Pinson v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.

37 F.2d 652, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2610
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 3, 1930
DocketNo. 5570
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 37 F.2d 652 (Pinson v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pinson v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 37 F.2d 652, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2610 (5th Cir. 1930).

Opinion

DAWKINS, District Judge.

The issues of this ease are fully stated in the opinion on the previous appeal of the defendant, and will not be repeated here. 23 F.(2d) 247. A verdict for the plaintiff was therein set aside, for the reason that the evidence was found insufficient to show negligence on the part of the railroad company. On the second trial, after the plaintiff had completed her proof, and before defendant had offered any evidence, on motion of the latter, the lower court directed a verdict in its favor. The sole question before us at this time, therefore, is as to whether there was evidence tending to show negligence on the part of defendant sufficient to require a submission of the ease to the jury.

It is first contended that the record does not show that the dog referred to in the testimony of the various witnesses on the second trial as “Rock” was the one whieh bit the plaintiff. However, the answer does not deny that plaintiff was bitten at the time alleged, for in the third paragraph thereof it “says that the plaintiff, Della May Pinson, by her own acts, caused the dog in question to bite her at the time alleged, and for this reason, among other things, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover herein. * * *” The answer otherwise is a denial that she fell against or was injured by the ledge of the window, after being bitten by the dog, and defendant avers that this suit is a fraudulent conspiracy to obtain money from it on the part of the plaintiff by pretending to have been injured. Both on the original and second trials there was no dispute apparently as to the fact that the dog bit her, but the fact that she was seriously injured was, of course, denied as well as that the defendant was guilty of negligence.

All of the testimony tended to show that there was but one dog in question, and that was the one which bit her. He was uniformly referred to on the first trial as “Rock,” and there does not appear to have been any issue raised about this below. It is also clearly shown by the judge’s charge, in directing a verdict, wherein he states that, in spite of his own views to the contrary, he is bound to follow the ruling of this court that the defendant company was required to use only ordinary care, and under that theory in his opinion the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a verdict for plaintiff. Then, too, this record was by agreement curtailed, so as to present only the issue as to whether or not the defendant had been shown to be negligent in permitting the dog, in the manner disclosed by the evidence, to be in its depot at the time plaintiff was bitten, and the parties appear to have had no thought about the point now raised in this court that Rock was not the dog involved. The stipulation .concurred in by counsel on both sides, and approved by the court below, was “that the issues * * * can be decided * * * without an examination of all the pleadings and evidence filed and taken herein on the trial of this case. * <*« Hence we will assume that the court below had before if sufficient evidence otherwise to permit it to decide the issues whieh were decided and are now before us on this appeal, and will not entertain the contention of the defendant upon the point raised.

There was considerable cross-examination of plaintiff’s witnesses below as to the color and appearance of the dog Rock, but this was manifestly for the purpose, first, of determining whether they knew or were familiar with the dog in question or the one in the depot at the time plaintiff was bitten and on other occasions; and, secondly, to test their credibility.

The evidence brought up on this appeal consists, first, of the testimony of the plaintiff and her mother as to the time, place, and circumstances under whieh she was bitten, her fall against the window ledge, the attendance of the doctor, etc., her father’s statement as to what he had expended in medical treatment of the plaintiff, etc., and the testimony of some seven other witnesses as to the nature and reputation of Rock for vieiousness, and the frequency with which he was seen in and around the depot of the defendant.

The first of these latter witnesses was J. T. Scoggins, who stated he knew the dog Rock, and on several occasions prior to December 9, 1923, had seen him, together with other dogs, with a special agent of the defendant company by the name of Ball, around the depot of the defendant, but witness had no knowledge as to what Ball used the dog for or if he used him for anything; did not know whether Ball ever made any effort to keep him around the depot; that witness never saw Rock in the depot, and did not know whether he was vicious or not.

The next witness was a man by the name of R. E. Kay, who operated a service ear at Leesville before and at the time plaintiff was [654]*654bitten, and had occasion to visit the depot on the arrival and departure of trains many times a day. He knew Rock, and had seen him and other dogs around the depot frequently with Mr. Ball, special agent for the railroad company; that he had not seen Rock around the depot since the plaintiff was bitten; that there were two dogs that stayed around the depot with Mr. Ball, but he did not know which one was named Rock, one being speckled or spotted and the other red or black and tan. Witness was not at the depot when plaintiff was bitten, but returned there shortly afterwards, and saw her in the waiting room with her leg bandaged and bleeding just above the ankle. He never saw a dog in the depot or waiting room more than one time. He had seen a red hound around the depot a number of times, but did not remember ever seeing him in the depot. „ ■

Next appears the testimony of the witness Perry MeElveen. He knew a dog named “Rock” at Leesville which was “a big red hound dog.” He had seen him around town" for several years before the injury to plaintiff. This dog had a “highly nervous disposition, and if you walked up to him he would bite if he was asleep, or if you stepped on him accidently or on purpose * * * he was vicious — a dreaded dog. That was what people generally said about him.” He had seen this dog around the station at Leesville with Mr. Ball, special agent for the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, who “used dogs in the performance of his duties and this was one of them. He had a big spotted dog that I would see around there. I have seen this dog inside the station in the office. They were not paying any attention to him that I know of. He just Went and came. I would not think it was an unusual thing to see him around the office. I really don’t know how long he hung around that office before this girl was bitten. Well, it was months. Mr. Ball was very friendly with the dog. I saw. him there with Mr. Ball a number of times.” Witness, together with the night marshal of the town and Ball, chased a negro who had committed some offense with this dog and another. “I saw this dog in the office times when I would be there. I don’t recall any dates on that. I do not remember him being in the office more than once. * * * It was the general talk that Rock was a vicious dog.”

On cross-examination, he was asked if he had not testified previously that, while the dog roamed the town, “as to his being of a .friendly disposition, .1 know nothing about that,” and replied that he did not know anything of his being of a friendly disposition;further, if he had not also stated in his previous testimony that “I have never heard of him biting anyone unless he was molested in some way, either by accident or on purpose,” and replied, “I imagine I did.” This was what he based his statement that Rock was a vicious dog upon.

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Related

Young v. Baldwin
84 F.2d 841 (Eighth Circuit, 1936)
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Pinson
61 F.2d 1001 (Fifth Circuit, 1932)

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Bluebook (online)
37 F.2d 652, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2610, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pinson-v-kansas-city-southern-ry-co-ca5-1930.