Picou v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.
This text of 345 So. 2d 509 (Picou v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is a possessory action. This Court on March 15, 1976, issued alternative writs of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition commanding the Trial Judge to order the defendant to answer each and every one of the interrogatories propounded by plaintiffs fully and completely both for the time period prior to April 16, 1973, (d'ate possessory suit was filed), and also for the time period after April 16, 1973, or in the alternative for the Trial Judge and the respondent, The Louisiana Land and Exploration Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to as LL&E), to show cause by brief on or before March 29, 1976, why the writ should not be made peremptory. The Trial Judge and the respondent have elected the alternative. In the event the alternative was elected, and until further orders of this Court, all proceedings against the relators in this cause in the Trial Court were stayed and suspended.
Briefly, the record points out that this possessory action has been brought by the [510]*510plaintiffs-relators to have their possession of certain property in Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana, recognized and maintained, and thus is a civil suit subject to the appellate and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. Art. 5, § 10(A) La.Const. (1974).
The plaintiffs-relators propounded some 21 various interrogatories to the respondent, to which the respondent objected generally as to those interrogatories which sought to discover anything which occurred after April 16, 1973, the date of filing suit. The respondent specifically objected to Interrogatories Nos. 1, IS and 16.1
Hearing was held in the Trial Court as to why the respondent should not be ordered to answer all of relators’ interrogatories fully and completely both for the period prior to April 16, 1973, and for the period subsequent thereto. The Trial Judge sustained the respondent’s objections and overruled relators’ motion to compel the respondent to answer interrogatories, except that he ordered the respondent to supplement its answers to Interrogatories Nos. 15 and 16 so as to provide information for the period prior to April 16, 1973. It was from this order of the Trial Court that the relators’ applied for writs to this Court.
The relators contend that the Trial Judge was in error (1) in refusing to compel the respondent to state, in its answer to Interrogatory No. 1, whether it claimed it was in possession of the property at the time suit was filed or at any time during the year preceding the filing of suit; (2) in sustaining respondent’s objections insofar as the period subsequent to April 16, 1973, is concerned in refusing to order the defendant to answer Interrogatories 15 and 16 for that period; (3) in sustaining respondent’s objections and refusing to order the respondent to answer Interrogatories 17 and 18 2; and (4) in sustaining respondent’s objection and refusing to order the respondent to answer Interrogatories 19 and 20 3.
[511]*511The use of interrogatories as a discovery device is governed by LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1491 and 1436.4 It is interesting to note that Code of Civil Procedure art. 1436 in part states that “[i]t is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-dence.” As this Court said in Gaudet v. Lawes, 166 So.2d 337, 342 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1964),
“ * * * [I]t seems the announced purpose of the discovery statute is to insure a full and fair trial on the merits of [512]*512each case by affording all litigants full opportunity to obtain the true facts pertinent to each individual case. To this end discovery also sanctions the disclosure of all issues, both legal and factual, intended to be relied upon by each litigant to eliminate the element of surprise and assure that each party may be fully aware of and prepared to meet, defend and answer all issues which may be presented during the trial irrespective of whether same be related to questions of law or fact.”
Therefore, we conclude that through the use of discovery devices, all party litigants should have the availability of all facts, whether these facts be admissible at trial or not, in order to be fully prepared for the presentation of their cases so that justice can be done.
Both the Trial Judge and the respondent, LL&E, in answering the alternative writ contend that as to Interrogatory No. 1, it is up to the plaintiffs-relators to prove the requisites of LSA-C.C.P. art. 3658, and since the respondent, LL&E, only claims that the plaintiffs-relators were not in possession, there is no need for LL&E to be compelled to answer this interrogatory. This contention would perhaps be true if it was shown that any answer to Interrogatory No. 1 could be of no possible help to relators in the preparation of their case. We are, however, of the opinion that an answer, whatever it may be, which would be of some aid to relators in the preparation of their case, and could reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is proper. This is not to say that such an answer is admissible at a trial on the merits. Admissibility is not a prerequisite for the answering of an interrogatory. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1436. If the answer to Interrogatory No. 1 aids the relators in the preparation and prosecution of their suit, it falls within the spirit and purpose of discovery procedure, and therefore the respondent, LL&E, should be compelled to answer same.
As to the other three specifications of error concérning Interrogatories Nos. 15 through 20, as to whether relators are entitled to answers which relate to the period of time subsequent to the date on which suit was filed, both the Trial Judge and LL&E refer this Court to the case of Ree Corporation v. Shaffer, 261 La. 502, 260 So.2d 307 (1972) for the proposition that the issue before the Court is whether plaintiffs in a possessory action had the type of possession required by the Code of Civil Procedure for more than a year prior to the disturbance complained of, Thusly, they argue that any activity on the part of LL&E after the date of the filing of suit is of no moment.
We believe, however, that this argument goes more to the admissibility of the evidence at a trial on the merits, rather than to the validity of the objection to the interrogatory. As we .have above noted, if an answer to an interrogatory will aid a party litigant in the preparation of his case, and will reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, it should be answered. We do not agree that it was ever intended that the strict rules of evidence be used to prohibit answers to interrogatories. Here also we believe that justice will be served by these interrogatories being answered.
Therefore, for the above and foregoing reasons, the writ issued by this Court is made peremptory. This matter is now remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein, and all costs of this proceeding before this Court are taxed to respondent, LL&E.
BLANCHE, J., dissents and assigns reasons therefor.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
345 So. 2d 509, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 4078, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/picou-v-louisiana-land-exploration-co-lactapp-1976.