Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis R. W. Co. v. Morton

61 Ind. 539
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1877
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 61 Ind. 539 (Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis R. W. Co. v. Morton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis R. W. Co. v. Morton, 61 Ind. 539 (Ind. 1877).

Opinions

Biddle, C. J.

This suit was originally brought in the Yewton Circuit Court, by the appellees, against the appellant and “ The Columbus, Chicago and Indiana Central Railway Company.”

The complaint, besides the usual formal averments, states the following substantial facts :

That the plaintiffs were, at the time of the grievances complained of, engaged in buying, shipping and selling all kinds of grain, under the firm name and style of R. Morton & Co., at Kentland, in Yewton county, State of Indiana; that the defendants, at the same time, “were operators of, and as common carriers for hire were engaged in transporting for hire all articles of merchandise along, a certain line or lines of railway, extending from the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, to the city of Columbus, in the State of Ohio, and there connecting with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, thus forming a continuous lino of transit from said city of Chicago to the city of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, and the city of Yew York, in the State of Yew York; and so represented and held themselves out to the public generally as common carriers for hire of personal property, snob as merchandise and all kinds of grain, from the said town of Kentland to the said cities of Philadelphia and Yew York; that one of the branch or division lines, operated by said defendants as aforesaid, now passes, and at the time of the commission of the grievances as hereinafter complained of did pass, through the said town of Kentland, in the county of Yewton, and State of Indiana;” that it was the duty of the defendants, as such common carriers, to furnish cars, ship grain, etc., along their line or lines of railroad, when requested to do so, for hire; that the plaintiffs relying upon their right to have such grain as they might wish transported over and along said lines of railway, they purchased, in the month of December, 1870, eight thousand bushels of corn, and stored the same at Kentland for shipping, and [542]*542then and there demanded of said defendant means of transportation, and that they would transport said grain to the city of New York aforesaid, or to the terminus of their said route, in the same general direction, they, the said plaintiff's, being then and there ready, willing and able to pay the said defendants the usual and customary rates of freight charged by them for the transportation of such grain; but the said defendants, wholly disregarding their duties and obligations, failed and refused to transport said grain, or any part thereof.”

There are other separate averments in the complaint, called paragraphs, numbered 2, S, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, but they do not contain separate causes of action; they are rather specified breaches, at different times, of the obligation of the defendants as such alleged common carriers, and averments of special damages sustained.

On the application of the defendants below, the venue was changed to the Tippecanoe Circuit Court, wherein the appellants filed a demurrer to the complaint, alleging as ground the insufficiency of the facts stated therein to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled, and exceptions reserved; whereupon the appellants answered by a general denial.

The appellees then dismissed the case as to “ The Columbus, Chicago and Indiana Central Railway Company.” A jury trial was had, resulting in a verdict for the appellees. Motion for a new trial; causes filed; motion overruled; exceptions; judgment on the verdict; appeal.

The demurrer to the complaint was properly overruled. We think it is sufficient. The objections made to it by the appellant are not substantial.

The appellees call our attention to what they urge as a defect in the record, namely: That, although the bill of exceptions purports to contain all the evidence given in the case, yet it appears upon its face that it does not, and they point out several objections to it to sustain their views, as follows:

[543]*543In the cross-examination of Richard Morton, one of the appellees, as a witness, he was asked the question:

“ Can you tell the number of cars you received from the company during any one month?”

He answered:

“ No, not accurately. I can approximate it. I received in the neighborhood of-.”

There is another instance in the testimony of the same witness, touching the elevators, wherein his answer to a question seems to be unfinished, in a similar manner; but it is impossible for us to tell by the record, whether, at these times, the witness answered any farther than the evidence in the record states, or not. It may be that that was all he said at these several times; if so, the record is right. These instances are not similar to those where something has been introduced as evidence, as- the contents of a paper, which does not appear in the bill of exceptions. In such cases, the bill of exceptions, notwithstanding it states that it contains all the evidence, shows upon its face that it does not. In this case the general statement, that the bill contains all the evidence, is not contradicted by what appears to be an unfinished answer of a witness to a question, because the answer might, in fact, have remained unfinishéd, precisely as it is stated in the bill of exceptions.

The substantial evidence given in the case is as follows: On behalf of the appellee,

B. M. Chaffee testified : “ Am agent of the I. B. & W. Railway, at Danville, Illinois. In 1870 was agent of Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company, at Kentland, Indiana. "Was such agent from 1868, until November 7th, 1871. Mr. Ritchie was my successor. No other railroad passed through Kentland during that period. I know plaintiffs.”

Admitted that plaintiffs had in storage at Kentland, in December, 1870, eight thousaud bushels of corn, and that [544]*544this was not an unusual or unreasonable amount for shipment at that period of the year.

“Back as far as December, 1870, and in the Eall of 1871, Mr. Morton used to request transportation nearly every morning, sometimes verbally and sometimes by written notices. Rot during the whole time, but during the Eall, there was a constant demand for cars. I used to send these written demands to Mr. Hill, superintendent, at Logansport. I think Mr. Morton sent a man east to obtain White Line cars to transport grain in. I think cars were not furnished as fast as he ordered them.”

Admitted by defendant’s counsel, that, if defendant had sent a train to Kentland, plaintiffs would have loaded it without delay.

“ Sometimes he would demand five cars, and sometimes ten cars, a day, I think. There were not enough cars to supply the demand that'he made. He demanded cars principally for Boston and New York. What he had been shipping in 1870, and such transportation as was furnished in 1871, was shipped to Logansport, as a general thing. I used to give bills of lading for New York and Boston.

“There were other dealers in grain and shippers, at that station. I couldn’t give any particular month in which Mr. Morton made demands for cars. I have no means of fixing the dates of the several demands. He did not do different from other shippers. He used to tell me where he wanted it to go. Demands "were made to me for cars by other shippers during this time by three other firms. There was no discrimination made in shippers. Mr. Morton had his full share of cars. I only know from information of his going for White Line cars.

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Bluebook (online)
61 Ind. 539, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pittsburgh-cincinnati-st-louis-r-w-co-v-morton-ind-1877.