Pike County Board of Education v. Jonathan Collins

Opinion

RENDERED: AUGUST 14, 2026; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2025-CA-0894-MR

PIKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00431

JONATHAN COLLINS AND JOHN ROBINETTE APPELLEES

OPINION

REVERSING AND REMANDING

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BEFORE: CALDWELL, A. JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES. MCNEILL, JUDGE: This is a negligence case arising from a collision between a truck driven by Appellee Jonathan Collins (“Collins”) and a school bus owned and operated by the Pike County Board of Education (the “Board”). The Board filed a motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunity, which the Pike

Circuit Court denied. The Board appeals to this Court as a matter of right. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.” Lewis v. B&R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001) (citation omitted). Whether immunity applies is purely a question of law and is also reviewed de novo. LP Louisville Herr Lane LLC v. Buckaway, 705 S.W.3d 31, 33 (Ky. App. 2024) (citing Gambrel v. Croushore as next friend of Villarreal, 638 S.W.3d 452 (Ky. App. 2021); and Lewis, 56 S.W.3d 432). With these standards in mind, we return to record and arguments at issue in the present case.

ANALYSIS

The Board’s sole argument on appeal is that it is entitled to governmental immunity. The circuit court disagreed and provided the following reasoning in its order denying summary judgment:

Defendant argues that the Pike County Board of Education is immune for car accident cases involving their buses because transporting school children is an inherent ministerial function of the state. However, Kentucky’s General Assembly can waive governmental immunity by statute. See Schwmdel v. Meade County,

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113 S.W. 3d 159, 168 (Ky. 2003). Pursuant to KRS[1]

160.310, school boards are authorized to provide auto liability insurance for school buses. The only reason for this authorizing statute would be to allow claims against school boards for transporting school children, an inherently ministerial act of school boards. See Haney v Monsky, 31 l S.W. 3d 235, 246 (Ky. 2010); see also Jones v. Lathram, 150 S.W. 3d 50, 53 (Ky. 2005). Here, the contracting by the Pike County Board of Education to maintain a policy of liability insurance waives their claim for governmental immunity in this case and they, to the extent that coverage as a named insured on the liability insurance policy, should remain a party to this action up to and including the limits of the policy coverage.

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Contrary to the circuit court’s decision here, Kentucky courts have repeatedly held:

School boards and their employees are considered agencies of the state and enjoy governmental immunity.

James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 904 (Ky. App. 2002).

“The immunity that an agency enjoys is extended to the official acts of its officers and employees. However, when such officers or employees are sued for negligent acts in their individual capacities, they have qualified official immunity.” Autry v. Western Kentucky University, 219 S.W.3d 713, 717 (Ky. 2007).

Mucker v. Brown, 462 S.W.3d 719, 721 (Ky. App. 2015). This applies to motor vehicle transportation. Compare Letcher Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Tackett, No. 2009- CA-001463-MR, 2011 WL 4861128, at *2 (Ky. App. Oct. 14, 2011) (“The

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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transportation of pupils is a governmental action because it is a necessary part of the school program of a county board of education.”) (citing Bronaugh v. Murray, 172 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1943)) with Transit Auth. of River City v. Bibelhauser, 432 S.W.3d 171, 174-75 (Ky. App. 2013) (“TARC engages in a quintessentially local proprietary venture, i.e., providing transportation services, just like other for-profit taxi and bus services in the Louisville Metro area.”).

And as to the circuit court’s specific reliance on KRS 160.310, that provision “does not waive a board of education’s governmental immunity from suit . . . .” Grayson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Casey, 157 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Ky. 2005). “This court ruling has been reaffirmed and codified by the General Assembly: “the purchase of liability insurance . . . shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity or any other immunity or privilege thereby held.” Jenkins Indep. Schs. v. Doe, 379 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Ky. App. 2012) (citing KRS 44.073(14)) (emphasis in original).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Pike Circuit Court’s order denying the Board’s motion for summary judgment is REVERSED. We REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

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ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JONATHAN COLLINS:

Jonathan C. Shaw Grant R. Chenoweth William R. Johnson Paintsville, Kentucky Brittney Schaeffer Johnson Pikeville, Kentucky

William J. Baird, IV J. Russell Hill Kevin C. Burke Pikeville, Kentucky Jamie K. Neal Louisville, Kentucky