Pintenics v. Menwig

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Pintenics v. Menwig

172 A. 377, 113 N.J.L. 4, 1934 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 261

CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey

DecidedMay 9, 1934

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 172 A. 377 (Pintenics v. Menwig) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Pintenics v. Menwig, 172 A. 377, 113 N.J.L. 4, 1934 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 261 (N.J. 1934).

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Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Perskie, J.

Plaintiff, administrator of the estate of Julia Pintenies, deceased, instituted a replevin suit against the defendants for the return of a piano, after demand had been made and the return thereof refused. Plaintiff also sought $500 for the piano and its detention. The latter phase of plaintiff’s action (claim for damages) appears to have been abandoned. It is not treated by either party.

The record submitted is meager and unsatisfactory. In *5 the agreed state oí facts it appears that the plaintiff offered, in evidence his letters of administration, and “a bill of sale dated August 28th, 1933, from Gilsenan Piano Co., to Julia Pintenics;” and that the piano is now in possession of the defendants, and that they refuse to surrender possession thereof. It neither appears that the bill of sale from Gilsenan Piano Company to Julia Pintenics transferred title to the piano in question nor that the Gilsenan Piano Company ever had title thereto. The mere offer in evidence of the bill of sale, under the circumstances of the instant case, proved nothing.

Defendants admitted receiving the piano. Over objection and exception taken, Anna Menwig testified “that the piano was left with her with the understanding that it was not to be removed from her home until the storage was paid for.”

It is urged that the admission of that testimony was erroneous. Section 4 (transactions with deceased) of our Evidence act, 2 Comp. Stat. 1709-1910, pp. 2216, 2218. To this insistmont we desire to make the following observations: First, it is a well-established rule that the grounds of appeal in cases of rulings on evidence should state the name of the witness, and the questions or answers objected to and ruled upon by the trial judge. Booth v. Keegan, 108 N. J. L. 538; 159 Atl. Rep. 402; Ciccone v. Colonial Life Insurance Co., 110 N. J. L. 276; 164 Atl. Rep. 444, and a host of like cases to that effect. That rule has not been complied with in the-instant ease. Second, the record fails to disclose whether this alleged “understanding” was with the deceased. It does not show that she had any “understanding” or transaction-with the deceased. Third, excluding o'r deleting this testimony it does not follow that the plaintiff’s legal position is in anywise fortified or strengthened.

The burden was, of course, on the plaintiff to establish by competent proof, ownership, absolute or qualified, and right to exclusive possession where such ownership or right is denied. Security Credit Corp. v. Whiting Motor Co., 98 N. J. L. 45; 118 Atl. Rep. 695; Merchants Securities Corp. v. Lane, 106 N. J. L. 169, 576; 147 Atl. Rep. 385, 559.

*6 We have considered all other points raised and argued and find them-to be without merit.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs.

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The opinion of the court was delivered by

Perskie, J.

Plaintiff, administrator of the estate of Julia Pintenies, deceased, instituted a replevin suit against the defendants for the return of a piano, after demand had been made and the return thereof refused. Plaintiff also sought $500 for the piano and its detention. The latter phase of plaintiff’s action (claim for damages) appears to have been abandoned. It is not treated by either party.

The record submitted is meager and unsatisfactory. In *5 the agreed state oí facts it appears that the plaintiff offered, in evidence his letters of administration, and “a bill of sale dated August 28th, 1933, from Gilsenan Piano Co., to Julia Pintenics;” and that the piano is now in possession of the defendants, and that they refuse to surrender possession thereof. It neither appears that the bill of sale from Gilsenan Piano Company to Julia Pintenics transferred title to the piano in question nor that the Gilsenan Piano Company ever had title thereto. The mere offer in evidence of the bill of sale, under the circumstances of the instant case, proved nothing.

Defendants admitted receiving the piano. Over objection and exception taken, Anna Menwig testified “that the piano was left with her with the understanding that it was not to be removed from her home until the storage was paid for.”

It is urged that the admission of that testimony was erroneous. Section 4 (transactions with deceased) of our Evidence act, 2 Comp. Stat. 1709-1910, pp. 2216, 2218. To this insistmont we desire to make the following observations: First, it is a well-established rule that the grounds of appeal in cases of rulings on evidence should state the name of the witness, and the questions or answers objected to and ruled upon by the trial judge. Booth v. Keegan, 108 N. J. L. 538; 159 Atl. Rep. 402; Ciccone v. Colonial Life Insurance Co., 110 N. J. L. 276; 164 Atl. Rep. 444, and a host of like cases to that effect. That rule has not been complied with in the-instant ease. Second, the record fails to disclose whether this alleged “understanding” was with the deceased. It does not show that she had any “understanding” or transaction-with the deceased. Third, excluding o'r deleting this testimony it does not follow that the plaintiff’s legal position is in anywise fortified or strengthened.

The burden was, of course, on the plaintiff to establish by competent proof, ownership, absolute or qualified, and right to exclusive possession where such ownership or right is denied. Security Credit Corp. v. Whiting Motor Co., 98 N. J. L. 45; 118 Atl. Rep. 695; Merchants Securities Corp. v. Lane, 106 N. J. L. 169, 576; 147 Atl. Rep. 385, 559.

*6 We have considered all other points raised and argued and find them-to be without merit.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs.

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172 A. 377, 113 N.J.L. 4, 1934 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pintenics-v-menwig-nj-1934.

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