breneman, 700 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. 1997) and Leonelli v. McMullen, 700 A.2d 525 (Pa. Super. 1997) which, once again, adopted the factors to be [453]*453considered by our courts as set forth in DiFranco v. Pickard.

Husband plaintiff was injured when he was driving his motor vehicle on February 28, 1993 when it was struck on the right passenger side by a vehicle driven by the defendant. He was treated in the emergency room of Delaware Valley Medical Center complaining of neck, back, right hip and bilateral knee pain. Although x-rays for fracture were negative, the x-ray of his left knee did show metallic staples at the proximal tibia at the site of an old osteotomy. The x-ray also showed mild degenerative changes. No treatment was rendered, and plaintiff was released.

Plaintiff sought treatment with Dr. Joseph Cammarata, a chiropractor. His complaints on his first visit on March 3, 1993 were neck pain and left knee pain. Physical therapy was initiated for these complaints, and the plaintiff was referred by Dr. Cammarata to Steven Meseri M.D. for an evaluation on March 8, 1993. Dr. Meseri’s diagnosis was of cervical strain and sprain, trapezius myofascitis, post-traumatic cephalgia, contusion to third finger of left hand, contusion of left knee.

Dr.

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Related

DiFranco v. Pickard
398 N.W.2d 896 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1986)
Curran v. Children's Service Center of Wyoming County, Inc.
578 A.2d 8 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1990)
Dodson v. Elvey
665 A.2d 1223 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1995)
Oswin v. Shaw
609 A.2d 415 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1992)
McClung v. Breneman
700 A.2d 495 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1997)
Leonelli v. McMullen
700 A.2d 525 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1997)
Licari v. Elliott
441 N.E.2d 1088 (New York Court of Appeals, 1982)
Washington v. Baxter
719 A.2d 733 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
38 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 1999 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/piwonski-v-choe-pactcomplbucks-1999.