Pierce v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation

38 So. 2d 527, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 395
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 2, 1949
DocketNo. 3075.
StatusPublished

This text of 38 So. 2d 527 (Pierce v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pierce v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation, 38 So. 2d 527, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 395 (La. Ct. App. 1949).

Opinion

On August 6, 1945, plaintiff was in the employ of the co-partnership of Nelson Cooley (composed of Floyd Nelson and Dempsey Cooley), sawmill operators, and while engaged in his duties in loading a truck with logs, he sustained an accident by logs striking him and breaking his right hip joint. Immediately after the accident his employers took him to the clinic of Dr. J. D. Frazar in De Ridder, Louisiana, where he was placed under the care of Dr. Frazar. Dr. Frazar found that he had a compound fracture of the right femur, and *Page 528 reduced the fracture and then placed a body cast on the plaintiff and used traction. It is shown that this first body cast was broken, obviously for the reason that plaintiff insisted on rolling back and forth in his bed, and, thereafter, a second body cast was placed on plaintiff by Dr. Frazar, and shortly thereafter he was permitted to return to his home with the admonition that he should remain quietly in bed. He returned to his home on September 1st, and came back to visit Dr. Frazar's clinic during the first week in November, and according to his version at that time his cast was removed. Dr. Frazar testifies that upon his return to the clinic during the first week of November, 1945, the cast had already been removed. In any event, it is shown that at that time plaintiff's fracture was in the same condition as when originally injured and that for some reason, although the fracture had been properly reduced by Dr. Frazar, an overlapping had occurred between September 1st and the first week of November. Plaintiff sues the insurer of Nelson Cooley for compensation at the maximum rate of $20 per week from the date of his injury, August 6, 1945, for a period of 400 weeks, less compensation payments heretofore made.

It is shown by the pleadings and by stipulation between counsel for plaintiff and defendant that the accident arose in the course of employment as alleged; that the defendant is the insurer of the employer; that the accident occurred on August 6, 1945, in Beauregard Parish, and that plaintiff was earning wages sufficient to entitle him to compensation at the maximum rate of $20 per week; that as a result of the accident the plaintiff sustained a compound fracture of his right femur; that defendant paid compensation to plaintiff at the rate of $20 per week from August 6, 1945, through October 16, 1946; that the defendant offered plaintiff an operation to be performed by Dr. Guy Caldwell of New Orleans to remove or reduce disability; that said operation was offered as late as August 6, 1946.

The defense to plaintiff's suit was that the sole cause of plaintiff's disability was his willful refusal to cooperate with the physician supplied him by defendant. Defendant contends that because of plaintiff's lack of cooperation with Dr. Frazar, he broke the first cast placed on him by rolling and tossing in bed, contrary to instructions, and that when the second cast was placed on him, in spite of repeated instructions, he continued the same acts of failing to remain quietly in bed and moreover that he punctured a hole in the cast with a wire or coat hanger, and failing to remain in bed, fell down; that these acts resulted in the overlapping which occurred after the second cast was placed on him. They further contend that plaintiff removed the second cast before returning to the Frazar clinic, and contrary to instructions, and that upon his return he refused to permit Dr. Frazar to apply a third cast. They contend that if plaintiff had cooperated with the physician, he would have recovered within 12 months from the date of injury and could then have resumed his work, and that because his condition is due directly to his own wilful lack of cooperation no further compensation is due him.

On trial of the case the trial judge found that, while plaintiff had been uncooperative to some extent, yet his condition could not be attributed to that, but was due to natural causes; that he was totally and permanently disabled and that to correct this disability would necessitate a major operation, which was dangerous and uncertain and that, therefore, under the law, did not have to be submitted to by plaintiff. Accordingly, he rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for workmen's compensation at $20 per week for 400 weeks, beginning August 6, 1945, less a credit for payments previously made, plus legal interest on delinquent payments and all costs.

After rendition of this judgment the defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, naming in the motion specific witnesses, by which it could he shown that the second body cast was removed prior to plaintiff's return to the Frazar clinic in the first week of November, 1946. This motion for a new trial was denied and defendant has appealed. *Page 529

The only questions before us on appeal are: (1) Should the trial judge have granted defendant's motion for a new trial so as to give it the opportunity of showing that the second body cast was removed prior to plaintiff's coming to the clinic as contended by defendant and was not removed at the clinic as contended by plaintiff? (2) Was disability due to his wilful refusal to cooperate with the physician supplied him by defendant?

With reference to whether or not the second cast was removed at the clinic or before plaintiff arrived at the clinic is the testimony of plaintiff himself, of his employer, Floyd Nelson, and of Dr. Frazar.

Plaintiff testified that in the first week of November he went to the Frazar clinic with the cast on, for the purpose of having the cast removed. His testimony on the subject matter is significant:

"Q. Who took the cast off? A. There was a nurse — I don't remember, but there was a nurse there. Mr. Austin Doyle at Singer was the one who cut the cast off of me." This testimony is subject to two interpretations, one, that the nurse saw or did the removal of the cast at the clinic; the other that Mr. Austin Doyle cut and removed the cast at Singer and not at the clinic. It is noted that neither the nurse nor Mr. Doyle testified in the case. There is no explanation of the absence of their testimony. We feel that their testimony is relevant to the issue presented herein.

Mr. Nelson testified that he is the one who took plaintiff to the clinic for the purpose of an examination and removal of the cast. On the other hand, Dr. Frazar testifies positively that plaintiff did not have the cast on when he saw him at the clinic.

The trial judge, for his written reasons for judgment, appears to have reached the conclusion that the cast was removed at the clinic, but that Dr. Frazar did not see the plaintiff until after its removal. It seems strange that the doctor would have permitted the removal of the cast without his instructions and that, even if removed without his instructions, that he would have had no knowledge or information thereof.

It is material to know definitely how and when this second cast was removed. Certainly, it would indicate some lack of cooperation on the part of plaintiff, if he arbitrarily removed this cast or had it removed contrary to the instructions of his physician.

As to the contention of defendant that plaintiff wilfully failed to give his cooperation in his treatment, in addition to the facts involved with reference to the second cast, we have the definite admission of plaintiff that he rolled around in bed contrary to instructions and that as a result his first cast was broken and the second cast had to be applied. We also have his admission that he persuaded Dr. Frazar to allow him to return home on September 1, 1945. We, of course, have no testimony as to his conduct at home, except that of plaintiff and his wife.

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Bluebook (online)
38 So. 2d 527, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 395, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pierce-v-bituminous-casualty-corporation-lactapp-1949.