Pisces Madden v. Judge Tabatha Holliday et al.

• Court: District Court, M.D. North Carolina
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00991
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA PISCES MADDEN,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:25CV991

JUDGE TABATHA HOLLIDAY et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on pro 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. Id. at 6. But 18 se plaintiff Pisces Madden’s U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 are criminal application to proceed in forma statutes and convey no private right of pauperis. See Docket Entry 1. For the action. United States ex rel. Angel v. reasons set forth below, the Court will Scott, 697 F. Supp. 3d 483, 490 (E.D. grant the application for the limited Va. 2023). Accordingly, the Court purpose of allowing the Court to construes these claims under 42 consider a recommendation of U.S.C. § 1983. dismissal. Madden has sued all defendants in I. BACKGROUND their official and individual capacities. Compl. at 7–9. He seeks “an order Madden has a sued the State of North declaring [the defendants’ conduct] Carolina, a state judge (Tabatha unconstitutional.” Id. at 6. He also Holliday), prosecutors (Elizabeth requests compensatory damages, Lamb and Austin Tyler Furtrell), punitive damages, and reasonable public defenders (Ashley L. Cambell, attorney’s fees. Id. Lauren Gebhard, and Susan Alexandra Snow), and a police officer II. DISCUSSION (Tracy L. Chandler) for their involvement in his various criminal Jurisdiction “may (or, more precisely, cases. See Docket Entry 1 (Compl.) at must) be raised sua sponte by the 7–9. court” if in doubt. Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Madden claims the defendants Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. violated his constitutional rights and 2004); accord Mebane v. GKN Driveline N. Am., Inc., 499 F. Supp. A. Madden Does Not Have 3d 220, 229 (M.D.N.C. 2020). Standing to Seek Declaratory Standing is a jurisdictional issue, as is Relief. the Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition on suits against states. Maddens seeks “an order declaring Indus. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Dobson, 68 [the defendants’ conduct] F.4th 155, 167 (4th Cir. 2023). unconstitutional.” Compl. at 6. However, a plaintiff must typically Federal courts may exercise allege “ongoing or future harm” to supplemental jurisdiction over state have standing to seek declaratory law claims that are closely related to relief. Jensen v. Maryland Cannabis claims over which the court has Admin., 719 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (D. original jurisdiction. See § 1367(a). Md. 2024), aff’d, 151 F.4th 169 (4th But if a court dismisses the claims Cir. 2025), cert. denied sub nom. over which it has original jurisdiction, Jensen v. Md Cannabis Admin, No. it may also dismiss the claims over 25-766, 2026 WL 490640 (U.S. Feb. which it would have had 23, 2026); see also Wells v. Johnson, supplemental jurisdiction. § 150 F.4th 289, 305 (4th Cir. 2025) 1367(c)(3). (“[P]laintiffs who have suffered injury Additionally, the Court must dismiss in the past seldom need preclusion. a case filed in forma pauperis if it fails They need compensation, and to state a claim on which relief may be declaratory judgments are not granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). compensatory.”). Madden has alleged To state a claim, “a complaint must no such ongoing or future harm. The contain sufficient factual matter, undersigned therefore considers only accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to Madden’s claims for monetary relief that is plausible on its face.’” damages below. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, a plaintiff must make B. The Eleventh Amendment and factual allegations that are “enough to Monell Bar Madden’s Official raise a right to relief above the Capacity Claims. speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic “[O]fficial capacity suits generally Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 represent but another way of pleading (2007) (citation omitted). an action against the entity of which A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be the officer is an agent.” Hughes v. construed liberally in their favor. See Blankenship, 672 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 176 Cir. 1982); accord Robertson v. (4th Cir. 2015). “A plaintiff often must Anderson Mill Elementary Sch., 989 offer more detail, however, than the F.3d 282, 287 n.5 (4th Cir. 2021). If bald statement that he has a valid the officer is an agent of the state, the claim of some type against the Eleventh Amendment may bar their defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 suit. Albert v. Lierman, 152 F.4th F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001). 554, 560 (4th Cir. 2025). But if the officer is an agent of a municipality, Futrell (prosecutors), and the state of the suit must instead satisfy Monell v. North Carolina. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 2. Monell Bars Madden’s Official Capacity Claims Against the 1. The Eleventh Amendment Bars Police Officer Defendant. Madden’s Claims Against North Carolina and His Official capacity claims against police Officials Capacity Claims officers are claims against the police Against the Judge and department, and therefore claims Prosecutor Defendants. against a municipality, not the state, for Eleventh Amendment purposes. The Eleventh Amendment bars courts See Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, from hearing a citizen’s claim against 338-43 (4th Cir. 1996); Gantt v. a state. See U.S. Const., amend. XI; Whitaker, 203 F. Supp. 2d 503, 508- Albert, 152 F.4th at 560. The Fourth 09 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (explaining why Circuit has determined that North Harter remains good law despite Carolina prosecutors are agents of the intervening Supreme Court cases), state for Eleventh Amendment aff’d, 57 F. App’x 141 (4th Cir. 2003) purposes, Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 (unpublished); e.g., Atkinson v. F.3d 237, 249 (4th Cir. 2006), and a Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 509 (4th Cir. robust consensus of persuasive 2024). authority supports the same rule for North Carolina judges, see, e.g., Alden In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of v. Jones, No. 519CV00115KDBDCK, City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 2020 WL 912783, at *4 (W.D.N.C. (1978), the Supreme Court Feb. 25, 2020); Olavarria v. N. determined that a municipality is Carolina Admin. Off. of the Cts., No. liable for the acts of its employees only 5:15-CV-00049-F, 2015 WL 1526544, if it “follows a custom, policy, or at *4 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2015); practice by which local officials violate D’Alessandro v. North Carolina, No. a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” 5:14-CV-507-D, 2014 WL 7182975, at Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Att’ys *2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2014); Everson v. Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014) Doughton, No. 1:08CV887, 2009 WL (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). The 903316, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 2, Fourth Circuit has identified four 2009), report and recommendation ways to satisfy Monell: adopted, Docket Entry 26, No. 1:08CV887 (M.D.N.C. July 15, 2009), (1) “Through an express policy, No. aff’d, 366 F. App’x 461 (4th Cir. such as a written ordinance or 2010). regulation;”

