FI LE D SUPERIOR CGURT GF GUAM ZU22 APR lb PH 3 : Ii l CLERKOFCGURT 2 ay= IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM I I
4 JADEN C. PIOLO, Z.C.P., a minor, CIVIL CASE NO. CV0347-20 E.M.C.P., a minor, and E.M.C.P., a minor, by and through their mother as Guardian, MIKA 5 PIOLO Individually, and MIKA PIOLO as Administrator of the Estate of Elbert Gallaza 6 Piolo,
Plaintiffs, DECISION AND ORDER 7 Motions for Reconsideration vs. 8 GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, FRED E. 9 BORDALLO, JOSEPH CARBULLIDO, JASON AGUON, and DOES 1 TO 5, 10 Defendants.
INTRODUCTION 12 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on January ll, 2022, for a
13 motion hearing on competing Motions for Reconsideration. Plaintiffs Jaded c. Piolo, Z.C.P., a
14 minor, E.M.C.P., a minor, and E.M.C.P., a minor (collectively "Minors"), by and through their
15 mother as Guardian, Mika Piolo Individually, and Mika Piolo as Administrator of the Estate of
Elbert Gallaza Piolo (collectively "Plaintiffs") are represented by Attorney Daniel J. Berman. 16 Defendants Government of Guam, Fred E. Bordallo, Joseph Carbullido, and Jason Aguon 17 ("Defendants" or "Government") are represented by the Office of the Attorney General 18 ("Government"). Having considered the arguments and the applicable law, the Court hereby
19 decides and orders the following. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.
20 Further, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and has reconsidered
Page 1 of 16 l the Motion. Finally, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Since Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss is denied, Count I, II, and IV will proceed. 2
3 BACKGROUND 4 This case is based upon events which occurred on July 13, 2015, wherein Officer Elbert
5 Piolo ("Officer Piolo") was allegedly shot and killed by fellow Officer Mark Torre Jr. ("Officer
6 Torre"). Am. Con pl. 11 17 (Oct. 8, 2020). Plaintiffs, who are immediate family members of
7 O$cer Piolo, filed a Government Claim against the Guam Police Department ("GPD")
8 seeking damages for his death on May 25, 2018. Am. Con pl. Ex. B. This claim was denied on / November 9, 2018. Id., Ex. C. 9 Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on June 5, 2020. On October 8, 2020, Plaintiffs 10 filed the First Amended Complaint for Damages ("Amended Complaint"). The Amended
11 Complaint alleges five causes of action: (1) negligent hiring, retention, supervision and
12 training; (2) negligent entrustment; (3) breach of f iduciary duty ardor conf idential
relationship; (4) direct liability negligence; and (5) deprivation of federal civil rights under 42 13 U.S.C. § 1983. The Government filed its Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First 14 Amended Complaint ("Motion to Dismiss") on October 19, 2020. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition 15 on November 10, 2020.
16 On November 9, 2020, the Government tiled a Notice of Errata to indicate it
17 represented Defendants Bordello, Aguon, and Carbullido. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike the
Notice of Errata on November 17, 2020. The Government tiled its Reply on November 30, 18
2020, followed by the Plaintiffs' Reply on December 29, 2020. 19 Plaintiffs filed a Request for Entry of Default against Defendants Aguon, Bordadlo and 20 Carbullido on November 6, 2020, November 20, 2020, and March ll, 2021, respectively.
Page z of 16 1 Entries of Default were filed by the clerk for Defendants Aguon and Bordadlo on November 16,
2 2020, and November 23, 2020. The Government objected to Plaintiffs' Requests for Entry of
Default on March 18, 2021. Plaintiffs filed a Reply in support of their requests for default on 3 . April 5, 2021. 4 Oral arguments on the Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike the Notice of
