Pidge v. Tyler

4 Mass. 541
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedOctober 15, 1808
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 4 Mass. 541 (Pidge v. Tyler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pidge v. Tyler, 4 Mass. 541 (Mass. 1808).

Opinion

The question upon this report having been submitted, without argument, to the decision of the Court, their opinion was now delivered by

Parsons, C. J.

The deed, in this case, was objected to at the trial as not within the provincial statute of 9 W. 3, c. 7, regulating the conveyances of land. It was admitted de bene esse, for the purpose of reserving the question for the opinion of the whole Court, if the demandant obtained a verdict. The jury found the issue for him, and we are now to decide on the validity of the objection ; the parties having agreed that, if the deed ought not to have been admitted, the verdict shall be set aside, and a general verdict be entered for the tenants.

*Il is well known that livery and seisin were necessa- [* 543] ry to pass lands at the common law, when the conveyance was by feoffment. This was required to give notoriety to the alienation by preventing secret transfers of the freehold.

After the introduction of uses, which passed by grant, and which were enforced by a court of equity, conveyances to uses were as general as they were mischievous, the freehold being in one man, while the use or beneficial interest was in another. To remedy this inconvenience, the statute of uses (27 H. 8, c. 10) was passed, [476]*476by which the freehold and use were necessarily united in the same person. In consequence of this statute, the owner might sell the use, and the statute transferred the freehold, so that the alienation might be private, attended with no circumstances of notoriety.

To prevent this mischief, at the same session of parliament, the statute of enrolments (27 H. 8, c. 16) was passed. The statute prohibited the passing of- lands by bargain and sale, unless the same was by deed indented and enrolled within six months in one of the courts at Westminster, or in the county before certain public officers therein mentioned. On the construction of this statute, the land, after executing the indentures, did not pass before the enrolment; but after the enrolment, within six months, the bargainee was seised by relation from the execution.

That this statute was passed to give notoriety to alienations by bargain and sale is manifest, because it is holden that, although the first bargain and sale be not enrolled, yet a second conveyance to one who in fact had notice of the prior conveyance, is fraudulent and void. The statute extends but to one kind of conveyance, and does not require an acknowledgment of the bargainor, or make any express provision that the deed shall be good against him and his heirs without enrolment.

As the intent of the statute was to give notoriety to bargains and sales of land, if a fictitious conveyance, not executed by the bargainor, should be enrolled, greater mischiefs would arise, and the public records might deceive in place of informing intended purchasers. The officer, therefore, whose duty it was to [ * 544 ] make the enrolment, must have evidence * that the instrument produced for enrolment had been in fact executed. Hence arose in England the acknowledgment of the deed by the bargainor; which was made either in the court where the deed was to be enrolled, or before the officer who was directed to make the enrolment, as the best evidence of the execution ; although there are cases in which the enrolment has been holden good when the deed was otherways authenticated than by acknowledgment.

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Bluebook (online)
4 Mass. 541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pidge-v-tyler-mass-1808.