Pinuelas v. Saul

District Court, S.D. California·Decided July 8, 2020·No. 3:20-cv-00734·Unknown

Opinion

Case No.: 20CV734-MMA(BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN v. DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING OF FEES OR COSTS

SECURITY, [ECF NO. 2] Defendant.

The instant matter was initiated on April 16, 2020 when Plaintiff filed a complaint to seek review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s “application for Title II Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. §1383(c)(3).” ECF No. 1 at 1. That same day, Plaintiff filed a Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. ECF No. at 2. Having reviewed the complaint and motion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to survive sua sponte screening. Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which states: [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding ... without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. The determination of indigency falls within the district court's discretion. California Men's Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds by, 506 U.S. 194 (1993) (“Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute's requirement of indigency.”). It is well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for costs ... and still be able to provide for himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At the same time, “the same even-handed care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense, ... the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). District courts tend to reject IFP applications where the applicant can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to other expenses. See, e.g., Allen v. Kelley, 1995 WL 396860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Plaintiff initially permitted to proceed IFP, later required to pay $ 120 filing fee out of $ 900 settlement proceeds); Ali v. Cuyler, 547 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (IFP application denied because the plaintiff possessed savings of $ 450 and that was more than sufficient to pay the filing fee). Moreover, the facts as to the affiant's poverty must be stated “with some particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of demonstrating that she is entitled to IFP status. According to her affidavit in support of application, Plaintiff lives with her three adult children who pay the $1300 monthly rent for her apartment (Plaintiff does not contribute) and receives free health care through Medi-Cal. ECF No. 2 at 1-2. Plaintiff does not have a checking or savings account, currently has $45.00 in her possession, and owns a non-operational 1999 Nissan Altima. Id. a 2. Plaintiff purchased approximately $400 worth of clothing last year, spends approximately $190.00 per month for food and utilities, and visits a food bank weekly. Id. at 3. Plaintiff is a student and receives around $4,000 per semester1 in federal student financial aid. Id. at 2. The money that she receives is deposited into a bank account that is owned and controlled by Plaintiff’s mother. Id. Plaintiff has a debit card to the account that she uses to withdraw money and the account currently has about $300 in it. Id. Plaintiff’s mother does not contribute extra money to the account except for an occasional birthday or holiday present of around $40.00. Id. In addition, Plaintiff receives approximately $650 in government benefits per semester for school books and school supplies. Id. at 2. That money is placed onto Plaintiff’s student ID and is only used to purchase books and school supplies. Id. Plaintiff does not have to care for any dependents. Id. at 2. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that she is unable to pay the $400 filing fee. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915(a) Complaints filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) are subject to a mandatory screening by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Alamar v. Social Security, 2019 WL1258846, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019). A complaint should be dismissed if it is (1) “frivolous or malicious;” (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. To survive, all complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, “recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id. Instead, the plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face, meaning “the 27 pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570)). “When there are well-pleaded fac

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