Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Cowles Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co.

64 F. 125, 1894 U.S. App. LEXIS 3031
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio
DecidedNovember 9, 1894
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 64 F. 125 (Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Cowles Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Cowles Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co., 64 F. 125, 1894 U.S. App. LEXIS 3031 (circtndoh 1894).

Opinion

TAFT, Circuit Judge.

This is a bill to enjoin the infringement of a patent for a process of making aluminum by electrolysis, and to re[126]*126cover damages. Tlie case Ras been Reax-d or its merits, and a. decree rendered sustaining tbe patent, finding that tbe defendant bas infringed it, and referring to a special master tbe question of damages. The opinion of tbe court is reported in 55 Fed. 301. A motion is now made by tbe defendant to reopen tbe case, for leave to introduce new evidence, and for a rebearing. Tbe opinion on tbe merits was filed on January 20, 1803, and a decree entered in accordance therewith shortly afterwards. Defendant then took an appeal to tbe circuit court of appeals, under tbe seventh section of the court of appeals act, providing for an appeal from an interlocutory order granting an injunction. When tbe appeal was called in the circuit court of appeals in June, 1893, it was .dismissed by tbe appellant. Tbe master then proceeded with tbe bearing of evidence on tbe question of damages. Pending this bearing, both tbe counsel for the defendant company who had argued tbe case on the merits in this court died. Thereafter tbe present counsel for tbe defendant offered evidence before tbe master, which tbe master correctly ruled to be irrelevant on tbe issue of damages, and only relevant with respect to the merits of tbe controversy already decided by tbe court. Counsel for the defendant, by agreement with opposing counsel, brought tbe question of tbe admissibility of this evidence before tbe court, and tbe action of tbe master was sustained. On June 21, 1894, tbe motion for rehearing now to be decided was filed in tbe words following:

“And now comes the defendant, and files this, his amended motion for a rehearing in this case; and, for grounds for granting the same, the defendant states as follows, namely: (1) That, upon the original hearing of this cause upon the questions as to character and validity of the patent in suit, it was claimed and represented by the complainant that there was an important difference between the solution of the alumina in the fused cryolite bath under the patent in suit and the fusion of alumina with cryolite as a flux in electric smelting, and that the patent in suit was for the solution of alumina in the fused cryolite bath, and not for the fusion of alumina with cryolite as a flux in electric smelting, which representation and claim the defendant believed to be true, and was thereby led into the trying of the case on its part upon that basis, and to rely upon its right, in ease it should become necessary, to set up the process of electric smelting with the use of cryolite as a flux under electric smelting patents belonging to the defendant, as a standard of the comparison as to the cost of so manufacturing aluminum, as compared with the process under the patent in suit. That, upon the hearing in damages, the complainant objected to the introduction of evidence as to such comparative cost of manufacturing aluminum, upon the ground that the use of cryolite as a flux in electric smelting was the same as the solution in a fused cryolite bath under the patent in suit, and that all such testimony was thereupon stricken out by the court, and all further testimony on the subject was disallowed; that, by the means above set forth, the defendant was entirely deprived of the benefit of such testimony in any way. In law and justice, he is now entitled to the use of the same upon the questions as to the validity or scope of the patent in suit, and the infringement of the same by the defendant. (2) That the court erred in finding and holding that the testimony in the cause showed that alumina, was not dissolved in the cryolite bath of the soluble anode process to any appreciable amount, and also in finding and holding that the defendant operated said soluble anode process improperly and unfairly in respect to the soluble anodes being partly above and partly within the bath, and holding that the same should have been entirely immersed in the fused bath; whereas, in truth and in fact, it is the uniform custom in using anodes, whether soluble or otherwise, to place them [127]*127partly in and partly above the bath, as shown in the drawing's attached to the Hall and Bradley patents: and whereas, also, in fact, the alumina is or may bo dissolved in ample amounts in said soluble anode process in such fused bath of cryolite, — all of which the defendant can fully establish as clear and positive facts, and will do so, if allowed the opportunity, and that the defendant will also fully prove that as much alumina will be and is dissolved in such Tused bath in such soluble anode process whether anodes are entirely immersed as when used in the manner which the defendant used them. The defendant aslts that, upon the granting of such rehearing, the parties may be allowed to introduce all such further testimony as may be relevant, in such rehearing, and that the defendant may have leave to amend its answer accordingly.”

The ground of the first paragraph of the motion, as elucidated in the oral presentation of it, is peculiar. It is, in effect, that complainant’s counsel by their argument misled the defendant and its counsel into taking a wrong view' as to the issue of the cause; and now, having discovered the real issue to be something other than it was supposed to Tbe, defendant wishes to adduce more evidence and make further argument on the new issue heretofore successfully obscured and concealed from the defendant, its counsel, and the court by the ingenuity of complainant’s counsel. Defendant’s present counsel expressly disclaims ihe slightest intention to impeach the good faith or professional skill oí defendant’s former counsel, hut merely contends that in this case the arguments on behalf of complainant were so persistently sophistical and calculated to mislead that a serious mistake was made by the solicitors for defendant. The ground for the second paragraph of the motion is, in effect, that the court made an error in holding that the De Ville process for making aluminum by electrolysis was not an anticipation of the complainant’s process, which error it is proposed to show more fully by subsequent experiments made by the defendant, and now offered in evidence.

The rules which govern the court in granting a rehearing in a cause like this, after a full hearing and decree on the merits, are well settled. In Baker v. Whiting, 1 Story, 218, Fed. Cas. No. 786, Mr. Justice Story, in a full discussion of the subject, holds that a rehearing for the purpose of admitting new evidence can only he granted when it would he granted on a bill of review after final decree. In Purcell v. Miner, 4 Wall. 519, the supreme court quote, and follow Lord Chancellor Bacon’s rule with reference to a hill of review:

“No bill of review shall be admitted except it contain either error in law appearing In the body of the decree, without further examination of matters in fact, or some new matter which hath arisen any time after the decree, and not on any new proof which might have been used in the decree so made. Nevertheless, upon new proof that is come to light after the decree was made, which could not possibly have been used at the lime when the decree passed, a bill or review may be granted by the special license of the court, a.nd not otherwise.”

See, also, City of Omaha v. Redick, 63 Fed. 1-6.

It is not claimed by counsel for the defendant that the new evidence sought to be put in is evidence which could not have been brought before the court by due diligence at the original hearing.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cashvan v. Darling
107 A.2d 896 (Court of Chancery of Delaware, 1954)
Comolite Corp. v. Davidowitz
30 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. New York, 1939)
Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Levally
16 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Illinois, 1936)
Sheeler v. Alexander
211 F. 544 (N.D. Ohio, 1913)
Moneyweight Scale Co. v. Toledo Computing Scale Co.
199 F. 905 (Seventh Circuit, 1912)
Panzl v. Battle Island Paper Co.
138 F. 48 (Second Circuit, 1905)
Panzl v. Battle Island Paper & Pulp Co.
132 F. 607 (N.D. New York, 1904)
Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Cowles Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co.
121 F. 556 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio, 1903)
Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Pittsburgh Reduction Co.
111 F. 742 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western New York, 1901)
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.
10 N.M. 617 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 1900)
Flint & P. M. R. Co. v. Marine Ins.
71 F. 210 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Michigan, 1895)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
64 F. 125, 1894 U.S. App. LEXIS 3031, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pittsburgh-reduction-co-v-cowles-electric-smelting-aluminum-co-circtndoh-1894.