Phylena Babbitt, individually, and as personal representative of Janet Broadbrooks v. Cullman Regional Medical Center, Inc Cullman Emergency Medical Service The Health Care Authority of Cullman County and Andrew Blake Hartley

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Decided: September 5, 2014
• Docket: 1130490
• Status: Published

Opinion

REL:09/05/2014

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229- 0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2014 ____________________

1130490 ____________________

Phylena Babbitt, individually, and as personal representative of Janet Broadbrooks, deceased.

v.

Cullman Regional Medical Center, Inc; Cullman Emergency Medical Service; The Health Care Authority of Cullman County; and Andrew Blake Hartley

Appeal from Cullman Circuit Court (CV-2011-900297)

BOLIN, Justice.

AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

Stuart, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. 1130490

Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.

2 1130490

MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).

Phylena Babbitt, the plaintiff below, individually and as

the personal representative of the estate of her deceased

mother, Janet Broadbrooks, appeals from a summary judgment in

favor of the defendants, Cullman Regional Medical Center,

Inc., Cullman Emergency Medical Service ("Cullman EMS"), the

Health Care Authority of Cullman County, and Andrew Blake

Hartley. Today this Court affirms the summary judgment,

without an opinion. I respectfully dissent because I believe

a jury should have been allowed to consider the facts of this

case to determine whether Hartley was negligent and whether

Broadbrooks was contributorily negligent in the accident that

caused Broadbrooks's death.

On May 12, 2011, Hartley, who was employed by Cullman

EMS, was driving an ambulance to the scene of a motor-vehicle

collision. He had been dispatched from Cullman Regional

Medical Center. He was driving the ambulance eastbound on

Highway 157 when he encountered traffic and decided to

continue in the same direction in the westbound lane, which is

to say that he decided to drive the wrong way in the oncoming

lane of traffic. Hartley testified that he was driving between

3 1130490

40 and 45 miles per hour as he drove the wrong way on the

road. The speed limit was 55 miles per hour.

Broadbrooks was driving a truck that was pulling a horse

trailer with a young horse inside. Babbitt testified that

Broadbrooks wanted to turn the vehicle around because the

horse had been inside the trailer for about two hours before

traffic came to a stop. Broadbrooks turned on her blinker to

signal that she was turning left into a parking lot where she

would then turn around to drive westbound on Highway 157.

Hartley testified that he saw movement coming from his right

as he passed an 18-wheeler or semi-trailer truck. Babbitt

testified that she did not hear the ambulance sirens, and

Hartley testified that he attempted to avoid the collision

with Broadbrooks's truck as it turned left in front of him.

The vehicles collided; Broadbrooks died from her injuries.

On November 9, 2011, Babbitt sued the defendants,

alleging negligence and wantonness. The defendants answered by

asserting the affirmative defense of contributory negligence;

they later moved for a summary judgment on this ground. On

January 7, 2014, the trial court entered a summary judgment

for the defendants, stating that, pursuant to § 32-5A-7, Ala.

4 1130490

Code 1975,1 "[Babbitt has] failed to present substantial

1 Section 32-5A-7 provides:

"(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.

"(b) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:

"(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;

"(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;

"(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property;

"(4) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions.

"(c) The exemptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of an audible signal meeting the requirements of Section 32-5-213 and visual requirements of any laws of this state requiring visual signals on emergency vehicles.

"(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the 5 1130490

evidence of a breach of [the defendants'] duty of care or

wantonness" and that, "under the unique facts of this case,"

the defendants were "also entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law based on contributory negligence."

Whether Hartley was negligent under § 32-5A-7 was, I

believe, a question for the jury, as was whether Broadbrooks

was negligent in failing to observe the ambulance on the wrong

side of the road before the ambulance struck her vehicle. I do

not agree that, as a matter of law, driving an ambulance

between 40 and 45 miles per hour on the wrong side of the road

in a 55-mile-per-hour zone is not negligent. Therefore, I

dissent.

driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others."