5 Errata were held on May 11, 2021. On August 20, 2021, this Court issued its Decision and
6 Order dismissing Counts III and V of the Amended Complaint, and accepting Government's
7 Notice of Errata. As a result, all prior entries of default were declared void.
g Two competing motions for reconsideration have since been tiled. The first Motion for
Reconsideration was Filed by the Government on August 30, 2021. Plaintiffs tiled an
9 Opposition on October 6, 2021, to which the Government filed an Amended Reply on October 10 25, 2021 I
11 The second Motion for Reconsideration or Relief From Order and Memorandum in
12 Support was filed by Plaintiffs on September 29, 2021. The Government filed its Opposition
on October 27, 2021, to which Plaintiffs replied on November 12, 2021. The Court held a 13 hearing on the completion Motions for Reconsideration on January ll, 2022, airer which it 14 took both matters under advisement. 15
Page 3 of 16 1 DISCUSSION
1. APPLICABLE STANDARD. 2 Pursuant to the Local Rules of the Superior Court of Guam, a motion for 3 reconsideration may be made upon the following grounds: 4 (1) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Comet before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been 5 known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time of such decision, or,
6 (2) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such decision, or, 7 3) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before such decision. 8 CVR '1.l(i)(1H3). A motion for reconsideration may not repeat arguments already made 9 regarding the original motion. Id.
10 The Govermnent brought its Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Guam Rule of
11 Civil Procedure ("GRCP") 59. See Guam R. Civ. P. 59(e) ("Any motion to alter or amend a
12 judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."). Although GRCP 59
appears to apply only to judgments, the Guam Supreme Court has held that a trial court may 13 entertain a GRCP 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration relative to a decision. DFS Guam L.P. v. 14 A.B. Won Pat Int'l Airport Auth., 2014 Guam 12 1121. The Guam Supreme Court has also held 15 that GRCP 59(e) motions are appropriate "where the Md court: (1) is presented with new
16 evidence, (2) committed clear error or the decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an
17 intervening change in controlling law." Id. (quoting Rong Chang Company, Ltd. v. M2P, Inc.,
2012 Guam 1 1116). Clear error occurs when a trial court issues a decision it could not have 18
rationally reached. DFS, 2014 Guam 12 1122. A GRCP 59 motion "shall be filed no later than 19 10 days after entry of the judgment." Guam R.Civ. P. 59(e), Rong Chang, 2012 Guam 1 1116. 20 Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration was tiled within ten days and is timely.
Page 4 of 16 1 The Plaintiffs bring their Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to GRCP 60(b)(1) and
2 60(b)(6).1 See Ron Chang, 2012 Guam l 11] 18-21 (finding no error when a trial court applied
GRCP 60(b) in its review of post-judgment motions for reconsideration and to set aside the 3 judgment). GRCP 60(b) provides the following:
4 On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 5 reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, 6 (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
7 Guam R. Civ. P. 60(b). GRCP 60(b)(l) also encompasses "mistakes in the application of the
8 law." Cristobal v. Siegal, 2012 Guam 16 118 (quoting Parks v. US. Life & Credit Corp., 677
9 F.2d 838, 839-40 (1 ltd Cir. l982)). A GRCP 60(b) motion should be made within a reasonable
10 time, and for reasons one through three, not more than one year later. Guam R. Civ. p. 60(b).
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration was filed one month after the Com issued its Decision 11 and Order, and was therefore timely. 12 II.UPON RECONSIDERATION, THE COURT FINDS THAT EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS SUPPORTED B Y T H E F A C T S C O N T A I N E D I N THE 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT.
14 In the Court's August 20, 2021, Decision and Order, it laid out its reasoning for finding
15 that Plaintiffs' claims were not clearly time-barred under this theory. See Decision and Order
pp. 7 - 8 (Aug. 20, 2021). Upon reconsideration, the Court finds that the allegations made in the 16 Amended Complaint are sufficient to warrant the application of equitable estoppels. 17
1 Plaintiffs further argue that their motion for reconsideration is appropriate under Rule 59(e) (supra) and 54(b) 19 ("any order or other form of decision which adjudicates fewer than all the claims Or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 20 claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."). However, the Plaintiffs' motion is untimely under 59(e), and is more appropriately considered under GRCP 60(b).
