Pierce County Republican Party v. Eric Eugene Crowl

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05251
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 PIERCE COUNTY REPUBLICAN CASE NO. C25-5251 BHS 8 PARTY, ORDER 9 Plaintiff, v. 10 ERIC EUGENE CROWL, 11 Defendant. 12

13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on five motions, all filed since the Court held 14 a hearing to deny as meritless nine prior motions, and to encourage the parties to refrain 15 from such wasteful filings in the future. It also informed the parties of its view that the 16 dispute could and should be resolved on a default judgment as to the already defaulted 17 non-profit LLCs, or by summary judgment, minimizing or obviating the need for further 18 personal interaction, extensive discovery or motions practice, or a trial. 19 The parties’ subsequent filings, and their recent disrespectful email exchanges 20 with each other and the Court demonstrate that the Court’s message was not received. 21 The issues are addressed in logical order. 22 1 1. PCRP’s second motion for default is DENIED. 2 PCRP has only one pending motion, a second motion for default.1 It asserts that 3 Crowl had 14 days to Answer its Complaint after the Court denied PCRP’s Rule 12(b)(6)

4 motion to dismiss. Dkt. 94 at 1 (citing Rule 12(a)(4)). PCRP’s motion explains that it will 5 in time also seek a default judgment, because the facts of the case are “relatively straight 6 forward and not seriously contested.”2 Id. at 2. 7 Crowl filed his Answer the next day. To be sure, it is not in the usual form, and it 8 does not respond to PCRP’s complaint paragraph by paragraph. But it does “summarily

10 1 PCRP’s first motion for default, Dkt. 31, was granted as to Crowl’s non-profit entities, but denied as to Crowl because he had filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Dkt. 43. For 11 reasons that remain unclear, PCRP has not sought a default judgment against the non-profit, in- default defendants. 12 2 PCRP’s counsel repeats this claim in his recent emails to the Courtroom Deputy: “Because the facts and law in this case is so straightforward, we are hoping to resolve this 13 litigation through default judgement.” A default judgment is not the appropriate mechanism for resolving a case that is “straightforward.” Instead, a default judgment resolves cases, unlike this 14 one, in which the defendant has not appeared or defended. Counsel’s emails also inform the Courtroom Deputy of his belief that Crowl has been 15 “uncooperative” throughout the case, that various motions had been pending for 45 days, and of his “hope” that Court will resolve the pending motions this week. Crowl predictably responded 16 with his own arguments, and counsel predictably replied. And then they went another round, attaching pdf copies of already-filed pending motions for the Courtroom Deputy’s review. This 17 is not helpful, to put it mildly. Any argument or objection or complaint or request that a party may have about any 18 matter it truly believes is worthy of the Court’s attention should be addressed to the Court in a written motion, served, filed and noted on the docket for the Court’s consideration under the 19 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—including Rule 11, which applies to pro se litigants. It is wholly inappropriate to email Court staff to argue the merits of a pending motion or dispute, or 20 to complain about an adversary (or the Court). Litigants and attorneys may contact the Courtroom Deputy only about scheduling issues 21 and other logistical matters, and they may do so only with common courtesy and common sense. The Courtroom Deputy is not a concierge assigned to arbitrate this case. Future emails of this 22 nature will result in sanctions payable to the Court. 1 deny the allegations in the original and amended complaints,” and refers the reader to his 2 numerous other filings in this case for his position on the merits. Crowl proclaims that he 3 is not in default and that the Court would be “foolish” to “entertain” PCRP’s “wild theory

4 of law.” Dkt. 95 at 2. 5 PCRP’s reply asserts that Crowl’s filing “purports to be an Answer, but it is not.” 6 Dkt. 97 at 1 (emphasis in original). It contends that FRCP 8 requires Crowl to “admit or 7 deny the factual allegations made against him,” and that Crowl has failed to do so. Id. 8 A pro se litigant is not held to the same standard as a licensed attorney. Haines v.

