RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1678-24
PINE RIDGE REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION v. February 4, 2026 APPELLATE DIVISION 1 A.O.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
L.O.,
Defendant. _________________________
Submitted November 6, 2025 ‒ Decided February 4, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk, Bishop-Thompson, and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-000523-24.
South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys for appellant (John Pendergast and Kenneth Goldman, on the brief).
1 We use initials to identify the parties because of allegations of domestic violence. R. 1:38-3(c)(12). Respondent has not filed a brief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BISHOP-THOMPSON, J.A.D.
In this residential landlord-tenant matter, defendant A.O. appeals from the
January 2, 2025 order of the Law Division, Special Civil Part, denying her
motion to vacate a judgment of possession entered against L.O. and seal the
court record. This appeal raises a novel legal question: Does a consent order to
surrender property to a landlord constitute a judgment for possession in
landlord-tenant cases under our governing law? The answer to this question
determines whether such a consent order remains a public record for seven years.
We hold a consent order to surrender property to a landlord, based on its
substantive nature and underlying purpose, is distinct from a judgment for
possession. Accordingly, such a consent order is subject to the sealing
requirement under Rule 1:38-3(f)(11), and is shielded from public view.
In February 2023, A.O. and L.O. leased an apartment in Lindenwold from
their landlord, plaintiff Pine Ridge Realty Associates, LLC (Pine Ridge). In
January 2024, Pine Ridge filed a summary action based on the nonpayment of
rent for January and February 2024, taking into account the scheduled February
trial date. Sometime after the complaint was filed, A.O. moved out of the
A-1678-24 2 apartment and returned to her parents' residence due to alleged domestic
violence by L.O.
L.O. remained in the apartment. A default judgment for possession was
entered against L.O. only and a warrant of removal was subsequently executed.
A.O. paid the outstanding rent to Pine Ridge and a consent to surrender the
property to the landlord was subsequently signed by the parties on February 29,
2024. The handwritten notation at the bottom of the form stated: "[Pine Ridge]
has agreed that [A.O.] may apply to the court to have [the] records . . . shielded
from public view pursuant to [Rule] 1[:]38[-11](b)."
A.O. was unable to obtain new housing. She moved to vacate the
judgment for possession entered against L.O. and seal the record from public
view pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(f)(11), Rule 1:38-11, and Rule 4:50-1(e). In her
certification, A.O. stated the judgment for possession appears on background
checks conducted by prospective landlords, which prevents her from obtaining
new housing.
The court denied A.O.'s unopposed motion and directed the clerk of court
to enter a case notice specifying the default judgment for possession was only
against L.O., and not A.O. Despite this administrative correction, the court
found Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) was dispositive, explaining records of landlord-tenant
A-1678-24 3 cases in which a judgment for possession has been entered cannot be sealed
unless seven years have passed from the date of the judgment.
On appeal, A.O. argues the record should be sealed under Rule 1:38-11
because failure to do so will likely cause her irreparable harm. She further
argues she "has an overwhelming interest in privacy." A.O. contends the trial
court erred by improperly relying on Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) to preclude relief.
At the outset, we note A.O. lacks standing to challenge the entry of default
judgment against L.O. A.O. is not "a party or the party's legal representative"
and therefore is not authorized to seek relief from a final judgment under our
court rule. See R. 4:50-1. However, this does not prevent us from addressing
the issue presented.
The issue of first impression is whether a consent order for possession of
property constitutes a judgment for possession, and is therefore subject to the
requirement that it remain a matter of public record for seven years in a landlord-
tenant case pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(f)(11). We conclude it does not.
To resolve this issue, we must construe the application of a court rule.
"The approach taken in respect of the construction of court rules is the same as
that for the construction of statutes." State v. Anthony, 443 N.J. Super. 553, 564
(App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Clark, 191 N.J. 503, 508 (2007)). The
A-1678-24 4 applicability or interpretation of court rules are reviewed de novo. State v.
Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018). We afford "no deference to the trial court's
legal conclusions." Kennedy v. Weichert Co., 257 N.J. 290, 302 (2024).
We also review orders denying motions to seal judicial records for abuse
of discretion. Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J.
356, 380 (1995). "A court abuses its discretion when its 'decision is made
without rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or
rested on an impermissible basis.'" State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021)
(quoting State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)). "If the [court] misconceives or
misapplies the law, [its] discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary
act." In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. 596, 606 (App. Div. 2022) (alterations in
original) (quoting In re Presentment of Bergen Cnty. Grand Jury, 193 N.J. Super.
