Pitney Road Partners LLC v. Murray Associates

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 18, 2014
• Docket: 2253 MDA 2013
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A18021-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PITNEY ROAD PARTNERS, LLC T/D/B/A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF REDCAY COLLEGE CAMPUSES I PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

MURRAY ASSOCIATES ARCHITECTS, P.C.

Appellee No. 2253 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Order Entered on November 19, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at No.: Cl-06-01429

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2014

Pitney Road Partners, LLC t/d/b/a Redcay College Campuses I

motion for summary judgment filed by Murray Associates Architects, P.C.

held that an arbitration decision between Pitney and a third party, Warfel

a matter of law under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. After careful

review, we affirm.

November 19, 2013:

This litigation arises as a result of the construction of a building on the Lancaster campus of [Harrisburg Area Community College J-A18021-14

discussions with Warfel to construct a classroom building on land owned by Pitney and leased to HACC. Warfel contracted with Murray, an architectural firm that had worked with HACC in the past, to provide the architectural services for constructing the new building. Under the [oral] agreement, Murray was to prepare plans, drawings and specifications for the project known as the Phase II Expansion Project.

Pitney met with Warfel and Murray numerous times in 2003 during which Pitney claims it told them that the new building should be identical to the existing building on the property. Pitney alleged Warfel and Murray represented that the new building would look the same, a representation upon which Pitney claims it relied.

plans about the design of the new building were false and misleading and, as a result, a significant number of changes had to be made which greatly increased the cost to Pitney. Specifically, Pitney claims over 50 windows, brick banding, and a notch for a stairwell had to be added to the new building to make it conform to the design of the existing building.

Pitney also alleges Warfel and Murray falsely represented that the HVAC system was complete and would fit in the building as it was designed. In fact, crucial pieces of equipment were omitted and there was not enough space left under the trusses of the roof to fit the equipment. As a result, [] substantial reworking of the roof and duct work was required. Pitney further claims that

could be constructed with brick, but it needed steel support beams to keep from collapsing.

Pitney alleges Warfel and Murray knew Pitney relied upon the plans prepared by Murray in determining its budget for the

project was delayed[,] resulting in lost rental income, and Pitney incurred additional costs to correct the problems with the design.

-3 (footnote and record

citations omitted).

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Pitney refused to pay Warfel because of the construction delays, and

Warfel could not pay its subcontractors. Warfel filed suit against Pitney to

recover the amounts owed, and Pitney filed a counterclaim to recover its

increased costs due to the design errors made by Murray, including the

HVAC system, the facade, and the windows and brick banding. Id. at 3-4.

Warfel and Pitney proceeded to binding arbitration, and after ten days

of testimony, on May 12, 2006, the arbitration panel rendered an award in

favor of Warfel for $5,971,010.

and setoffs of Pitney Road Partners, LLC t/d/b/a Redcay College Campuses I,

are denied in their entirety. . . . The award is in full settlement of all claims

and counterclaims submitted to this Arbitration. All claims not expressly

Pitney filed motions to vacate or modify or correct the arbitration

award. Additionally, on June 21, 2006, Pitney filed the instant complaint

against Warfel, HACC, and Murray. Meanwhile, on February 9, 2007, the

because, in its complaint, Pitney had failed to state a cause of action against

HACC. Pitney did not appeal this determination or amend its complaint to

state a claim against HACC. On August 17, 2007, the parties entered into a

formal settlement agreement by which Pitney dismissed its claims in the

On November 26, 2007, Pitney discontinued this action against Warfel.

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On March 22, 2013, Murray, the remaining defendant, filed a motion

for summary judgment in which Murray a

precluded by collateral estoppel and barred by the settlement agreement

between Pitney and Warfel. Pitney responded on June 24, 2013, and on

judgment, concluding that Murray was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law because Pitney was collaterally estopped from relitigating the claims that

were settled by the arbitration award. Pitney timely appealed on December

19, 2013, and filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on January 10, 2014. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On February 6, 2014, the trial court entered its Rule

the

1925(a) Opinion, 2/06/2014, at 4.

Pitney raises the following two issues for our review, which we have

reordered for ease of disposition:

1. Statement of Matters

issues Pitney is raising on appeal with sufficient specificity?

