Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Pittsburgh

60 A. 1077, 211 Pa. 479, 1905 Pa. LEXIS 485
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 17, 1905
DocketAppeal, No. 12
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 60 A. 1077 (Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Pittsburgh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Pittsburgh, 60 A. 1077, 211 Pa. 479, 1905 Pa. LEXIS 485 (Pa. 1905).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Brown,

Tlie decree in this case might well be affirmed on the opinion of the learned president judge of the court below. We shall not, therefore, attempt to add anything to what he has said, but very briefly emphasize his view that the city of Pittsburgh is attempting to levy and collect a property tax from the appellee without statutory authority to do so.

The ordinances under which the city has imposed the tax provide that there shall be established and levied as an annual “ license ” tax “ upon each and every street railway company or corporation the sum of twenty-five (25) cents per foot for each lineal foot of track laid, maintained or operated by such company or corporation within the limits of the city of Pittsburgh, exclusive of such track as may be in the yards or buildings of such company or corporation.” As authority for the passage of these ordinances and the collection of the tax imposed by them, the city relies upon paragraphs IY and XXII of the third section of art. 19 of the Act of March 7, 1901, P. L. 20. Those paragraphs are: “IV. Every city of the second class shall have power, for general revenue purposes, to levy and collect a license tax, to be fixed by ordinance, upon street railways, hack drivers, auctioneers, and all and every corporation, company or individual doing business in said city, payable annually, and to regulate the collection of the same.” “ XXII. And every city of the second class shall have power, for general revenue purposes, to levy and collect license taxes or fees, to be fixed by. ordinance, upon street railways, hack drivers, auctioneers, bill posters, public balls or dances, night soilers, garbage collectors, railroad switches, pawn brokers, peddlers; venders of any kind of merchandise whatever, using the streets, lanes, highways, wharves, or public squares or grounds, for the purposes of vending the same; all theatrical exhibitions, whether permanent or transient (including circuses), vehicles, bicydes, tricycles, automobiles, dogs, ball games or ball parks, and all other matters and things of a like nature, and to regulate the collection of the same and to provide penalties for default therein.”

What the act of assembly authorizes the city to levy and collect is a license tax or fee, and the ordinances are so worded. They term the tax assessed against the appellee a “ license ” [488]*488tax; but no matter what the municipal authorities call it, the question is, what is it ? The tax is twenty-five cents per foot “ for each lineal foot of track laid, maintained or operated ” by the appellee within the city of Pittsburgh, exclusive of such tracks as may be in its yards or buildings. The tracks of a street railway company are as much its property as are its power houses, car barns or repair shops; and, if so, could it be seriously argued that an annual tax of twenty-five cents per lineal foot on a car barn would not be a tax on the property, no matter by what name called, especially if to be collected for the general revenue purposes of the municipality ? Manifestly it would be such a tax, and such is the character of the tax which the appellant would impose on the tracks of the appellee. We are told that this question has not been decided in this state. We can recall no case in which it was raised, but in other jurisdictions the view just expressed lias been entertained. By a statute of the state of Ohio $1.00 per annum was imposed upon each mile of railroad track within the state, the statute calling it a fee. Of it the supreme court of that state said, in Railway Co. v. State of Ohio, 49 Ohio, 189:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

G. Fish v. Twp of Lower Merion, Aplt.
128 A.3d 764 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2015)
Commonwealth v. Bradley
40 Pa. D. & C. 584 (Alleghany County Court of Common Pleas, 1940)
Rock v. Philadelphia
191 A. 619 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1936)
Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Pittsburgh
175 A. 691 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1934)
Arronson v. City of Philadelphia
16 Pa. D. & C. 427 (Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 1932)
Bethlehem Poster Advertising & Sign Corp. v. City of Bethlehem
2 Pa. D. & C. 307 (Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, 1922)
Philadelphia v. Townsend
80 A. 69 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1911)
Kittanning Borough v. Garretts Run Gas Co.
35 Pa. Super. 167 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1908)
Kittanning Borough v. Armstrong Water Co.
35 Pa. Super. 174 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1908)
Borough v. Consolidated Natural Gas Co.
68 A. 728 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1908)
Titusville v. Gahan
34 Pa. Super. 613 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1907)
City of Scranton v. Scranton Electric Light & Heat Co.
33 Pa. Super. 431 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1907)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
60 A. 1077, 211 Pa. 479, 1905 Pa. LEXIS 485, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pittsburgh-railways-co-v-pittsburgh-pa-1905.