Pierson v. Smith

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedJanuary 3, 2024
Docket6:23-cv-00434
StatusUnknown

This text of Pierson v. Smith (Pierson v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pierson v. Smith, (E.D. Okla. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA AARON NATHANIEL PIERSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. CIV 23-434-RAW-DES ) MONICA SMITH, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff is a pro se state prisoner who is incarcerated at the McIntosh County Jail in Eufaula, Oklahoma (Dkt. 1 at 2). He filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations at the jail. The defendants are Monica Smith, Jail Administrator; Mary Martin, Assistant Jail Administrator; Kevin Ledbetter, McIntosh County Sheriff; McIntosh County; and the McIntosh County Sheriff’s Department. I. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff alleges he is being denied access to law books, other legal material, and the right to represent himself. (Dkt. 1 at 5). He also contends his right to practice his religion is denied, because the jail policy places inmates in indefinite administrative segregation when they receive a special or religious diet. Id. He further claims that county inmates who are sentenced to jail time are given trustee positions and earn “2 for 1” time credits, and other inmates except Plaintiff have been given this opportunity. Id. at 6. In addition, this denial is discrimination based on his sex offender status. Id. Plaintiff also asserts the jail policy does not allow inmates “to communicate with family, friends, the courts or others by letters or phone call.” Id. After review of the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff must file an amended civil rights complaint on the Court’s form, as set forth below. II. Screening/Dismissal Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The pleading standard for all civil actions was articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint also must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555-56. “So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558. The Court applies the same standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that is employed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that § 1915A dismissals are reviewed under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard for stating a claim for relief). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous construction given to the pro se litigant’s allegations, however, “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiff’s various mistakes or misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so . . . .” Id. A reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 2 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). III. Defendant McIntosh County Sheriff’s Department Plaintiff has sued the McIntosh County Sheriff’s Department. “Courts routinely dismiss § 1983 claims that name and seek to impose liability directly upon municipal and county police departments because police departments are not separate suable entities.” Harper v. City of Cortez, No. 14-2984-KLM, 2015 WL 4720311, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2015) (citing cases) (unpublished). See also Lewis v. Houston County Jail, 876 F. Supp 861, 865 n.1 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (“The Houston County Jail is not a legal entity capable of suit.”); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person’--it is not a legal entity to begin with.”); Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[C]ounty jails are not legal entities amenable to suit.”). Because the McIntosh County Jail is not a “person” under § 1983, it is DISMISSED from this action and may not be named in the amended complaint. IV. Access to Legal Materials Plaintiff complains that he is not allowed access to law books, LexisNexis, and other legal materials. He does not, however, provide specific dates and instances that he was allegedly denied access to these materials. He also fails to name the specific defendant who was involved in the denial. To have standing to raise a claim of denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must demonstrate actual injury.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Gallagher v. Shelton
587 F.3d 1063 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Lewis v. Houston County Jail
876 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Texas, 1995)
Powell v. Cook County Jail
814 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Illinois, 1993)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Archuleta v. McShan
897 F.2d 495 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Bryson v. City of Edmond
905 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Gilles v. United States
906 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Miller v. Glanz
948 F.2d 1562 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Pierson v. Smith, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pierson-v-smith-oked-2024.