2. Whether the trial court erred in applying collateral estoppel and, specifically, in holding that the issue design errors was adjudicated by the arbitrators and essential to their decision in the Warfel v. Pitney Arbitration, thus precluding Pitney from litigating the issue in the Pitney v. Murray Lawsuit and resulting in the granting of Murr summary judgment motion?

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deeming the issues waived on appeal because Pitney failed to identify its

issues with sufficient specificity in its Rule 1925(b) statement. We agree

with Pitney that its issues are not waived.

Failure to comply with a Rule 1925(b) order may be considered by the appellate court as a waiver of all objections to the order, ruling or other matter complained of. Regarding vague or overly broad statements, this Court has also stated:

When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review. When an appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues.

In other words, a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at all. While [Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998)] and its progeny have generally involved situations where an appellant completely fails to mention an issue in his Concise Statement, for the reasons set forth above we conclude that Lord should also apply to Concise Statements which are so vague as to prevent the court from identifying the issue to be raised on appeal.

Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2006) (most citations

is . . . tantamount to a conclusion of

Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936

A.2d 1058, 1059 (Pa. 2007); see also McKeeman v. Corestates Bank,

N.A.,

Appellate Procedure apply to criminal and civil cases alike, the principles

enunciated by Lord

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Here, Pitney raised the following three issues in its Rule 1925(b)

concise statement:

a. The [c]ourt erred in holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Murray made errors and omissions in its design for the project at Harrisburg Area

b. The [c]ourt erred in holding that Pitney was collaterally estopped from litigati errors and omissions in the present lawsuit based upon the outcome in the Warfel v. Pitney Arbitration.

c. The [c]ourt erred in holding that Murray met all five requirements necessary for invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel, specifically: (1) that the issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one presented in the later case, (2) that there was a final judgment on the merits, (3) that the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case, (4) that the party or person privy to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding, and (5) that the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment.

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/10/2014, at 1-2. Pitney therefore identified its

collateral estoppel to grant

summary judgment to Murray. Furthermore, even after finding waiver, the

trial court was able to conduct an alternative analysis, in which it stated:

on appeal is set out in the opinion and order of November 19,

Murray were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, there was no need to determine whether an issue of material fact existed as to Murr

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Lineberger, 894 A.2d at 148.

Accordingly, the

Lynn v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 70

A.3d 814, 823 (Pa. Super. 2013). Therefore, because Pitney has not waived

remaining issue.

motion becau Warfel v. Pitney

Our standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is an abuse of discretion. Summary judgment as a matter of law may be had where there are no genuine issues of material fact as to a cause of action. Pa.R.[C].P. 1035.2. Summary judgment is properly granted on grounds of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and supporting affidavits disclose that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Robbins v. Buck, 827 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Pa. Super. 2003) (case citations

omitted). Here, the trial court determined that Pitney was collaterally

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estopped from raising claims of alleged design error by Murray because of

cision in favor of Warfel on May 12, 2006.

The decision to allow or to deny a prior judicial determination to collaterally bar relitigation of an issue in a subsequent action historically has been treated as a legal issue. As such, this Court is not bound draw our own conclusions from the facts as established.

Meridian Oil & Gas Enters., Inc. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 614 A.2d 246, 250

(Pa. Super. 1992).

Collateral estoppel applies if (1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to one presented in the later case; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case; (4) the party or person privy to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding and (5) the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment.

Collateral estoppel, sometimes referred to as issue preclusion, operates to prevent a question of law or an issue of fact which has once been litigated and adjudicated finally in a court of competent jurisdiction from being relitigated in a subsequent suit.

Kituskie v. Corbman, 682 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations

omitted).

In the instant case, Pitney challenges the first and fifth elements of the

issue has been adjudicated and is essential to the judgment in a prior

proceeding

were several legitimate bases by which the arbitrators could have reached

their decision [in Warfel v. Pitney] without having to even consider, let

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alone decide, the issues concerning Murra Id.

Thus, our task is to determine whether the trial court erred in determining

decision. See Kituskie, 682 A.2d at 382.

adjudicated in the arbitration. In its complaint in the instant litigation,

Pitney raises one count of negligent misrepresentation against Murray,

alleging that Murray violated section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of

Torts1

Complaint, 8/08/2006, at 10 ¶ 44; see id. at 9-10 ¶¶ 38-45. Specifically,

misrepresentations that its design would match the existing building and

____________________________________________

1 § 552 Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others

(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1).

