Pierce Estate

20 Pa. D. & C.2d 51, 1958 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 263
Pennsylvania Orphans' Court, Montgomery County·Decided October 3, 1958·No. no. 57,419 of 1958·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Taxis, P. J.,

— The first and final account of Lucille C. Pierce, executrix, was examined and audited by the court on March 12, May 7,'May 8 and May 14, 1958.

[52] The account shows a balance for distribution of $21,520.20, composed as follows: Two $500 United States Treasury Bonds 2^4’s; two $1,000 United States Treasury Bonds 2%’s; two $10,000 United States Treasury Bonds 2%’s; deposit of $405.48 in a special account; $790 representing commissions due decedent; and an amount due the accountant of $2,~ 675.28.

Walter Bryant Pierce committed suicide on October 1, 1954, leaving his widow to survive him and a will dated April 23, 1946, in which he named his widow as executrix and sole residuary legatee. Objections to the inventory and to the account were filed by Nancy Vadner Chance and Charles Rush Miller,* guardian of the estate of Norman Vadner, a minor, complaining that the United States Treasury Bonds in the amount of $23,500 and the cash in the amount of $405.48 are the property of the objectors and not of decedent or his personal representative.

A pretrial conference was held in this matter on November 13, 1957, at which time many of the facts, hereinafter recited, were stipulated and agreed to by counsel for the parties. Some of these agreed facts were subsequently withdrawn at bar at the hearing on March 12, 1958. However, a full and complete copy of the pretrial conference and the subsequently retracted agreed-to facts has been made a part of the record in this matter and is appended to the notes of testimony.

In support of their allegation that the United States Treasury Bonds and the cash as set forth in the inventory belong to them and not to the estate, claimants called Lucille Pierce as on cross-examination. Lawrence Samuel Vadner and Eleanor Vadner, father and [53] mother respectively of the two claimants, also appeared and testified.

Counsel for the executrix has objected to the testimony of Mr. Yadner on the grounds that this witness is incompetent under the terms of the Evidence Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, sec. 5(c), 28 PS §322. The statute reads in parts pertinent as follows:

“Nor, where any party to a thing or contract in action is dead . . . and his right thereto or therein has passed, either by his own act or by the act of the law, to a party on the record who represents his interest in the subject in controversy, shall any surviving or remaining party to such thing or contract, or any other person whose interest shall be adverse to the said right of such deceased . . . party, be a competent witness to any matter occurring before the death of said party. . . .”

It is urged that Mr. Vadner also appeared in this proceeding as an alternative claimant to the fund, that therefore he has an interest which is adverse to that of the estate and accordingly is incompetent to testify on behalf of the claim of his son and daughter as to any events which occurred during the lifetime of decedent. What constitutes adverse interest sufficient to disqualify a witness from testifying has been reviewed in Gaston Estate, 361 Pa. 105, at 108, as follows:

“The law applicable . . . was stated by Justice Gibson in Wolf v. Carothers, 3 S. & R. 240, as follows: ‘To exclude a witness, it is necessary that he should have a vested interest, not in the question, but in the event of the suit. It must be an interest, that the judgment in the cause would operate upon; for if by the event, he would neither acquire or lose a right, nor incur a responsibility, which the law recognizes, he is competent. Every other kind of interest goes to credibility.’ [citations]

[54] “This court also said in Braine vs. Spalding, 52 Pa. 247: ‘The true test of the interest of a witness is that he will either gain or lose, as the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment, or that the record will be legal evidence for or against him in some other action. It must be a present, certain and vested interest, and not an interest uncertain, remote or contingent: Greenleaf’s Ev. Vol. I, §390.’”

Counsel for the executrix contends that by presenting testimony on behalf of the claim of his children, the witness Vadner will thereby defeat his own claim as an alternative claimant. They argue, therefore, that his interest is one upon which judgment in the case will operate, i.e., that the witness will lose as the direct legal operation and effect of a judgment rendered in a suit. Although it cannot be denied that Mr. Vadner’s claim is defeated by his own testimony on behalf of his children to the effect that the securities in question are the property of his children, it is equally obvious that Mr. Vadner is testifying against his own interests. Hence the conclusion is .inescapable that Mr. Vadner has no direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of his children’s claim, in fact the situation is exactly the opposite. Accordingly the objection of counsel for the executrix is overruled and the testimony of Mr. Vadner is received as being fully competent. The fact that the witness is the father of claimants goes merely to his credibility and not to his competency.

It should be observed that the stipulations of fact concerning the securities involved all refer to these securities as being “registered in the name of Nancy and Norman Vadner,” and that the language of this particular designation was used at the insistence of counsel for the executrix. Accordingly, in an abundance of caution and in anticipation of the defense counsel for claimants joined Mr. Vadner as an alternative claimant to these securities. With this history [55] in mind it would be inequitable and unjust to allow an evidentiary ruling to evolve from such maneuvering and be controlled by the technical niceties of pleading, especially in this court, governed as it is by equitable principles.

From the pretrial conference and stipulation of facts and from the oral testimony the following facts were established in support of the two claims. Between 1948 and 1953. Mr. and Mrs. Vadner gave to their two children, Nancy Vadner Chance and Norman Vadner, securities totaling in value $87,560.66. The various securities, as more particularly set out in paragraph 5 of the pretrial stipulation, were traced and their origin developed by the testimony of Mr. Vadner. With regard to the details of acquisition, the record clearly establishes, and I find as a fact, that between 1948 and 1953 these securities were given to Nancy and Norman Vadner by their father and mother and that on or about August 1953, these two children were the owners of the securities more particularly described in paragraph 5 of the pretrial stipulation.

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Pierce Estate, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 51, 1958 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958).

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