Pillow v. State

Florida Circuit Courts

Pillow v. State

48 Fla. Supp. 2d 52

CourtCircuit Court for the Judicial Circuits of Florida

DecidedApril 1, 1991

DocketCase No. 90-7-AM (Lower Court Case Nos. 90-10644TT-42-L and 90-1161-MM-42-L)

StatusPublished

This text of 48 Fla. Supp. 2d 52 (Pillow v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court for the Judicial Circuits of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Pillow v. State, 48 Fla. Supp. 2d 52 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1991).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The officer stopped Teresa L. Pillow for having a cracked tail light lens, discovered her driver’s license was suspended, and searched her vehicle, finding drug paraphernalia. This situation presents a Kehoe question. Was the warrantless stop of the vehicle one which a reason[53]*53able officer would have made absent the additional invalid purpose? See Kehoe v State, 521 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1988). The officer testified that he “typically responded in the same manner” to defective equipment similar to a tail light. There is nothing in the record that refutes the officer’s statement. See State v Gibson, 560 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (“normal practice” to stop cars with loud mufflers).

AFFIRMED. McNEAL, R., BOOTH, J., SINGELTARY, G., concur.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The officer stopped Teresa L. Pillow for having a cracked tail light lens, discovered her driver’s license was suspended, and searched her vehicle, finding drug paraphernalia. This situation presents a Kehoe question. Was the warrantless stop of the vehicle one which a reason[53]*53able officer would have made absent the additional invalid purpose? See Kehoe v State, 521 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1988). The officer testified that he “typically responded in the same manner” to defective equipment similar to a tail light. There is nothing in the record that refutes the officer’s statement. See State v Gibson, 560 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (“normal practice” to stop cars with loud mufflers).

AFFIRMED. McNEAL, R., BOOTH, J., SINGELTARY, G., concur.

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48 Fla. Supp. 2d 52, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pillow-v-state-flacirct-1991.

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