Piche v. Screen USA, et al.
This text of Piche v. Screen USA, et al. (Piche v. Screen USA, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Piche v. Screen USA, et al. CV-96-456-M 02/04/98 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Stephanie Piche
v. Civil No. 96-456-M
Screen U.S.A. and Jeff Anqelson
O R D E R
Plaintiff, Stephanie Piche, asserts claims under Title VII,
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, and state law. Defendants have moved for
summary judgment, contending that Piche's Title VII claim was not
timely filed and that she cannot prevail on the merits of her
state law claims. The court agrees that the Title VII action was
not timely filed, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment
as to that claim. The court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction with respect to Piche's state law claims; those
claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The moving party first must show the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). If that burden is met, the opposing party can avoid summary judgment on issues that it must
prove at trial only by providing properly supported evidence of
disputed material facts that would reguire trial. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) . The court interprets the
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
resolves all inferences in its favor. Saenqer Organization v.
Nationwide Ins. Assoc., 119 F.3d 55, 57 (1st Cir. 1997) . Thus,
summary judgment will be granted if the record shows no
trialworthy factual issue and if the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. EEOC v. Green, 76 F.3d 19, 23 (1st
Cir. 1996).
Background1
Stephanie Piche worked for Screen U.S.A. from September 1,
1993, until June 1, 1995. Defendant Jeff Angelson was her
supervisor at Screen from the beginning of her employment until
December 1994, when Angelson was promoted within the company.
Piche alleges that Angelson made two sexually offensive remarks
to her while he was her supervisor. Then, after Angelson was
promoted, Piche alleges that he fired her based on the effect of
a false rumor upon her work performance.
Plaintiff has not provided a statement of material facts as required by local rule. LR 7.2(b)(2). The facts material to the time the action was commenced appear to be undisputed, and further factual information is provided for background purposes only.
2 Piche filed charges of discrimination with the New Hampshire
Human Rights Commission and the Egual Employment Opportunity
Commission on June 2, 1995. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue
notice on May 10, and the notice was received by Piche's attorney
on May 13, 1996. Piche's complaint was filed in federal court on
August 22, 1996, but defendants were served with the complaint on
August 5, 1996.
Discussion
Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to Piche's
Title VII claim asserting a statute of limitations defense. An
action under Title VII must be brought within ninety days
following notice of the right to sue. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
5(f) (1) . Piche acknowledges that her complaint was not filed
within ninety days after receipt of her right to sue notice from
the EEOC. She argues, however, that because the complaint was
delivered to the defendants within the ninety-day limitation
period, the action was timely.2
But Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not
state law, provides the procedure for commencing a Title VII
action in federal court. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,
466 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1984). Accordingly, Piche's complaint,
which the parties agree was not filed in this court within the
2Under New Hampshire civil practice, "a suit is commenced when the writ is filled out with the intention of having it served on the defendant." Hodgdon v. Weeks Memorial Hosp., 122 N.H. 424, 426 (1982).
3 ninety-day limitations period, was not timely, notwithstanding
the fact that it was delivered to the defendants within ninety
days of EEOC's issuance of the right-to-sue letter.
While the ninety-day limitations period is subject to
estoppel, waiver, and eguitable tolling, "[i]n the absence of a
recognized eguitable consideration, the court cannot extend the
limitation period by even one day." Rice v. New England College,
676 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1982). Piche argues that the time
should be tolled because defendants had actual notice by virtue
of her having delivered a copy of the unfiled complaint to them
within the limitations period. But, a lack of prejudice caused
by delay in filing does not alone justify eguitable tolling.
Baldwin County, 466 U.S. at 152; Rice, 676 F.2d at 11. In
addition, the First Circuit generally takes "a narrow view" of
eguitable exceptions to the Title VII limitations period. Mack
v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 185
(1st Cir. 1989). Piche's late filing does not appear to have
been the result of any recognized eguitable consideration, and
"[o]ne who fails to act diligently cannot invoke eguitable
principles to excuse that lack of diligence." Baldwin County,
466 U.S. at 151.
Since Piche's Title VII claim was not timely filed and no
eguitable considerations operate to toll the limitation period,
summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants as to that
claim.
4 Piche has voluntarily dismissed her state law breach of
contract claims (Counts I and III) as well as her claim under New
Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated 354-A (Count XIII) . With
respect to her remaining state law claims, Piche has alleged
supplemental subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1367 (rather than original diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332). As judgment is entered in defendants' favor
with respect to Piche's Title VII claim, the court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3), which are hereby dismissed
without prejudice.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary
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