Pittsburgh Rys. Co. v. Chapman

145 F. 886, 76 C.C.A. 418, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 4040
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedMay 28, 1906
DocketNo. 17
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 145 F. 886 (Pittsburgh Rys. Co. v. Chapman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pittsburgh Rys. Co. v. Chapman, 145 F. 886, 76 C.C.A. 418, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 4040 (3d Cir. 1906).

Opinion

GRAY, Circuit Judge.

The defendant in error, John Chapman, hereinafter called the plaintiff, brought this suit in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained through the negligence of the plaintiff in error, the Pittsburgh Railways Company, hereinafter called the defendant.

[887]*887The plaintiff was a brakeman emploj-ed by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, and suffered the injuries complained of on the 4th day of March, 1903, by coming in contact with the trolley wire of defendant, or the guy wire used for its support, while standing on top of a freight car moving under said wires. The defendant’s road crossed the tracks of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at an acute angle, so that both the guy wire and the trolley wire were suspended diagonally across the line of said railroad. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was guilty of negligence, in maintaining said wires at an insufficient height from the tracks of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to clear the heads of those standing, as brakemcn are compelled to do, on the tops of cars moving under them. It also alleged negligence, in that no devices, such as tell-tales or whip lashes, were provided by defendant to give notice or warning of the danger.

It was conceded that the construction complained of was dangerous, and there was no allegation of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. It was contended, however, on behalf o’f the defendant that its original construction was safe, the trolley and guy wires at the point of crossing the rails of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad being then more than 20 feet above the same; hut that after this original construction of defendant’s line across the line of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, the latter company raised its tracks about two feet, reducing the distance between the wires and its tracks from 20 feet 5 inches to 17 feet 11 inches, the defendant company, of course, being obliged to elevate its track so as to cross at grade; that the defendant was not guilty of any negligence, but that the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company was the guilty party, by reason of its having lessened the distance between the tracks and the wires; that if there was any negligence on defendant’s part, in permitting the situation thus created to remain, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company-was itself also guilty of the same negligence, and was therefore either a joint or concurrent tort feasor with defendant, and that tire execution of certain releases by plaintiff to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, of liability in regard to the accident, as a matter of law, discharged the defendant.

The testimony shows that defendant’s railway was laid on a public road, and it does not appear that the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company had any, right to interefere with the proper use of said railway across its tracks. There was also testimony, tending to show that the defendant company acquiesced in the raising of the tracks at the crossing, without protest or resistance, as there was nothing to show that the latter company was not acting within its rights in the changes made at the crossing. What was before a reasonably safe situation, was made dangerous by this raising of the tracks of the defendant at the crossing, consequent upon the raising of those of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at that point, unless the overhead wires were correspondingly raised. There was testimony, and it is not denied, that the defendant company was notified by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company that it was about to make this change in grade. It is not denied that the defendant company, though [888]*888it raised its own tracks to correspond with the height to which the railroad company had raised its tracks, made no change in the height of the trolley or guy wires, which diagonally crossed the latter, or that it made no provision or effort to guard against the danger which was thereby obviously created. There is no testimony tending to show that the defendant made any protest to the railroad company, of inability from any cause to raise its wires, but apparently, from the evidence, allowed the situation created by the raising of its tracks to remain, without warning devices or safeguards, and without concern as to the great peril occasioned thereby to those riding on the tops of freight cars at night. At the trial, however, testimony was introduced on behalf of the defendant, to show that after the defendant company had crossed the railroad tracks of the Baltimore & Ohio at grade, it* line went under the railway of the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad, running parallel to land about 70 feet from the said crossing of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad; that owing to the then recent lowering of the girders carrying the said last-mentioned railroad across the trolley road, the trollejr wire had to be depressed at that point, and that on that account it was impracticable to raise it at the crossing of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. Its own engineers so testified, though engineers produced by plaintiff testified to the contrary. The case was submitted to the jury, with a reservation as to the effect of certain releases by plaintiff to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, put in evidence by defendant, and with a charge to which no exception was taken by the defendant.

The verdict of the jury, and the judgment thereon, were in favor of the plaintiff. With the writ of error sued out by the defendant, there are two assignments of error. First, That the court erred in refusing plaintiff’s first point, that under all the evidence the verdict must be for the defendant.' Second, That the court erred in refusing defendant’s motion for judgment, non obstante veredicto, on the question reserved as to the effect of certain releases from the plaintiff to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, hereinafter more fully referred to, and in ordering the clerk to enter judgment on the verdict for plaintiff.

We think, from the evidence as outlined above, it is apparent that the first exception is without merit. Whether the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company was guilty of negligence, or not, there was testimony tending to show a neglect of duty on the part of defendant, under the circumstances, which made the question a proper one for submission to the jury. No one has a right to create or maintain a structure dangerous to those lawfully exposed thereto, without just excuse, and in'a case like the present, it was incumbent itpon the defendant to show facts or circumstances which would constitute such excuse or justification of its conduct. We may assume that defendant company 'had a right to cross the tracks of the railroad company, as we may also assume that the railroad company was within its rights in raising the tracks at the crossing, and thus requiring a corresponding elevation of the defendant’s tracks at that point, but we cannot say, as defendant practically asked the court below to say, that no duty [889]*889was imposed upon defendant, in crossing these tracks, not to expose those lawfully using and operating the trains on the railroad, to- so serious a peril as a low trolley wire, safeguarded by no warning devices, and without notice to the railroad company of any supposed inability to raise it.

It would seem that, if there were a legal duty to raise its tracks to the same height as those of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, there was the same duty to raise its wires correspondingly, as a part of its structure at the said crossing.

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Bluebook (online)
145 F. 886, 76 C.C.A. 418, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 4040, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pittsburgh-rys-co-v-chapman-ca3-1906.