Page S of 16 1 Equitable estoppels is defined as the doctrine by which a person may be precluded by his
2 act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would
otherwise have had. Mobil Oil Guam, Inc. v. Young Ha Lee, 2004 Guam 9 1]24. The doctrine is 3 designed to prevent the miscarriage of justice and is to be used cautiously because it bars the 4 n normal assertion of rights otherwise present. Id. Equllty requires that a party be stopped firm
5 "asserting the statute of limitations as a defense ro an admitted untimely action because his
6 conduct has induced another into forbeMng suit within the applicable limitations period."
7 Guam Police Dept. v. Superior Court of Guam, 2019 Guam 21 1[ 15, eating Atwater Elementary
Sch. Dist. v. Calomia Dap 'r of Gen, Serv., 158 P.3d 794, 797 (Cad. 2007). The application of 8 equitable estoppal "is wholly independent of the limitations period itself and takes its life from 9 the equitable principle that no man may profit from his own wrongdoing in a court of justice."
10 Guam Police Dept., 2019 Guam 21 1] 15.
11 The Guam Supreme Court has laid out the following test for equitable estoppels:
12 [F]our elements must be proven in an equitable estoppels analysis: (1) the party to be stopped must be apprised of the facts;
13 (2) he must intend that his conduct will be acted upon, or act in such a manner that the party asserting the estoppels could reasonably believe that he intended 14 his conduct to be acted upon;
(3) the party asserting the estoppels must be ignorant of the true state of the facts, 15 and
16 (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.
17 Limtiaco v. Guam Fire Dep 't, 2007 Guam 10, 1] 58; see Title 6 GCA § 5106(3) ("Whenever a
18 party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief; he cannot, in any litigation arising 19 out of such declaration, act or omission be permitted to falsify it.") The party relying on the 20 doctrine has the burden to prove the existence of the four required elements. Mobil, 2004 Guam
Page 6 of16 1 9 1124, see also Crestline Mobile Homes Mfg. Co. v. Pac. Fin. Corp., 356 P.2d 192, 196 (Cal.
1960). 2 The Attorney General attempts to sparse the Office of the Attorney General from GPD 3 in its briefs in support of its Motion for Reconsideration. The Court rejects this perspective. 4 O I , . Q Plaintlffs make their dlegatlons against "GOVGUAM" that is to say the "Government."
5 Plaintiffs do not distinguish the Attorney General h°om GPD in its claims against the
6 Government. To the extent that Plaintiffs name the Attorney General and GPD, it speaks only to
7 the alleged specific acts. Therefore, the Court rejects the Attorney General's view that the
Attorney General's acts do not toll the statute of limitations in a claim against GPD. It is the 8 Government's acts, both the Attorney General and GPD in concert, that lead Plaintiffs' to 9 detrimental rely on the conduct to be stopped. Therefore, the party to be stopped is not just
10 GPD, it is the Government. 11 a. The Government was appraised of the facts.
12 The first element of equitable estoppels is that the party to be stopped is appraised of the
13 facts. Here, Plaintiffs alleged that the Government knew and misrepresented key facts that
deceived Plaintiffs to their detriment in paragraph 62 of the Amended Complaint: 14 Plaintiffs' claims against all Defendants are equitably tolled due to the acts and omissions of "Defendant GOVGUAM" including but not limited to, the [Attorney 15 General's] representation of Plaintiffs in the criminal trial proceedings against Torre, the [Attorney General's] representation of Plaintiffs in the restitution proceedings, the 16 [Attorney General's] failed appellate proceedings of the Restitution Order in the Supreme Court, the [Government's] statements to Plaintiffs that they represented and 17 would protect the interest of Plaintiffs, GOD's concealment of its own misconduct and negligence manifest in its objection to the Plaintiffs' FOIA claims, [the Government's] affirmative actions as legal counsel to pursue their claims and commence litigation, [the 18 Government's] deception in representing that it was protecting Plaintiffs' best interest in all com proceedings but then refusing to filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on the 19 Restitution issue which order all but denied restitution to the Plaintiffs, and [the Gove enfs] misrepresentation by omission to the Plaintiffs about the running of any 20 limitations period.
