Pickens v. Wallace

District Court, C.D. Illinois·Decided November 16, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-02189·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DAKIR PICKENS, ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) No.: 20-cv-2189-MMM ) DIANE MARLIN, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER Plaintiff, a detainee at the Champaign County Correctional Center (“Jail”), proceeding pro se, files a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649-51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations”, it requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 Fed. Appx. 588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011) quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff files a scattershot complaint naming 12 Defendants, alleging a host of violations at the Jail over a four-week period. Plaintiff attached approximately 30 pages of exhibits to his complaint which were not reviewed. See Fitzgerald v. Dep't of Corr., No. 07-61, 2007 WL 951861, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 26, 2007) (exhibits which were not “necessary to the complaint” were not considered at merit review). Plaintiff alleges that on May 21, 2020, another inmate threw bodily fluids on him. When Plaintiff complained to Officer Hibbs he was told “that’s what you get for talking shit.” Plaintiff found this comment unprofessional and filed a grievance of the matter. He claims that his complaint was not adequately investigated, and that Officer Hibbs participated in the investigation. Plaintiff also complains that criminal charges were not filed against the inmate who struck him.

Plaintiff makes the unrelated claim that on June 8, 2020, he asked for the names and employee status of all medical staff. Officer Spaulding responded by advising him to submit a Freedom of Information Act (“FOI”) request. Plaintiff complains that Officer Spaulding is not an Information Officer and is not qualified to make this recommendation. Plaintiff makes another unrelated claim that the attorney conference rooms are so close to the housing units that others might eavesdrop. Plaintiff also alleges that he was subjected to a series of disciplinary tickets on four occasions. Plaintiff does not provide much detail, other than that he was cited for interfering with the security staff. Plaintiff complains that he was not given hearings, though, on at least on

occasion, he participated in “mediation.” Plaintiff claims that when he requested a Ramadan diet, he was told there was no Ramadan diet but that he could receive a kosher diet. Plaintiff takes issue with this as well, not indicating whether there is a difference between a kosher diet and a Ramadan diet. Plaintiff also requested to be served dinner at 8:00 p.m. but does not indicate whether or not this request was accommodated. Plaintiff complains that the soup in the Jail commissary costs $.79. while soup sold in the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) costs, only $.25. He also complains that there is insufficient exercise equipment at the jail. Plaintiff names the City of Urbana, Mayor Diane Marlin, Sheriff Dustin Heuerman, Lt. Robert Cravens, Clinical Coordinator Brenda Spaulding, Lt. Josh Sap, Sgt. McPheron, Officer Hibbs, Officer C. McMahon, Food Service Director Dione Wallace, Program Coordinator Celeste Blodgette, and Aramark Food Services, The Seventh Circuit has consistently noted that “the essential function of a complaint under the civil rules...is to put the defendant on notice of the plaintiff’s claim.” Ross Brothers

Construction Co., Inc, v. International Steel Services, Inc. 2002 WL 413172 at *4 (7th Cir. 2002) quoting Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001). See Fed.R.Civ.P 10 (b). Here, however, Plaintiff names a dozen individuals, often not indicating which Defendant he holds responsible for any particular violation. The Court notes, further, that many of Plaintiff’s allegations do not state actionable claims. The fact that Plaintiff was struck by another inmate does not state a failure to protect, absent allegations that any Defendant had notice of the threat. See Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 844-45 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff must show both an objective risk of danger and actual knowledge of that risk on the part of Defendants.)

Officer Hibbs’s “unprofessional” response after Plaintiff was struck does not state a constitutional violation. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (mere insults do not amount to a due process or equal protection violation). The allegations that Officer Spaulding advised Plaintiff to submit an FOI request for the information he sought does not state any type of violation whatsoever. The same applies to the claim that detainees might be overheard while speaking with counsel, as it does not claim injury, merely the possibility of injury. Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 848-49 (7th Cir. 1999) citing Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 272–73 (7th Cir. 1996) (“suggesting that while a plaintiff may recover monetary damages under the Eighth Amendment for ‘failure to prevent harm,’ the plaintiff is not entitled to monetary compensation for the mere ‘failure to prevent exposure to [a] risk of harm’”). Plaintiff also asserts procedural due process claims, for the failure to conduct hearings in regard to his disciplinary tickets. As for any injury he sustained, Plaintiff indicates that on one occasion, he was “locked down” for two hours and 35 minutes, and that on another, he was

locked down for four days. It is well established that a prisoner is entitled to due process where there is a protected liberty or property interest at stake. Domka v. Portage County, 523 F.3d 776, 779–80 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, however, Plaintiff pleads only that he was on lockdown for several periods of time. This does not appear to implicate a protected interest, at least where Plaintiff does not claim that he was subjected to atypical hardship. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). While Plaintiff is critical of the handling of his various grievances, this is not enough to plead personal liability under § 1983. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). “[T]he alleged mishandling of [Plaintiff’s] grievances by persons who otherwise did not cause or

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Related

Sandin v. Conner
515 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Owens v. Hinsley
635 F.3d 950 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
John C. Babcock v. R.L. White and G. McDaniel
102 F.3d 267 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Ellis Henderson v. Michael F. Sheahan and J.W. Fairman
196 F.3d 839 (Seventh Circuit, 2000)
Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
689 F.3d 680 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Domka v. Portage County, Wis.
523 F.3d 776 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Michael Alexander v. United States
721 F.3d 418 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Wilson v. Ryker
451 F. App'x 588 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)