Pillon v. State of Washington

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: June 11, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01177
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 CHARLES PILLON, an individual, 11 NO. 23-cv-01177-RAJ Plaintiff, 12 ORDER GRANTING v. MOTION TO DISMISS 13 STATE OF WASHINGTON, 14 15 Defendant. 16 17

18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by the State 21 of Washington (“State of Washington” or “Defendant”). Dkt. # 11. Plaintiff Charles Pillon 22 (“Mr. Pillon” or “Plaintiff”) opposes dismissal. Dkt. # 15. For the reasons set forth below, 23 the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 24 25 26 27 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, asks this Court to vacate a $3,888,000 restitution 3 payment ordered by King County Superior Court. See Dkt. # 1. Mr. Pillon has repeatedly 4 sought relief from this judgment in the state court system, and now asks this Court to grant 5 relief. The relevant facts are set forth below. 6 7 Following a bench trail, the court found Mr. Pillon guilty of three offenses: 1) felony 8 violation of the Hazardous Waste Management Act; 2) felony violation of wrecking 9 vehicles without a license and with a prior conviction; and 3) gross misdemeanor count of 10 unlawful dumping of solid waste without a permit. See State of Wash. v. Charles E. Pillon, 11 12 No. 16-1-05983-6, (King Cnty. Sup. Ct. June 15, 2018). After his conviction, Mr. Pillon 13 filed a motion to vacate the payment, and the trial court denied the motion. See State of 14 Wash. v. Charles E. Pillon, No. 16-1-05983-6, (King Cnty. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2019). Next, 15 Mr. Pillon unsuccessfully appealed his convictions. See State v. Pillon, 11 Wash. App. 2d 16 17 949 (2020); State v. Pillon, 195 Wash. 2d 1031 (2020) (denying review). After that, Mr. 18 Pillon filed a Personal Restraint Petition to vacate the payment of the order, which the 19 Washington Court of Appeals denied. Matter of Pillon, 21 Wash. App. 2d 1032 (2022). 20 Now, Mr. Pillon brings this action, raising constitutional and statutory arguments already 21 22 raised in his state court appeals and petitions, essentially seeking relief from the state court 23 judgments. See Dkt. # 1. 24 25 26 27 1 III. LEGAL STANDARD 2 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain 3 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 4 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 5 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court draws reasonable inferences for the nonmoving 6 7 party; but offering “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 8 cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 9 In disposing of such a motion, along with the complaint, the Court may consider 10 documents mentioned in the complaint that are central to the claims and of undisputed 11 12 authenticity, Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006), and matters of judicial 13 notice, such as public records and court documents, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 14 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Evid. 201. 15 16 IV. DISCUSSION 17 Defendant argues that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject 18 matter jurisdiction to hear this case because it is a de facto appeal of final state court 19 judgments. See Dkt. # 11 at 7. Plaintiff opposes dismissal but fails to address the substance 20 of Defendant’s argument. See Dkt. # 15. Upon review of Plaintiff’s Petition to Vacate, 21 22 Dkt. # 1, which the Court will construe as a complaint, it is apparent that the claims are 23 barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as explained below. 24 In support of the motion to dismiss, Defendant asks the Court to take notice of orders 25 and decisions from King County Superior Court, the Washington Court of Appeals, and 26 27 the Washington State Supreme Court referenced in Section II supra. The Court takes 1 judicial notice of these orders and decisions because it is well established that “matters of 2 public record, including court records in related or underlying cases which have a direct 3 relation to the matters at issue, may be looked to when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to 4 dismiss.” In re Am. Continental Corp./ Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 5 1537 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg 6 7 Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 8 Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, district courts lack jurisdiction to review state 9 court judgments. The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, 10 granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, is exclusive and “precludes a United States district court from 11 12 exercising subject matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to 13 adjudicate . . . .” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indut. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005). 14 “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal 15 district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks 16 17 relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). 18 The doctrine bars suits “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 19 state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 20 inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 21 22 U.S. at 284. The doctrine applies “not only to final judgments, but also to ‘interlocutory 23 state court decisions.’” Santos v. Superior Ct. of Guam, 711 F. App’x 419, 420 (9th Cir. 24 2018) (quoting Doe & Assocs. Law Offs. v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 25 2001)). 26 27 1 Plaintiff asks this Court to vacate a restitution payment order that has been 2 vigorously contested and affirmed in the Washington State Court system. Mr. Pillon 3 reargues that the restitution payment is unconstitutionally excessive, an issue already 4 litigated and adversely decided against Plaintiff. See Matter of Pillon, No. 82929-7-I, 2022 5 WL 831891 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2022). Plaintiff’s alleged injuries stem from the 6 7 state court’s decisions against him and now he seeks relief in federal court on that basis. 8 These grievances are exactly the type the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars. See Henrichs v. 9 Valley View Development, 474 F. 3d 609 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding Rooker-Feldman barred 10 plaintiff’s claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine 11 12 that the state court's decision was wrong and thus void”). Accordingly, this Court does not 13 have subject matter jurisdiction over this case and must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. 14 On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no 15 request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not 16 17 possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. 18 Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court concludes that Plaintiff 19 can plead no facts consistent with the allegations in the Complaint that would prevent the 20 Rooker-Feldman doctrine from barring this case. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES 21 22 Plaintiff’s Complaint against the State of Washington with prejudice and without leave to 23 amend. 24 25 26 27 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 In conclusion, because the Court finds that it is divested of subject matter 3 jurisdiction, pursuant to Rooker–Feldman, the Court cannot grant relief sought by Plaintiff. 4 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 5 6 Dated this 11th day of June, 2024. 7 A 8

9 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 10 United States District Judge 11 12

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