The Court should therefore dismiss (2) “Through the decisions of a Madden’s official capacity claims person with final policymaking against Holliday (a judge), Lamb and authority;” (3) “Through an omission, such as This Court has, in the past, a failure to properly train determined that North Carolina officers, that manifests public defenders are state agents for deliberate indifference to the Eleventh Amendment purposes. See rights of citizens; or” Davis v. Blanchard, No. 1:15CV362, 2016 WL 1229087, at *5 (M.D.N.C. (4) “Through a practice that is so Mar. 28, 2016). Thus, the Court persistent and widespread as to should dismiss Madden’s official constitute a custom or usage capacity claims against Campbell, with the force of law.” Gebhard, and Snow. Howard v. City of Durham, 68 F.4th Assuming arguendo, though, that 934, 952 (4th Cir. 2023) (citation North Carolina public defenders are modified). municipal agents,1 dismissal remains appropriate. Madden’s makes only Chandler is a police officer, Compl. at vague allegations against his former 3; Madden’s official capacity claims defense counsel. He alleges that against her must therefore satisfy Campbell missed a filing deadline, Monell. But Madden’s sole factual that Snow did not file motions that allegation against Chandler is that she Madden told her to, and that Gebhard “took orders from Ms. Lamb and due conspired with prosecutor Futrell to to such case 24CR413577-400 came convince Madden to sign a plea alive.” Compl. at 3, 9. This alleges agreement. Compl. at 8. These none of the above elements. allegations do not contain sufficient detail to state a claim. They also do The Court should therefore dismiss not satisfy Monell because they Madden’s official capacity claims suggest no constitutionally deficient against Chandler. express policy, decision by a person with final policymaking authority, 3. Madden’s Official Capacity failure to train, or widespread Claims Against the Public practice. Defender Defendants Cannot Survive Regardless of Whether The Court should therefore dismiss They Are State or Local Agents. Madden’s official capacity claims against Campbell, Gebhard, and Madden’s remaining official capacity Snow. claims are against public defenders.