Page 7 of 16 l Am. Con pl. 11 62 (Oct. 8, 2020). When viewing these facts as true and in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs, it appears that the Government was apprised of the facts and 2 circumstances concerning the various representations to Plaintiffs and intending that those 3 representations be relied upon. The party relying on the doctrine of equitable estoppal is only 4 required to prove the existence of the elements. See Mobile, 2004 Guam 9 1] 24, Limitiaco,
5 2007 Guam 10 1158. The need to plead equitable estoppal with particularity is noticeably absent
6 firm the binding authority of the Guam Supreme Court. Therefore, this Court is satisfied that
the allegations in tlle Amended Complaint are sufficient to appraise the Government of the 7 facts. 8 b. The Government intended that its conduct would be acted upon in a manner 9 such that Plaintiffs could reasonably believe that such conduct would be acted upon. 10 The second element of estoppels is that the party to be stopped intend its conduct be
ll acted upon in a way that the plaintiff could reasonably believe such conduct would be acted
12 upon. The Government's intended conduct is sufficiently reflected in the Amended Complaint.
First, [the Government] prepared and presented Plaintiff Mika Piolo as their witness at Torre's 13
trial, which fact [sic] caused Plaintiff Mika Paolo to more than reasonably rely and believe that 14 the [Government] represented and was looking out for the best interest of Plaintiff Mika Piolo 15 a nd t he P la int iff Minor s. Am. C on pl. 11 50 (Oct . 8, 2020). S econd, t he [Gover nment ]
16 represented Plaintiffs on the Piolo restitution claims, and on the [Attorney General's] one failed
17 appeal to the Supreme Court of Guam. Id. Third, [the Government] made statements to
Plaintiffs that they [the Government] represented and would protect the interest of Plaintiffs. Id. 18
at1[62. 19 Here, the Governnlent's intended conduct is reflected in its representation of Plaintiffs 20 in the restitution claims and in making statements about protecting Plaintiffs' interest. In tum,
Page 8 of 16 1 the interaction between the Government and Plaintiffs throughout the trial and restitution
2 hearings, coupled with the Government's representation that it would protect Plaintiffs interest
is sufficient to manifest a reasonable belief in Plaintiffs that the Government intended to protect 3 their interest. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that time 4 . | , » , Amended Complalnt sufficiently reflects Plalntlffs' reasonable belief that the Government
5 intended to act, and would act to represent and protect Plaintiffs' interest.
6 c. Plaintiffs were ignorant to the state of the facts.
The third element of equitable estoppels is that the plaintiffs were ignorant to the state of 7
the facts. The Guam Supreme Court has held that an essential element of equitable estoppels is 8 the entire good faith and innocence of the party imposed on. Mobile, 2004 Guam 9 ii 26, 9 quoting WE. Richmond & Co. v. Sec. Nat'I Bank, 64 S.W.2d 863, 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).
10 "A party setting up an estoppal is bold to the exercise of reasonable diligence-such diligence
11 as the circumstances of the case require." WE. Richmond, 64 S.W.2d 863, 872, quoting Moore
12 v. Bowman, 47 N.H. 494, 494 (N.H. Superior Ct. 1867). To hold that one, who shuts his eyes
13 and disregards danger signals Haunted before his view, is an innocent party, entitled to invoke
the doctrine of equitable estoppal, would be to encourage fraud. A person who conducts himself 14 scarcely acts in good faith, and it is well settled that a party must proceed in the utmost good 15 faith to claim the benefit of estoppal. WE. Richmond, 64 S.W.2d 863, 872.
