Pine v. City of Midland

Fifth Circuit

Pine v. City of Midland

102 F. App'x 419

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJuly 8, 2004

Docket03-50988

StatusUnpublished

This text of 102 F. App'x 419 (Pine v. City of Midland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Pine v. City of Midland, 102 F. App'x 419 (5th Cir. 2004).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

The appellants-property owners appeal from the summary judgment dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as barred by the statute of limitations. Applying the same test as the district court, we affirm. See Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir.1998).

We hold that the district court did not err in its determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the instant case and, therefore, that the § 1983 claims were barred by Texas’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir.1991). We do not consider the appellants arguments raised for the first time on appeal that (1) application of the two-year limitations period is unconstitutional as applied to their Fifth Amendment takings claims and (2) fairness mandates the application of the equitable doctrine of laches. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir.1999).

AFFIRMED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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PER CURIAM: *

The appellants-property owners appeal from the summary judgment dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as barred by the statute of limitations. Applying the same test as the district court, we affirm. See Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir.1998).

We hold that the district court did not err in its determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the instant case and, therefore, that the § 1983 claims were barred by Texas’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir.1991). We do not consider the appellants arguments raised for the first time on appeal that (1) application of the two-year limitations period is unconstitutional as applied to their Fifth Amendment takings claims and (2) fairness mandates the application of the equitable doctrine of laches. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir.1999).

AFFIRMED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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102 F. App'x 419, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pine-v-city-of-midland-ca5-2004.

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