9 Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). Regardless of technical deficiencies, a pro se litigant’s 10 pleading should be judged only by function, not form. Id. 11 Obtaining a default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is a two- 12 step process. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). First, “[w]hen a 13 party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or

14 otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter 15 the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After the clerk enters default, a party must seek 16 entry of default judgment under Rule 55(b). The motions may be filed together. 17 A defendant is required to state in “short and plain terms” its defenses to each 18 claim asserted against it, and to “admit or deny the factual allegations asserted against it

19 by the opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1). Crowl’s Answer “summarily denied” all 20 of PCRP’s factual allegations. Dkt. 95. Crowl has appeared, answered, and otherwise 21 sought to defend himself. 22 1 PCRP repeatedly asserts that the facts are “straightforward” and that they are “not 2 seriously contested.” If this is true, Crowl’s failure to specifically deny each of PCRP’s 3 factual allegations is unlikely to hamper PCRP’s efficient prosecution of its

4 uncomplicated case. Pleadings are of “limited importance” of in federal practice. 5 Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure § 9:375 (citing Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, 6 Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991)). 7 It is inefficient for the parties and the Court to litigate whether a party has 8 sufficiently specifically admitted or denied each of plaintiff’s allegations, particularly

9 where the plaintiff apparently believes that the evidence and law are not seriously in 10 dispute. The appropriate method for resolving such a case is a Rule 56 motion for 11 summary judgment, not a motion for default, or some future motion for default judgment. 12 Rule 55 applies where a defendant has not “answered or otherwise defended” 13 itself. That is not this case. PCRP’s motion for default is DENIED. If necessary, PCRP

14 can address any specific factual denial through various discovery mechanisms. 15 2. Crowl’s special expedited UPEPA motion is DENIED. 16 For his part, pro se Defendant Crowl filed a state law Uniform Public Expression 17 Protection Act (UPEPA) “special motion for expedited relief,” within hours of the prior 18 hearing. Dkt. 85. He contends that under Erie, state law applies to PCRP’s state law

19 Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim. Id. at 1. Citing his own self-serving, conclusory 20 21 22 1 declaration, and identically worded declarations from his “witnesses,”3 Crowl contends 2 that he has established a prima facie case that his use of the name “Pierce County 3 Republican Party” is a “protected speech exercise” expressing his “mockery of the

4 Plaintiff.” Id. at 2 (citing Dkts. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39). 5 Crowl states his conduct was in furtherance of free speech on a public issue, and 6 that his motion has therefore (1) placed on PCRP the burden to demonstrate the merits of 7 its claim (a burden it has always carried), and (2) “automatically stayed all discovery.” Id. 8 at 3. He does not otherwise argue that the UPEPA applies to PCRP’s core federal

9 Lanham Act trademark infringement claim, and it plainly does not. Thus, it is worth 10 noting, even an automatic state law discovery stay could not as a matter of law apply to 11 outstanding or ongoing discovery on a federal Lanham Act claim. And that claim, and 12 this case, would remain, even if the Court granted Crowl’s motion. 13 PCRP responds that the Court already correctly held that speech which

14 misidentifies the source of the communication and violates federal trademark law is not 15 protected by the First Amendment. Dkt. 88. PCRP’s Response does not address the CPA 16 claim to which Crowl’s motion appears to be directed. 17 Nevertheless, the rule of liberal construction discussed above does not apply to a 18 pro se litigant’s own dispositive motions. A pro se litigant is not excused from following

19 the rules of civil procedure, or evidence. Although the Court must construe his complaint 20

21 3 PCRP asserts that Crowl wrote these “cookie cutter” declarations and that they were “signed” in an “online chat room,” Crowl hosted on April 10, 2025. Dkt. 89. It cites no evidence 22 to support that allegation. 1 liberally, a pro se litigant “must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other 2 litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds 3 by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 925–28 (9th Cir. 2012). Pro se litigants in

4 the ordinary civil case should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys. 5 Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986)). 6 Crowl’s motion does not address the substance of the UPEPA. The UPEPA 7 applies when a complaint is based on the individual’s ‘‘[e]xercise of the right of freedom 8 of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association,

9 guaranteed by the United States Constitution or Washington state Constitution, on a 10 matter of public concern.” See M.G. v. Bainbridge Island School Dist, #303, 34 Wn. App. 11 2d 51, 71 (2025) (citing RCW 4.105.010(2)(c). Whether speech is on a matter of public 12 concern is a question of law, not fact. Id. Accordingly, Crowl’s opinion testimony and 13 that of his witnesses is of no moment. Despite the volume of his filings, Crowl has not