16 In analyzing this element the Court considers the specific circumstances of the instant
17 case. First, the case stems from CF0421-15, a criminal homicide case. Second, the victim of the
18 homicide case is the father and husband of Plaintiffs. Am. Comal. 11115-6 (Oct. 8, 2020). Third,
the inception of the criminal case was in 2015 and its first adjudication was in 2017. Id. at LM 19 33-34 (Oct. 8, 2020). Fourth, the Government "prepared and presented Mika Piolo, [victim's 20 widow], as their witness at trial. Id. 1111 50 (Oct. 8, 2020). Finally, the Government fuMet
Page 9 ofl6 1 interacted with Plaintiffs as it relates their claims for restitution. See Id. These facts reflect that
2 the Government consistently interacted with Plaintiffs for at least two (2) years. The Court notes
that Plaintiffs here are not lawyers, they lacked legal training, and are ignorant of the true state 3 of their position, and the extent to which the Government represented their interests. The lay 4 Plaintiffs do not know how to look at the state of the facts, nor would they know what to look
5 for. Moreover, there is no indication that Plaintiffs consciously or intentionally disregarded any
6 signals that would reflect their awareness that the Government was not representing Plaintiffs
interest when it said it would. See WE. Richmond, 64 S.W.2d 863, 872. Instead, Plaintiffs seem 7 to have actively participated in the trial and complied with the Attorney General's request in 8 good faith. According to the Amended Complaint, it appears Plaintiff Mica Piolo searched and 9 retained private counsel after she learned that the Attorney General failed in its effort at
10 restitution, which also appears to be the first time Plaintiff became aware that the Government
ll was no longer acting in Plaintiffs' interest. See Am. Con pl. W 51-52 (Oct. 8, 2020). Instead of
12 choosing to ignore the indication that the Government was no longer representing Plaintiffs'
13 interest, Plaintiff Mika Piolo engaged in her search, therefore, affording Plaintiffs a claim for
estoppal. The Court finds that Plaintiffs acted in good faith and were ignorant to the state of the 14 facts. 15 d. Plaintiffs relied on the Government's conduct to their injury.
16 The final element for equitable estoppels is that the party asserting estoppels relied on the
17 conduct of the party to be stopped to its injury. In Limtiaco, the Guam Supreme Court found
lg that the plaintiff relied to his detriment on the Guam Fire Department's ("GFD") statements.
2007 Guam 10 1] 62. The Supreme CoM reasoned that the plaintiff could have filed his 19 grievance after the fire chief acknowledged his debt but did not pay, and that plaintiff could 20 have filed his grievance later in 2003 when they promised him again. Id. The Supreme Court
Page10of 16 l authority seems to suggest that foregoing an action as a result of relying on the statements made
2 by the party to be stopped is sufficient to satisfy reliance as it relates to estoppal. That is the
case here. 3 Here, the allegations set forth in paragraph 62 of the Amended Complaint reflect that 4 | | | » . | tune and tune again, the Government held Itself out to be representing the interest of the
5 Plaintiffs.2 Like the plaintiff in Limtiaco, who did not bring his grievance as a result of his
6 reliance on GFD's repeated statements that they would pay his debt, Plaintiffs here forwent
7 retaining private counsel as a result of their reliance on the various representations that the
Government was acting to protect their interests. See Limtiaco, 2007 Guam 10 1]62. The Court 8 finds flat the Government time and time again, for a period of about two (2) years, represented 9 that it was acting to protect Plaintiffs' interest, and Plaintiffs relied on those representations. 10 e. Equitable Estoppel against the Government
11 In addition to the four elements of equitable estoppels, a party asserting estoppal against
12 the government must also demonstrate inducement. The Guam Supreme Court has held that
successfully demonstrating that the theory of equitable estoppal prevents the government from 13 invoking sovereign immunity requires proof of inducement. Guam Poliee Dept. v. Superior 14 Court of Guam, 2011 Guam 8 1] 16. The Guam Supreme Could considered equitable estoppal 15 against the government in Lim tiaco. In that case, the Supreme Could held that the GFD was
16 2 Am. Con pl. 'I 62 (Oct. 8, 2020): Plaintiffs' claims against all Defendants are equitably tolled due to the acts and omissions of "Defendant 17 GOVGUAM" including but not limited ro, the [Attorney General's] representation of Plaintiffs in the criminal trial proceedings against Torre, the [Attorney General's] representation of Plaintiffs in the restitution proceedings, Me [Attorney General's] failed appellate proceedings of the Restitution Order in 18 the Supreme Court, the [Government's} statements to Plaintiffs that they represented and would protect the interest of Plaintiffs, GPD's concealment of its own misconduct and negligence manifest in its objection to the Plaintiffs' FOIA claims, [the Government's} affirmative actions as legal counsel to pursue 19 their claims and commence litigation, [the Government's] deception in representing that it was protecting Plaintiffs' best interest in all court proceedings but then refusing to filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on the 20 Restitution issue which order all but denied restitution to the Plaintiffs, and [the Government's] misrepresentation by omission to the Plaintiffs about the running of any limitations period.