2, 9 (App. Div. 1984)).
A judgment for possession may only be entered in three ways: (1) by
default judgment, Rule 6:6-3; (2) by the court after a trial, Rule 6:6-5; or (3) by
consent, Rule 6:6-4. "A consent judgment [is] defined as an agreement of the
parties under the sanction of the court as to what the decision shall be ." Cmty.
Realty Mgmt., Inc. v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 226 (1998) (quoting Stonehurst at
Freehold v. Twp. Comm of Freehold, 139 N.J. Super. 311, 313 (Law Div.
A-1678-24 5 1976)). Additionally, it "must contain a recital that all parties have consented
to both the entry and the form of the judgment." Id. at 228.
Our court rules establish "a general rule in favor of open judicial
proceedings, except upon a showing of good cause." In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J.
Super. at 607 (citing R. 1:2-1; R. 38-1; Hammock, 142 N.J. at 367-69, 375, 380-
82). Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) permits the sealing of landlord-tenant case records
under two circumstances: "(i) adjudicated or otherwise disposed of landlord
tenant cases in which no judgment for possession ever has been entered; and (ii)
landlord tenant cases in which judgment for possession was entered seven years
ago or longer."
The court entered a default judgment against only L.O., pursuant to Rule
6:6-3. There was no default, trial, or decision on the merits as to A.O. Instead,
A.O. and Pine Ridge reached an agreement by consenting to the surrender of the
apartment and the sealing of the record. Further, the consent order to surrender
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RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1678-24
PINE RIDGE REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION v. February 4, 2026 APPELLATE DIVISION 1 A.O.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
L.O.,
Defendant. _________________________
Submitted November 6, 2025 ‒ Decided February 4, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk, Bishop-Thompson, and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-000523-24.
South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys for appellant (John Pendergast and Kenneth Goldman, on the brief).
1 We use initials to identify the parties because of allegations of domestic violence. R. 1:38-3(c)(12). Respondent has not filed a brief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BISHOP-THOMPSON, J.A.D.
In this residential landlord-tenant matter, defendant A.O. appeals from the
January 2, 2025 order of the Law Division, Special Civil Part, denying her
motion to vacate a judgment of possession entered against L.O. and seal the
court record. This appeal raises a novel legal question: Does a consent order to
surrender property to a landlord constitute a judgment for possession in
landlord-tenant cases under our governing law? The answer to this question
determines whether such a consent order remains a public record for seven years.
We hold a consent order to surrender property to a landlord, based on its
substantive nature and underlying purpose, is distinct from a judgment for
possession. Accordingly, such a consent order is subject to the sealing
requirement under Rule 1:38-3(f)(11), and is shielded from public view.
In February 2023, A.O. and L.O. leased an apartment in Lindenwold from
their landlord, plaintiff Pine Ridge Realty Associates, LLC (Pine Ridge). In
January 2024, Pine Ridge filed a summary action based on the nonpayment of
rent for January and February 2024, taking into account the scheduled February
trial date. Sometime after the complaint was filed, A.O. moved out of the
A-1678-24 2 apartment and returned to her parents' residence due to alleged domestic
violence by L.O.
L.O. remained in the apartment. A default judgment for possession was
entered against L.O. only and a warrant of removal was subsequently executed.
A.O. paid the outstanding rent to Pine Ridge and a consent to surrender the
property to the landlord was subsequently signed by the parties on February 29,
2024. The handwritten notation at the bottom of the form stated: "[Pine Ridge]
has agreed that [A.O.] may apply to the court to have [the] records . . . shielded
from public view pursuant to [Rule] 1[:]38[-11](b)."
A.O. was unable to obtain new housing. She moved to vacate the
judgment for possession entered against L.O. and seal the record from public
view pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(f)(11), Rule 1:38-11, and Rule 4:50-1(e). In her
certification, A.O. stated the judgment for possession appears on background
checks conducted by prospective landlords, which prevents her from obtaining
new housing.
The court denied A.O.'s unopposed motion and directed the clerk of court
to enter a case notice specifying the default judgment for possession was only
against L.O., and not A.O. Despite this administrative correction, the court
found Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) was dispositive, explaining records of landlord-tenant
A-1678-24 3 cases in which a judgment for possession has been entered cannot be sealed
unless seven years have passed from the date of the judgment.
