Picnic Place Dev., L.L.C. v. Preston

2024 Ohio 6024

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 26, 2024
• Docket: 113754
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Picnic Place Dev., L.L.C. v. Preston, 2024-Ohio-6024.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

PICNIC PLACE DEVELOPMENT LLC, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 113754 v. :

JAZMANE M. PRESTON AND OCCUPANTS, :

Defendants-Appellants. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 26, 2024

Civil Appeal from the Parma Municipal Court Case No. 24CVG00307

Appearances:

Lee T. Skidmore, for appellee.

Jazmane M. Preston, pro se.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

Jazmane M. Preston appeals the municipal court’s decision granting

the forcible entry and detainer in favor of Picnic Place Development, LLC (“Picnic

Place”) and restoring its possession and control of an apartment unit leased to

Preston. Following the municipal court’s final decision, Preston ceded possession and control of the apartment to Picnic Place and, therefore, this appeal is dismissed

as moot.

In November 2023, the parties executed a lease agreement requiring

Preston to remit monthly payments of $2,145.00 for the renting of apartment

number 67850 in the building located at 6750 Maplewood Road, Parma Heights,

Ohio. The agreement was entered between her and Picnic Place, which was doing

business as The Villas at Maplewood also located at 6750 Maplewood Road. Shortly

after taking possession of the apartment unit, Preston ceased making payments. On

January 11, 2024, the apartment manager served a “notice to leave the premises”

based on the nonpayment of rent, late fees, and other charges totaling $5,521.33. A

complaint for forcible entry and detainer was filed 11 days later. After a hearing on

the matter before the magistrate, a writ of restitution was issued on February 27,

2024, ordering Preston to surrender the unit by March 3. Although Preston filed

objections to the magistrate’s decision, the municipal court overruled them and

issued the writ. No stay of execution was requested, and Preston voluntarily

surrendered possession of the unit.

Nonetheless, Preston appealed, advancing four assignments of error

claiming that the municipal court erred (1) by allowing the three-day notice sent for

a fictitious entity signed by another corporation to constitute compliance with the

provisions set forth in the contract; (2) by assuming the appellant did not pay rent

based on clarifying questions that were asked by Preston at the trial; (3) by

overruling the objections and allowing witness testimony and not requiring the landlord, its agent, or a real party in interest to appear at the hearing; and (4) by

accepting the testimony of Picnic Place’s attorney who claimed to have verified a

title. Those arguments are moot because Preston vacated the apartment unit before

the appeal was filed.

“Under Ohio law, a forcible entry and detainer action decides the right

to immediate possession of property and ‘nothing else.’” State ex rel. Tri Eagle

Fuels, L.L.C. v. Dawson, 2019-Ohio-2011, ¶ 10, quoting Sheehe v. Demsey, 2014-

Ohio-305, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), and Seventh Urban, Inc. v. Univ. Circle Property Dev.,

Inc., 67 Ohio St.2d 19, 25, fn. 11 (1981). When possession of the property has been

restored to the landlord following a successful forcible-entry-and-detainer action,

an appeal becomes moot. Id., citing Knop v. Davet, 2017-Ohio-1416, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.).

No further relief can be afforded to the ousted tenant. Id.; see also Amujiogu v. Oko,

2022-Ohio-1323, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.); Sheehe at ¶ 6; Cleveland Fin. Assocs., L.L.C. v.

Cleveland Banquets, L.L.C., 2011-Ohio-931, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).

Generally, restitution of the premises can be avoided if the defendant

perfects a stay of execution. In this case, Preston did not seek or obtain a stay of

execution of the writ of restitution and has since vacated the apartment, restoring

possession to Picnic Place. Preston does not dispute that she no longer is in

possession and control of the apartment unit. In her reply brief, she maintains that

her surrendering possession of the apartment unit was the product of an illegal act

by the landlord because the writ of restitution was not mailed to her but was instead

posted on the apartment by the bailiff. She nonetheless concedes that she vacated the apartment in compliance with the writ of restitution. Without a stay of execution

or her continued possession of the property, the appeal must be deemed moot.

There is no relief that can be offered.

Because possession of the leased premises has been restored to Picnic

Place, Preston’s appeal is moot. We need not address the merits of the assigned

errors. Any conclusions reached would be advisory in nature. The appeal is

dismissed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR