Pinkerton v. Stahly

144 F.2d 881, 32 C.C.P.A. 723, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 83, 1944 CCPA LEXIS 131
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 26, 1944
DocketNo. 4912
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 144 F.2d 881 (Pinkerton v. Stahly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pinkerton v. Stahly, 144 F.2d 881, 32 C.C.P.A. 723, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 83, 1944 CCPA LEXIS 131 (ccpa 1944).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Pinkerton and Mendius, the junior party, have here appealed from a decision of the Board of Interference Examiners of the United States Patent Office in an interference proceeding, awarding to Stahly and Hattox, the senior party, priority of the invention defined in count 2 (the only count at issue here). The interference is between appellants’ patent No. 2,233,144 granted February 25, 1941, on an application filed October 19, 1939, and appellees’ application, Serial No. 248,423, filed December 30, 1938. Appellants being the junior party, the burden was upon them to prove priority by a preponderance of the evidence.

The invention, for the most part, can be understood from a reading of the count involved. It relates to catalytic alkylation for the production of hydrocarbons suitable for use in motor fuels to increase their anti-knock qualities. The specifications of the patent and the application, and the briefs of the parties — especially the brief of appellants — devote much space to highly technical discussions of many phases of the process, which, in view of our conclusion and the narrowness of the issues presented, we need not repeat here.

The appellees copied into their application two claims taken from the said patent of appellants and requested an interference. [1] The interference was originally declared upon but one count, the Primary Examiner then holding that appellees could not make a claim corresponding to the involved count 2. Appellees then moved to amend the issue by adding count 2 and others, which motion was opposed by appellants (said opposition being equivalent to a motion to dissolve the interference). The Primary Examiner granted the motion to amend by adding count 2 and denied it as to the other proposed counts, whereupon the interference was redeclared comprising counts 1 and 2.

Neither party took testimony, but the case was submitted to the Board of Interference Examiners on the basis of stipulated evidence. Priority as to count 1, by virtue of facts shown in the stipulation of the parties, was awarded to appellants, and appellees concede the correctness of such holding.

We here quote count 2:

2. In the manufacture of iso-octane, the improvement which comprises subjecting a hydrocarbon mixture consisting essentially of a major proportion of isobutane and a minor proportion of a butylene component to contact with a phosphoric acid catalyst at a temperature approximating 150°-450° F. under a pressure upwards of about 500 pounds per square inch for a period of time sufficient to effect substantial alkylation, separating an isolmtane fraction from the products of the catalytic condensation and recirculating this isohutane fractio7i through the region of catalyst contact. [Italics ours.]

[725]*725Count 1 was identical with the unitalicized portion of count 2.

Appellants argued before the Primary Examiner and the board, and argue here, that appellees have no right to make count 2 because it is not supported by the disclosure of their application.

There are two main questions for decision here:

(1) Do appellees have the right to make count 2 ?
(2) If appellees have the right to make the count, have appellants sustained their burden of proving priority of invention ?

The latter involves the question of prior conception on the part of appellants and that of diligence on their part during the critical period.

The record shows that neither party “physically reduced to practice the subject matter defined in count 2 * * * prior to the filing dates of their respective applications directly involved in the present interference.” Since appellees took no testimony, they are restricted to their filing date (December 30, 1938) for conception and reduction to practice of the invention in issue.

Beginning in 1937 and continuing through 1938 and 1939, Pinkerton and Mendius were employees of the Development Department of the -Sinclair Refining Company (assignee of their patent involved in this interference) and Pinkerton was directly responsible to Mendius. Other parties concerned with the Development Department are referred to in the record and will be referred to hereinafter.

It was stipulated that in November of 1937 Pinkerton and Mendius were in conference with others of the Development Department when the question of the occurrence of alkylation under certain operating conditions was being considered. In April 1938 Pinkerton and Mendius executed an application prepared by one Adams, a member of the patent law firm of Pennie, Davis, Marvin & Edmonds, and the same was filed on April 28, 1938. Patent No. 2,177,579 (not the one in interference) was granted on this application on October 24,1939. This patent made no mention of the element of the count reciting that the hydrocarbon mixture consists “essentially of a major proportion of isobutane and a minor proportion of a butylene component,” as do the specification and claims of the patent herein directly involved. It was stipulated that Adams’ attention was called to the fact that the feature of “recirculation of saturates” and the feature of “maintenance of a relatively low concentration of un-saturates” were jointly conceived by Pinkerton and Mendius.

Another application was prepared by said Adams and executed by Pinkerton as the sole inventor. This application was filed on August 11, 1938, and was later abandoned. The filing date of this application was prior to any date to which appellees are entitled. In the sole application, the temperature in the catalytic reaction zone was [726]*726limited to not more than 250° F., whereas the instant count calls for a temperature of approximately 150°-450° F.

It is the contention of appellants that the invention of the count involved here, which is a claim, of their patent No. 2,233,144, is the same invention as that of the sole application except that the sole application is narrower in its scope than the joint application, and that the appellants here, in considering the question or priority, are entitled to a date of conception as of the date of the Pinkerton report which furnished the information to Adams in preparing the sole application — that date being much earlier than any date to which appellees are entitled.

It may be said here that the claims of the sole application were rejected on a British patent. Subsequently, Pinkerton filed an affidavit under Buie 75 and overcame the British patent, but the claims were then rejected on the ground of double patenting over the claims of the patent involved in the instant interference (which had been granted in the meantime) and also on a newly-cited United States patent.

Appellants also contend that under the stipulated record it should be held that the conception was a joint one; that the filing of the application of Pinkerton as sole inventor was a mistake, which was after-wards corrected by the filing of the application for the patent here involved; and that for that reason appellants are entitled to a date for joint conception of the invention at bar as of the date of conception of the invention disclosed in the sole application. It is then contended upon this premise that since appellants were the first to conceive and were diligent until the filing date of the application for the patent here involved, they must be regarded as the first inventors in this priority contest.

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144 F.2d 881, 32 C.C.P.A. 723, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 83, 1944 CCPA LEXIS 131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pinkerton-v-stahly-ccpa-1944.