Picard v. Hillsborough DOC
This text of 2006 DNH 141 (Picard v. Hillsborough DOC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Picard v. Hillsborough DOC 05-CV-234-SM 12/14/06 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Warren Picard, Plaintiff
v. Civil No. 05-CV-234-SM Opinion No. 2006 DNH 141 Hillsborough County Department of Corrections, et a l .,
O R D E R
Plaintiff, a former inmate at the Hillsborough County House
of Corrections ("HCHC"), brings this action seeking damages for
what he claims were violations of his rights under the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following dismissal of several of
plaintiff's claims, two remain. In the first, plaintiff says
defendants employed excessive force against him while they were
transporting him between cells on May 8, 2005 (count two). Next,
plaintiff alleges that, in response to certain litigation he
pursued against them years earlier, defendants retaliated against
him, in violation of his First Amendment rights (counts two and
three).
Defendants move for summary judgment, asserting that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff has not objected. For
the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.
Standard of Review
When ruling on a party's motion for summary judgment, the
court must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable
to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor." Griqqs-Rvan v. Smith. 904
F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate
when the record reveals "no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this context, "a fact is
'material' if it potentially affects the outcome of the suit and
a dispute over it is 'genuine' if the parties' positions on the
issue are supported by conflicting evidence." Intern'l Ass'n of
Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103
F.3d 196, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
Here, because plaintiff has failed to file an objection to
defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court will take as
admitted the factual statements recited in defendants' memorandum
and supporting affidavits. See Local Rule 7.2(b)(2) ("A
memorandum in opposition to summary judgment shall incorporate a
2 short and concise statement of material facts, supported by
appropriate record citations, as to which the adverse party
contends a genuine dispute exists so as to require trial. All
properly supported material facts set forth in the moving party's
factual statement shall be deemed admitted unless properly
opposed by the adverse party."). See also McCrorv v. Spigel, 260
F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Although we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant, as to any essential
factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear
the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with
sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants
summary judgment to the moving party.") (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Discussion
I. Administrative Exhaustion.
The undisputed material facts of record demonstrate that
plaintiff failed to exhaust available HCHC administrative
remedies prior to filing this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such
administrative exhaustion is a prerequisite to prisoner
litigation under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which provides
that:
3 No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See also Booth v. Churner. 532 U.S. 731
(2001); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Woodford v. N q o ,
126 S. C t . 2378 (2006) .
Having failed to properly exhaust available administrative
remedies, plaintiff is statutorily barred from pursuing this
litigation. Defendants are, then, entitled to judgment as a
matter of law as to the remaining counts of plaintiff's complaint
(i.e., counts two and three).
II. Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights were not Violated.
Even if plaintiff had properly exhausted available
administrative remedies, his complaint would fair no better. The
undisputed material facts of record demonstrate that, as a matter
of law, defendants did not employ excessive force when moving
plaintiff between cells on May 8, 2005. See generally Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Whitley v. Albers. 475 U.S. 312
(1986). The record also reveals that plaintiff was not the
4 victim of any unconstitutional retaliation in response to his
having exercised his right of access to the courts.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary
judgment (document no. 27) is granted. Plaintiff failed to
properly exhausted available administrative remedies and,
therefore, he is precluded from pursuing this litigation relating
to the conditions of his confinement. Moreover, even if he had
properly exhausted his claims, they would fail on the merits.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with
this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Hceven J./HcAuliffe Chief Judge
December 14, 2006
cc: Warren Picard, pro se Carolyn M. Kirby, Esq. John A. Curran, Esq. Elizabeth L. Hurley, Esq.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2006 DNH 141, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/picard-v-hillsborough-doc-nhd-2006.