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example, the design did not match the existing building, the front entrance

lacked sufficient structural support, the truss design would not accommodate

the HVAC equipment, and the plans, if followed, would have created student

Id. at 33.

In its arbitration brief, Pitney argued as follows:

Many of the more costly problems resulted from poor coordination between the project architect, Murray, and Warfel. For example, despite the fact that all parties understood that the new academic building was to be substantially similar to the existing building, Murray did not include plans for windows. The windows in the first academic building were in plain view and obvious even to a casual onlooker. The failure to notice that windows were not in the architectural plans added significant costs to the project. . . .

occurred during the construction phase of the academic building. The height of the penthouses was incorrect, and, therefore, duct work could not be installed. The roof trusses had to be redesigned to accommodate the HVAC equipment. This caused delays in the roof installation. As a result, the drywall and insulation were in place before the roof was finished. This caused leaks which resulted in mold damage.

-8.

finalized design drawings and specifications for

The penthouse area was poorly designed as the rooms were not designed to accommodate the [HVAC] equipment that was

- 10 - J-A18021-14

designed, and that the roof truss system would have to be redesigned, if possible, to accommodate this equipment.

There were design problems with the entrance. It became very obvious that there was an error made on the structural steel as far as accommodating the brick that was to go up over the entrance, over the peak. There was nothing there to carry it, which led to subsequent discussions with Murray . . . , and there had to be a redesign of the front steel.

Id. at 11-12 (quotation marks and record citations omitted).

Finally, the proposed verdict slip that Pitney submitted to the

arbitration panel included the following queries:

5. Was Murray negligent or did Murray breach its agreement with Warfel in its design of the Phase II class building in any of the following respects?

A. In designing the penthouse, HVAC systems and duct work in the penthouse;

B. In designing the front entrance to the building;

C. In designing the building without all appropriate windows and brick banding.

6. Set forth the amount of damage that [Pitney] suffered as a

Suggested answer: $558,209.72.

-3. Therefore, the record demonstrates

that Pitney presented to the arbitrators its allegations that Murray

negligently designed the building with respect to the HVAC system, roof

trusses, façade, and failure to match the first academic building. See id.

design errors alleged by Pitney . . .

are identical to those presented at the arbitration between Warfel and

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is

Kituskie, 682 A.2d at 382.

Second, Pitney challenges whether these issues were essential to the

let alone adjudicate, the issu

Warfel v. Pitney

claims that, if accepted by the arbitrators, would h

Id. We disagree.

When determining whether an issue is essential to the final judgment,

our Courts have looked to the context of the claim and whether it affected

the decision or damages rendered in the prior proceeding. See, e.g.,

, 618 A.2d 945, 955 (Pa. Super.

1992) (collaterally estopping insurance company from relitigating issue of

Meridian Oil &

Gas Enters., 614 A.2d at 252 (collaterally estopping litigation where

question of contract rights were essential in prior

dimensions of the ballast that Meridian had purchased under the contract

Incollingo v.

Maurer, 575 A.2d

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fifth requirement has also been met as it was essential for the panel to

determine damages as well as liability since the arbitration award was based

But

John J. Spencer Roofing, Inc., 565 A.2d 794, 797 (Pa. Super. 1989)

granted the non-

non-suit was n -

Here, in the arbitration, Pitney sought a determination of whether

unanticipated costs for which Pitney withheld pay from Warfel. See

from Warfel construction due to the improper accounting, the

mismanagement of the project which caused unnecessary costs, and the

award of the arbitrators to Warfel

Redcay College Campuses I, are denied in their entirety. . . . The award is

in full settlement of all claims and counterclaims submitted to this

Award of Arbitrators, 5/12/2006, at 3.

was essential for the panel to determine damages. See Stidham, 618 A.2d

at 955; Meridian Oil & Gas Enters.

assertion that the arbitration award could have been determined on

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Brief at 18, the arbitration p

cf.

their entirety, the arbitration panel was required to consider and decide the

See Incollingo, 575 A.2d at 941.

Thus, the fifth element of the collateral estoppel test was satisfied because

the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment.

See Kituskie

prove the first and fifth elements of the collateral estoppel test lacks merit.

Accordingly, because Murray satisfied all five elements of collateral

estoppel, Meridian Oil & Gas Enters., Inc., 614 A.2d at 250, the trial

court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that Murray was

entitled to summary judgment in the instant litigation as a matter of law.

Robbins, 827 A.2d at 1214.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9/18/2014

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