On appeal, A.O. argues the record should be sealed under Rule 1:38-11
because failure to do so will likely cause her irreparable harm. She further
argues she "has an overwhelming interest in privacy." A.O. contends the trial
court erred by improperly relying on Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) to preclude relief.
At the outset, we note A.O. lacks standing to challenge the entry of default
judgment against L.O. A.O. is not "a party or the party's legal representative"
and therefore is not authorized to seek relief from a final judgment under our
court rule. See R. 4:50-1. However, this does not prevent us from addressing
the issue presented.
The issue of first impression is whether a consent order for possession of
property constitutes a judgment for possession, and is therefore subject to the
requirement that it remain a matter of public record for seven years in a landlord-
tenant case pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(f)(11). We conclude it does not.
To resolve this issue, we must construe the application of a court rule.
"The approach taken in respect of the construction of court rules is the same as
that for the construction of statutes." State v. Anthony, 443 N.J. Super. 553, 564
(App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Clark, 191 N.J. 503, 508 (2007)). The
A-1678-24 4 applicability or interpretation of court rules are reviewed de novo. State v.
Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018). We afford "no deference to the trial court's
legal conclusions." Kennedy v. Weichert Co., 257 N.J. 290, 302 (2024).
We also review orders denying motions to seal judicial records for abuse
of discretion. Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J.
356, 380 (1995). "A court abuses its discretion when its 'decision is made
without rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or
rested on an impermissible basis.'" State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021)
(quoting State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)). "If the [court] misconceives or
misapplies the law, [its] discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary
act." In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. 596, 606 (App. Div. 2022) (alterations in
original) (quoting In re Presentment of Bergen Cnty. Grand Jury, 193 N.J. Super.
2, 9 (App. Div. 1984)).
A judgment for possession may only be entered in three ways: (1) by
default judgment, Rule 6:6-3; (2) by the court after a trial, Rule 6:6-5; or (3) by
consent, Rule 6:6-4. "A consent judgment [is] defined as an agreement of the
parties under the sanction of the court as to what the decision shall be ." Cmty.
Realty Mgmt., Inc. v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 226 (1998) (quoting Stonehurst at
Freehold v. Twp. Comm of Freehold, 139 N.J. Super. 311, 313 (Law Div.
A-1678-24 5 1976)). Additionally, it "must contain a recital that all parties have consented
to both the entry and the form of the judgment." Id. at 228.
Our court rules establish "a general rule in favor of open judicial
proceedings, except upon a showing of good cause." In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J.
Super. at 607 (citing R. 1:2-1; R. 38-1; Hammock, 142 N.J. at 367-69, 375, 380-
82). Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) permits the sealing of landlord-tenant case records
under two circumstances: "(i) adjudicated or otherwise disposed of landlord
tenant cases in which no judgment for possession ever has been entered; and (ii)
landlord tenant cases in which judgment for possession was entered seven years
ago or longer."
The court entered a default judgment against only L.O., pursuant to Rule
6:6-3. There was no default, trial, or decision on the merits as to A.O. Instead,
A.O. and Pine Ridge reached an agreement by consenting to the surrender of the
apartment and the sealing of the record. Further, the consent order to surrender
property does not contain the operative language of the model form contained
in our court rules, namely: "consent judgment" and "[t]he [t]enant . . . agrees to
immediate entry of a [j]udgment for [p]ossession." Consent to Enter Judgment
(Tenant Vacates), Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix XI-
W, at 2134 (2026).
A-1678-24 6 The consent order to surrender the property is, both in nature and effect
under our governing law, fundamentally different from a judgment for
possession, and therefore does not trigger any of the court rules applicable to
the entry of a judgment for possession. Although the court acknowledged Rule
1:38-3(f)(11) governed A.O.'s request to seal the record, it erred by failing to
recognize the clear distinction between a consent order to surrender property
and a judgment for possession. We therefore conclude the court misapplied its
discretion and Rule 1:38-3(f)(11), because the case was not disposed of by a
judgment for possession. Accordingly, we hold a consent order to surrender
property is subject to the sealing requirement under Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) and is
shielded from public view.
We therefore reverse the court's order denying A.O.'s unopposed motion
to seal the record and direct the trial court to enter an order sealing the court
records. Thus, we need not determine whether there was a showing of "good
cause," as defined by Rule 1:38-11(b).
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-1678-24 7