Page 11 of 16 1 stopped firm claiming that the plaintiff failed to act in a timely manner when GFD
2 representatives themselves induced his inactivity through their promises. Limtiaco, 2007 Guam
10 1174. GFD representatives had orally assured the plaintiff that he would receive back pay to 3 which he was entitled, and had additionally made that promise to the plaintiff in writing. Id. 11 4 52. The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Government should be stopped from luring [the
5 plaintiifj into inaction." Id. 1]64. The same is true here.
6 As discussed above, the Government made various representations to Plaintiffs that it
7 would protect Plaintiffs interests. The Government, in the instant case, goes one step further
than just oral and written assurances. Here, the Gove ent actually represented Plaintiffs at the 8 restitution proceedings. The CoM is satisfied that the Government's representation of Plaintiffs 9 at the restitution proceedings, coupled with the allegations discussed above effectively
10 convinced Plaintiffs that the Government was representing their interest, and in tum, induced
11 them to forgo retaining private counsel sooner.
12 Having considered the totality of the circumstances in equity, and in viewing the facts in
13 light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the allegations set forth in the Amended
Complaint are sufficient to support equitable estoppal against the Government. 14 IILTHE COURT DENIES PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 15 Next, the Court will consider Plaintiffs' competing Motion for Reconsideration or Relief
16 firm Order. In this Motion, Plaintiffs seek the Court's reconsideration of its dismissal of the 42
17 U.S.C. § 1983 claim contained in Count V of the Complaint and its dismissal of the breach of
18 fiduciary duty and/or confidential relationship claim contained in Count III of the Complaint.
Airer considering the arguments and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion 19 for Reconsideration. 20
Page 12 of 16 1 a. The Court finds that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim contained in Count V of the Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.
2 Plaintiffs first seek the Court's review of its dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
3 contained in Count V of the Complaint. The Court dismissed Count V otter finding that the
4 claim was not based on a violation of the Plaintiffs' rights. Plaintiffs argue that Section 1983
claims may properly be asserted by a decedent's estate. 5 To support this contention, Plaintiffs argue that courts have allowed an estate to assert a 6 claim on behalf of a decedent for failure to train or supervise police officers under Section 1983.
7 See Estate of Kamas v. Township of Irvington, 790 Fed. Apex. 395, 398 (3rd Cir. 2019)
8 (recognizing that an estate may claim civil rights violations on behalf of a decedent); see also
9 Est. of Adomako v. City of Fremont, No. 17-CV-06386-DMR, 2018 WL 587146, at *5 (N.D.
10 Cal. Jan. 29, 2018) (recognizing that an estate may assert a Section 1983 claim based on
excessive force). Plaintiffs also cite to Dela Cruz v. Santos, a district court case from the 11 Norther Mariana Islands, wherein the defendants conceded that plaintiff, whose son was shot 12 and killed by a police officer, could assert a Fourteenth Amendment civil rights claim based on
13 the deprivation of her liberty interest arising out of the familial relationship with her son. Dela
14 Cruz v. Santos, CV 06-0037, 2008 WL 11389557 at *2 (D. n. Mar. 1. Aug. 26, 2008). The
15 Ninth Circuit has also found that a Fourteenth Amendment claim for excessive force may be
brought by the parents and children of a decedent killed by police officers. Curnow By & 16 Through Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991). 17 However, even if an estate may properly assert a Section 1983 claim, the instant Section 18 1983 claim is barred by the statute of limitations. "Section 1983 claims are characterized as
19 personal injury suits for statutes of limitations purposes." Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103,
20 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim is governed by
Page 13 of 16 1 state law and is based on the personal injury statute for the jurisdiction. Id; see also Maldonado
2 v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, 7 GCA § 1l306(a) is the operative
personal injury statute of limitations. This statute provides that there is a two year statute of 3 limitations to bring "{a]11 action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, seduction of a person 4 .. below the age of legal consent, or for 1n_lury ro, or for the death o12 a person caused by the
5 wrongful act or neglect of another...." 7 G.C.A. § l 1306(a).
