Pior v. Giddens

23 So. 337, 50 La. Ann. 216, 1897 La. LEXIS 353
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedDecember 29, 1897
DocketNo. 12,477
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 23 So. 337 (Pior v. Giddens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pior v. Giddens, 23 So. 337, 50 La. Ann. 216, 1897 La. LEXIS 353 (La. 1897).

Opinions

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Blanchard, J.

In March, 1889, D. M. Giddens contracted a loan of money from the plaintiff and to secure payment thereof executed ■a mortgage on certain lands forming what is known as “the Sprowls Place ” in Red River parish.

This debt remaining unsettled, an action was brought in 1893 to -enforce its payment.

A short time prior to the filing of that suit Giddens made what purported to be a final settlement with his sons, R. A. and A. S. Giddens, whose tutor he had been, in which settlement he delivered to them, as their inheritance, along with other property, the Sprowls Place, which he had a few years previously mortgaged, as his own property, to plaintiff.

Because of this settlement with his sons and this delivery of the mortgaged property to them, the sons were made parties defendant, •along with the father, in the action to enforce payment of the debt for borrowed money, and the settlement and delivery was asked to be avoided in so far as the same affected the rights of the complaining creditor.

In that litigation the judgment of the court below was in favor -of plaintiff, decreeing recovery of the amount sued for, recognizing the mortgage as existing on the interest of D. M. Giddens in the •Sprowls Place, which was fixed at an undivided one-third thereof, •and avoiding the settlement and delivery of property made by Gid•dens to his sons, so far as the same affected plaintiff’s right as mort.gage creditor to the extent his mortgage was recognized in the judgment.

From this judgment R. A. and A. S. Giddens prosecuted an appeal .to this court, and in 1894 a decree was handed down reversing [218]*218in part the judgment appealed from and directing that the rights of the plaintiff under the mortgage be restricted to the interest of D. MGiddens in the community between himself and his deceased wife, to-be ascertained by proper proceedings in the court below, to which-court the case was remanded for the purpose. In this remanding the rights of the plaintiff were fully reserved to make effectual for the satisfaction of his mortgage the interest of D. M. Giddens in the community. 46 An. 1406.

Following this the present suit was instituted, the purpose of which-seems, first, to have it decreed that D. M. Giddens owns individually an undivided one-third of the property which he had mortgaged to-plaintiff in 1889, and subjecting same to the satisfaction of the mortgage debt; and, failing in this, second, to have determined the interest of said Giddens in the community between himself and his deceased wife, to the end that the same may be made amenable to plaintiff’s claim under the hypothecation aforesaid.

It is clear that the inquiry herein must be limited to the latter. The decree of this court in the former suit directs precisely that the rights of plaintiff under the mortgage be restricted to the interest of' ■ the elder Giddens in the community between himself and his dead wife, to be ascertained according to law. The intention and declara - tion of our judgment in that controversy was that the case be remanded for a settlement of community affairs.

This involved, first, ascertaining what were the rights of ownership of the community in the property which D. M. Giddens had mortgaged to plaintiff; and, second, how his interest in the share owned by the community might be affected by indebtedness, if any, due by him to the community, or by the community to him, as the case might be. And then, finally, should anything be left to Giddens, as the result of such settlement of community affairs, to apply same to the satisfaction of plaintiff’s mortgage claim. The opinion of the court declared that the community between the husband and wife-had never been settled and liquidated, and, consequently, that the rights of the spouses had not been fixed and determined. It was correctly held that the separate creditor of either spouse has the right, after the dissolution of the community, to have the community liquidated; that he can not deal with an undivided interest of his debtor in any specific piece of property belonging to the community, proceed against it by direct seizure, sell it and apply the proceeds to-[219]*219payment of his debt; that his proper course is to force by appropriate proceedings a final settlement and liquidation of the community, and then to proceed legally to subject the interest of his debtor thus found to the satisfaction of his debt. 46 An. 1145.

Thus is pointed out clearly the only course to be pursued in this later edition of a long standing litigation.

Robert H. Armistead died in 1868. He left surviving him a widow, Louisa Armistead. The community between them owned at the death of the husband several small Red river plantations. There were three children of this marriage surviving and of age when the father died. They were, Martha E., Mary Jane and John H. 4rmis-stead.

The first was married to J. W. Sandiford. Mary Jane Armistead had married David Briggs, who died in 1862. Three children were born of this marriage, of whom two were living when the grandfather, Robert H. Armistead, died.

Briggs owned some cotton which was sold after the war by Robert H. Armistead and netted fifteen hundred dollars. He retained this sum in his hands and owed it at his death — one half to Mrs. Briggs, widow in community, the other half to the Briggs children. '

Mrs. Briggs, the widow, in 1868, just after the death of her father, married D. M. Giddens. Two children sprang from this union — Robert A., born in February, 1870, Albert S. in August, 1872

One of the Briggs children died in 1871. His share of the cotton money (fifteen hundred dollars) was thereupon inherited by his mother, his surviving sister of the full blood, Ella Briggs, and his brother of the half blood, Robert A. Giddens. In what proportion, it is not material to inquire. The other Giddens child had not then been born.

Following the death of Robert H. Armistead, his widow and heirs effected a partition of the estate. The widow and her daughter Mary Jane (Mrs. Giddens) were awarded as their share what was known as the Armistead place” — the home of the family. Mrs. Sandiford and J. H. Armistead took other property.

By this arrangement Mrs. Louisa Armistead and Mrs. Giddens acquired the Armistead plantation in the proportion of three-fourths to the former and one-fourth to the latter. As widow in community Mrs. Armistead owned in her own right (there being no debts) one-half of the whole place, or three-sixths. Mrs. Giddens, as one of [220]*220three heirs, inherited one-third of one-haif, or one-sixth of the Whole. They each owned a like interest in the property which fell to Mrs. Sandiford and J. H. Armistead in the partition. The parties were effecting an exchange. The two-sixths interest owned by Mrs. Sandiford and J. H. Armistead in the Armistead place was exchanged for the interest Mrs. Armistead and Mrs. Giddens owned in the other property. The latter received, relatively to each other, the two-sixths interest of the former in the Armistead place in the same proportion that three-sixths bear to one-sixth.

Thus it was that Mrs. Armistead’s interest thereafter in the Home place was three-fourths and Mrs. Giddens one-fourth.

Mrs. Louisa Armistead died in September, 1871. She had made a will bequeathing her interest in the Armistead place to her daughter, Mrs.

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Bluebook (online)
23 So. 337, 50 La. Ann. 216, 1897 La. LEXIS 353, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pior-v-giddens-la-1897.