1 Determining whether a public officer is and “the definition of the official’s a state or municipal actor is not well functions under relevant state law.” See suited for the screening stage. It requires McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 the Court to consider factors such as U.S. 781, 786 (1997). what function the officer was performing C. Madden’s Individual Capacity referring to or how Holliday was Claims Against Holliday Fail responsible for these incidents. He Due to Judicial Immunity and has therefore not alleged these facts Deficient Pleading. with sufficient particularity to state a claim. “[J]udges are absolutely immune from suit for deprivation of civil rights D. Prosecutorial Immunity Bars brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” for Madden’s Individual Capacity actions they take in their capacity as Claims Against Lamb and judges. Darling v. Falls, 236 F. Supp. Futrell. 3d 914, 926-27 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (quoting King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, Prosecutors are immune from suits 356 (4th Cir. 1992)). “[F]actors for damages for actions “intimately determining whether an act by a judge associated with the judicial phase of is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature the criminal process.” Imbler v. of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); function normally performed by a Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, judge, and to the expectations of the 268 (4th Cir. 2018). This includes parties, i.e., whether they dealt with suits for malicious prosecution, id., the judge in his judicial capacity.” and for violation of a defendant’s right Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, against double jeopardy, Nivens v. 362 (1978). Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 250 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, Madden complains that, in his various criminal cases, Holliday—a Here, Madden sues Lamb and Futrell state judge—ordered that Madden for their role in prosecuting various “get a mental health assessment and criminal cases against him. See enroll in DVIP,” charged Madden with Compl. at 7–8. Madden further claims criminal contempt, set a $50,000 bail that Futrell “threatened Mr. Madden despite Madden’s indigent status, and that he (Mr. Madden) would be placed an ankle monitor on Madden. charged on a weekly basis if he (Mr. Compl. at 7. All of these are functions Madden) did not plea to a stalking normally performed by a judge charge.” Id. Finally, Madden claims dealing with criminal defendants; that Futrell brought stalking charges Holliday is therefore immune to any against him that had already been claims arising out of them. dismissed. Id. at 8. Prosecutorial immunity bars all these claims. Madden also complains that he “was denied his first appearance, second appearance, and was not taken before the Magistrate as ordered per the Conditions of Release and Release Order.” Id. However, Madden does not specify what appearances he is E. Madden Has Not Stated a And Madden cannot claim ineffective Claim Against Campbell, assistance of counsel because his Gebhard, and Snow in Their complaint is not a habeas petition. Individual Capacities. Madden has not alleged that he is currently being detained, and even if Section 1983 typically does not allow he had, courts generally dismiss suits against public defenders for complaints brought under Section actions they took “when performing a 1983 without prejudice rather than lawyer’s traditional functions as convert them into habeas petitions. counsel.” See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, See generally Copus v. City of 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); accord Edgerton, 96 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. Howard v. Sharrett, 540 F. Supp. 3d 1996) (“The district court [is] not 549, 553 (E.D. Va. 2021). Exceptions authorized to convert a § 1983 action exist only for unusual circumstances, into a § 2254 action, a step that carries such as “intentional misconduct” disadvantages (exhaustion and the involving “conspiratorial action with certificate of appealability only two state officials.” See Tower v. Glover, among many) for litigants.... When a 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984). Thus, the plaintiff files a § 1983 action that only federal cause of action for cannot be resolved without inquiring ineffective assistance of counsel is in into the validity of confinement, the the form of a habeas petition where a court should dismiss the suit without detained plaintiff sues not for prejudice.”). damages but for release. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. Madden has therefore failed to state a 668, 686 (1984). federal claim against Campbell, Gebhard, and Snow in their individual Here, Madden has alleged that capacities. To the extent that he has Campbell missed a filing deadline and stated any claim against them under that Snow did not file motions as state law, the Court should decline to directed. Compl. at 8. These are exercise supplemental jurisdiction traditional defense counsel functions over it in absence of a surviving and therefore not actionable under federal claim. See 28 U.S. Code § Section 1983. 1367(c)(3). Madden also alleges that Gebhard F. Madden’s Allegations Are Too conspired with prosecutor Futrell to Vague to State a Claim Against convince Madden to sign a plea Chandler in Her Individual agreement. Id. However, Madden Capacity. alleges no specific facts showing a conspiracy. He therefore fails to state Madden’s only factual allegation a claim under the conspiracy against Chandler—a law enforcement exception to the general prohibition officer—is that she “took orders from on suing defense counsel under Ms. Lamb and due to such case Section 1983. 24CR413577-400 came alive.” Compl. at 3, 9. Madden’s allegations regarding Lamb, in turn, state only that Lamb “violated 18 U.S. Code Section 242 in two cases she overseen [sic] in District Court[.]” Compl. at 7. Madden provides no further facts. Madden’s claims against Chandler thus fall well below even the “speculative level” that the Supreme Court rejected in Twombly. Madden has therefore failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim against Chandler in her individual capacity. III. CONCLUSION IT IS ORDERED that Madden’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, Docket Entry 1, is GRANTED for the limited purpose of allowing the Court to consider the following recommendation of dismissal. IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

SUL na Gibsn McFadden United States Magistrate Judge March 23, 2026 Durham, NC