6 Here, in order to meet the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiffs were required to
7 file their Section 1983 action within 2 years from the date their claim arose. See 7
GCA § 1l306(a). Plaintiffs' claims would have arisen on July 13, 2015, the date of Officer 8 Piolo's passing. Renewed Mot. to Dismiss at 18-19 (Oct. 19, 2020) (see supra, finding that 9 equitable estoppels does not apply to toll the statute of limitations). Thus, using Guam's personal
10 injury statute of limitations of two years, the deadline to tile this action would have been two
11 years after Officer Piolo's passing, or July 13, 2017. However, Plaintiffs did not tile the initial
12 complaint until June 5, 2020, which is nearly three years too late. For these reasons, the Could
13 Ends that Count V is barred for violation of the statute of limitations. Because this is dispositive
of die Court's review of Count V, the Court will not address the remaining arguments relative to 14 Count V. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration on this basis is denied. 15 b. The Court declines to reinstate the breach of fiduciary duty and/or confidential relationship claim contained in Count III of the Complaint 16 because Plaintiffs' failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
17 Plaintiffs also seek the Court's review of its dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty
18 and/or confidential relationship claim contained in Count III of the Complaint. In its August
Decision, the Court noted that Count III was not contained in or reasonably related to claims 19 contained in the Plaintiffs' government claim. Thus, the Court dismissed Count III due to 20 Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Page 14 of 16 I Plaintiffs now seek the Court's reconsideration and contend that Count III should not be
2 dismissed. Plaintiffs argue that because their government claim was rejected in Toto based on
statute of limitations grounds, bringing a claim specifically for breach of fiduciary duty ardor 3 confidential relationship would have been pointless, as the claim would inevitably have been 4 rejected along with all the other claims listed in the government claim. Plaintiffs argue that the
5 Government's denial of all their government claims was a foregone conclusion.
6 However, this argument is purely speculative. As the government notes, the breach of
7 fiduciary duty claim could have been construed as a continuing wrong, which would have
affected when the claim arose for statute of limitations purposes. It is impossible to know what 8 the government would have done considering the claim was never raised. If Plaintiffs' logic 9 prevails, they could conceivably add any new cause of action based on the assumption that the
10 government would have denied the claim in rote.
11 The Court has previously found that Count III is not reasonably related to the remaining
12 claims alleged in the government claim, and as such the government was not put on notice of
13 the claim and did not have an opportunity to settle it prior to this litigation. See Gibby v. Pierce
Cnty, L, Enf't Support Agency, City of Taeoma, 785 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9* Cir. 1986), see also 14 Lopez v. United States, 823 F.3d 970, 976-77 (10th Cir. 2016). For the above reasons, Count III 15 is jurisdictionally barred. Consequently, it is unnecessary for the Court to address other
16 arguments relative to this claim.
17 For the above reasons, the Court declines to reinstate Count V or Count III of the
18 Complaint and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration or Relief from Order.
Page 15of 16 1 CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for 2 Reconsideration and has reconsidered the Motion. After such consideration the Court finds that 3 the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint are sufficient to EQUITABLY TOLL the 4 statute of limitations for Claims I, II, and W. Finally, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion
5 for Reconsideration.
IT IS S0 ORDERED APR 1 4 2022 7 • 8 HONORABLE ARTHUR R. BARCINAS 9 Judge, Superior Court of Guam
10 SERVICEVIA E-MAIL l acknowledge 1ha1 an electronic copy of the original was e-mailed to;
11 gt:"f"-Wa
/76' ° iffy! I
12 Date: 9//9/Q2 Time: 212 5
Deputy Clerk, Superior Court of Guam 13
Page 16 of 16