14 cited any binding or persuasive state or federal authority for the proposition that his co- 15 opting the PCRP’s long-used name is a protected exercise of his First Amendment rights. 16 Until and unless a defendant makes such a showing, no burden “shifts” to the 17 plaintiff, and the defendant is not entitled to dismissal. Crowl has not established that his 18 incorporation and use of the name “Pierce County Republican Party” as a means of

19 “mocking” the Pierce County Republican Party is protected speech on a matter of public 20 concern as a matter of law. His UPEPA motion is DENIED. 21 22 1 3. Crowl’s summary judgment motions are DENIED. 2 Crowl has two pending separate summary judgment motions. Dkts. 87 and 92. The 3 first asserts that his use of the name “Pierce County Republican Party” is used only as a

4 protected-speech exercise by defendant. He attempts to “prove” this assertion with eight 5 identical Declarations: 6 I know it to be certain that the use of the name “Pierce County Republican Party” has been used as a protected-speech exercise by 7 Defendants, namely: a. To bring public attention to the Plaintiff’s failure to register and 8 secure their namesake(s); and b. To mock, parody, criticize, and otherwise make fun of Plaintiff in 9 various capacities.

10 See Dkts. 32–39. 11 Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 12 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any 13 material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 14 P. 56(a). In determining whether an issue of fact exists, the Court must view all evidence 15 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in 16 that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1986) 17 (emphasis added); Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996). 18 A genuine issue of material fact exists where there is sufficient evidence for a 19 reasonable factfinder to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The 20 inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission 21 to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. 22 at 251–52. The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no evidence 1 that supports an element essential to the nonmovant’s claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 2 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the movant has met this burden, the nonmoving party 3 then must show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. If the

4 nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the 5 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24. 6 Crowl’s “evidence” is not admissible, and even if it was the Court would accord it 7 no weight under the summary judgment standard. These conclusory, signed-under- 8 penalty-of-perjury, identical lay legal opinions from unknown persons are not enough to

9 defeat, much less obtain, summary judgment. Crowl’s first summary judgment motion, 10 Dkt. 85, is DENIED. 11 Crowl’s second summary judgment motion is based on a social media post he 12 apparently claims PCRP made, explaining that all its income is from donations, and that 13 it will therefore not pay sales tax on any of its events. Dkt. 92 at 5. He argues without

14 citation that the Lanham Act requires PCRP to prove that his “actions involve 15 commercial activity affecting others.” Id. at 2. He contends that because PCRP posted on 16 social media that it relies only on donations, it cannot show that Crowl’s use of PCRP’s 17 name causes confusion in commercial activity affecting others as a matter of law. Id. 18 Crowl cites not a single case or any other authority supporting this position. Nor is the

19 social media post properly before the Court as evidence; it is not attached to a 20 Declaration attesting to its authenticity. 21 Crowl’s second summary judgment motion, Dkt. 92, is DENIED. 22 1 4. Crowl’s Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss with prejudice is DENIED. 2 Finally, Crowl moves to dismiss PCRP’s claims with prejudice under Rule 41(b) 3 because, he claims, the Court tasked PCRP’s counsel with “taking the lead” on filing a

4 Joint Status Report, and he has failed to do so. Dkt. 96. He cites no authority supporting 5 this draconian sanction, and it is not one he would want the Court to impose so 6 haphazardly, particularly where he is so adamant about his refusal to discuss any matters 7 with counsel on the phone or in person. Crowl’s motion is without merit and it is 8 DENIED. Counsel shall engage Crowl by email to exchange proposals for a Joint Status

9 Report. 10 The parties shall file a Joint Status Report within 10 days. They should be 11 prepared to share with the Court every email between them on this topic, attached to a 12 properly sworn Declaration and filed on CM/ECF. If the Joint Status Report is not timely 13 filed, the party responsible for the delay will be sanctioned, up to and including dismissal

14 or the entry of a default judgment. Litigants in this Federal District Court will not conduct 15 themselves as the litigants in this case have so far, without consequences. 16 * * * 17 Going forward, the losing party on any motion of the sort resolved in this or the 18 Court’s prior orders will be subject to monetary or other sanction. Do not waste the

19 Court’s or each other’s time on petty disputes, or unproductive, unsupported motions. Do 20 not litigate or complain about each other or the Court to the Courtroom Deputy. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 // 1 Dated this 3rd day of December, 2025. A 2 3 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 4 United S tates District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22