Pion v. Richardson

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedDecember 22, 2025
Docket25-cv-3957
StatusUnknown

This text of Pion v. Richardson (Pion v. Richardson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pion v. Richardson, (Vt. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Termont Superior Court Filed 12/08/25 Orleans UUnit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Orleans Unit Case No. 25-CV-03957 247 Main Street Newport VT 05855 802-334-3305 www.vermontjudiciary.org

Christopher Pion v. Wayne Richardson et al

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION Title: Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Motion: 1) Filer: William F Grigas Filed Date: September 11, 2025

Plaintiff Christopher Pion seeks a preliminary injunction requiring defendants Wayne and Melanie Richardson to permit Christopher to use Keep-Out Drive in Lowell to access property he owns. The court held a hearing on the motion on December 3, 2025. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

Findings of Fact The court finds the following facts established by a preponderance of the evidence introduced at the motion hearing: e The parties are neighboring property owners in Lowell and have known each other for decades. e The Richardsons live on property located at 314 Keep-Out Drive. e Christopher owns property located at 175 Keep-Out Drive that he uses for maple sugaring and operating a small sawmill. There are also several cabins located on the property. e The parties and their families have lived on the properties and surrounding lots for many years. Christopher acquired ownership of his lot from his father in 2002. e Since owning his property, Christopher has always used the gravel road known as Keep-Out Drive to access his property. Keep-Out Drive runs from Buck Hill Road and crosses the Richardsons' property for approximately 400 feet. Christopher has no express easement to use Keep-Out Drive.

e Christopher credibly testified that his father helped improve Keep-Out Drive before Christopher acquired the property, and Christopher has at least occasionally maintained and plowed the road between acquiring the property in 2002 and

Entry Regarding Motion Page 1 of 4 25-CV-03957 Christopher Pion v. Wayne Richardson et al December 2024, and that he never sought or obtained the Richardsons’ permission to use or maintain Keep-Out Drive.

• Christopher has an easement for a right-of-way across a neighboring relative’s property that would allow him to access his property from Buck Hill Road without crossing the Richardsons’ property. There is no established road along that easement, and Christopher estimated it would cost tens of thousands of dollars to install a road. Access is possible by foot or off-road capable vehicles such as a four- wheeler or a skid steer.

• There is currently no other way to access Christopher’s property by car or truck except by using Keep-Out Drive.

• Christopher formerly worked for the Town of Lowell doing road maintenance and plowing work but quit his job in late 2024 with plans to work full-time on the Keep- Out Drive property, including by doubling the size of his sugaring operation (from approximately 2,000 to 4,000 taps).

• In or about December 2024, Christopher visited his property with plans to plow the road and found that the Richardsons had roped off Keep-Out Drive at their property line. Christopher removed the rope and continued plowing the road. • The Richardsons had previously roped off Keep-Out Drive in past winters, but not consistently, and it had never become a source of conflict between the parties. It is unclear from the current record how often Christopher previously accessed his property during the winter months, whether he ever knew the Richardsons had roped off the road, or whether he was ever unable to access his property from Keep- Out Drive before December 2024.

• Following the December 2024 incident, the Richardsons for the first time took the position that Christopher could not cross their property on Keep-Out Drive at any time without the Richardsons’ permission.

• The parties reached a temporary agreement allowing Christopher access during the 2025 sugaring season, but that agreement expired in May. Christopher has not been able to access his property using Keep-Out Drive since that time.

• As a result of not being able to use Keep-Out Drive, Christopher has not been able to drive a truck to his property and has not been able to expand his sugaring operation as planned or prepare for the 2026 sugaring season. By being unable to access his mill, he has lost business opportunities to mill road markers for the Towns of Newport Center and Westfield. More generally, he has not been able to access and enjoy his property to the full extent that he previously enjoyed.

Entry Regarding Motion Page 2 of 4 25-CV-03957 Christopher Pion v. Wayne Richardson et al Conclusions of Law “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Taylor v. Town of Cabot, 2017 VT 92, ¶ 19, 205 Vt. 586, 596, 178 A.3d 313 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). The movant bears the burden of establishing that the relevant factors call for the imposition of a preliminary injunction. Id. Those factors are: “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the potential harm to the other parties; (3) the likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Id. (citation omitted). The burden has been met here. Christopher credibly testified that he has lost business opportunities and cannot readily access his property because he is unable to cross the Richardsons’ property using Keep-Out Drive. Both the loss of business opportunities and the denial of access to one’s real property have been held to constitute irreparable harm. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004) (business opportunities); Weston v. Mcmahan, No. 23-CV-02678, 2024 WL 409038, at *1 (Vt. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2024) (Hoar, J.) (access to property). The Richardsons, by contrast, have not shown they will be harmed if Christopher is permitted access to Keep-Out Drive while the case is pending. Turning to the merits, the court construes Christopher’s complaint as seeking a prescriptive easement to access his property by traveling over the Richardsons’ property on Keep Out Drive. 1 “To establish a prescriptive easement, plaintiff’s use of the land must have been open, notorious, continuous for fifteen years, and hostile or under claim of right.” Schonbek v. Chase, 2010 VT 91, ¶ 8, 189 Vt. 79 (quotation omitted); Cmty. Feed Store, Inc. v. Ne. Culvert Corp., 151 Vt. 152, 156 (1989) (describing the elements as “open, notorious, hostile and continuous use over a fifteen-year period in which the fee owner has acquiesced”). “These elements are essentially the same as those required to gain title to land by adverse possession,” except that adverse possession additionally requires “that the claimant must maintain exclusive possession of the claimed property during the statutory period.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.17 cmt. a). For prescriptive easements, however, the “use need not be, and frequently is not, exclusive.” Id. The extent of the property right acquired must be determined by the extent of the plaintiff’s use of the property that is open, notorious, continuous for fifteen years, and hostile or under a claim of right. See id., ¶ 8; Cmty. Feed Store, Inc., 151 Vt. at 156 (quotation omitted).

1 Christopher does not claim he had exclusive use of Keep-Out Drive and he is not requesting that

the court award him exclusive use. Rather, he is seeking use of the road as a right-of-way to access his property. In other words, he is seeking a prescriptive easement.

Entry Regarding Motion Page 3 of 4 25-CV-03957 Christopher Pion v.

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Related

register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.
356 F.3d 393 (Second Circuit, 2004)
SCHONBEK v. Chase
2010 VT 91 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2010)
Greenberg v. Hadwen
484 A.2d 916 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1984)
Community Feed Store, Inc. v. Northeastern Culvert Corp.
559 A.2d 1068 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1989)

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Pion v. Richardson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pion-v-richardson-vtsuperct-2025.