Pisarri v. State

724 So. 2d 635, 1998 WL 909803
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedDecember 31, 1998
Docket98-2086
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 724 So. 2d 635 (Pisarri v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pisarri v. State, 724 So. 2d 635, 1998 WL 909803 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

724 So.2d 635 (1998)

Peter A. PISARRI, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 98-2086

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

December 31, 1998.

*636 Peter A. Pisarri, Orlando, pro se.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Locksley O. Wade, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

ORFINGER, M., Senior Judge.

Some thirteen months after appellant was sentenced for attempted sexual battery of a child under twelve years of age, the trial court entered a written order declaring him to be a sexual predator and requiring him to comply with the registration requirements of section 775.22, Florida Statutes (1993). Pursuant to section 775.21(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) is required to place a defendant's name on its list of sexual predators once a court makes a written finding that a defendant is a sexual predator.

Appellant sought a writ of mandamus to compel FDLE to remove his name from that list and appeals the denial of his petition. However, mandamus is available only to enforce a clear legal right to the performance of a particular duty, where there is no other legal method of obtaining relief. Pino v. District Court of Appeal, Third District, 604 So.2d 1232 (Fla.1992). Based upon the trial court's order, FDLE was required to place appellant's name on the list of sexual predators and was thus performing its legal duty. If the trial court erroneously found appellant to be a sexual predator, an appeal from that order would have been the appropriate remedy. See Downs v. State, 700 So.2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The fact that some time intervened between appellant's sentencing and the court's determination that appellant was a sexual predator would not, in and of itself, make that finding erroneous. See Collie v. State, 710 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), rev. denied, No. 93,032 (Fla. Aug. 7, 1998); Macias v. State, 708 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So.2d 1124 (Fla.1998);

AFFIRMED.

W. SHARP and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

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Related

Saintelien v. State
990 So. 2d 494 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2008)
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884 So. 2d 482 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
724 So. 2d 635, 1998 WL 909803, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pisarri-v-state-fladistctapp-1998.