Phun Hram v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
• Decided: July 8, 2026
• Docket: 07-25-00401-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00401-CR

PHUN HRAM, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 47th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 084813-A-CR, Honorable Dee Johnson, Presiding

July 8, 2026 OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

Appellant, Phun Hram, appeals his conviction for the offense of solicitation of

prostitution 1 and resulting sentence of six months’ incarceration and $300 fine.

Appellant’s sole issue presents a challenge to the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s pre-

trial motion to suppress. 2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.021(a).

2 The actual title of Appellant’s motion to suppress is “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to

Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence.” BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are not in dispute. The Amarillo Police Department

conducted a prostitution sting operation on September 28, 2023, at a local motel. Officer

Patricia Moreno posed as a prostitute. After Appellant indicated that he wanted to have

intercourse with Moreno in exchange for a fee, the two negotiated a price. Moreno sent

Appellant to a hotel room where he was arrested. Appellant was subsequently charged

with the offense of solicitation of prostitution. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress

in which he argued that the “[p]olice were not allowed to commit the offense [of

prostitution] to provoke the offense [of solicitation]” and, thus, all evidence obtained by

the police in this case was inadmissible under the United States and Texas constitutions

and article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. After conducting a hearing,

the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant pleaded

guilty and was sentenced as identified above. He timely filed the instant appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard

of review. State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We give almost

total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and review de novo the

application of the law to the facts. Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012). However, the instant case presents us with a question of law based on

undisputed facts and, therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review. Oles v. State,

993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

2 LAW AND ANALYSIS

We begin by noting that Appellant is not relying on the defense of entrapment. See

TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.06. Rather, Appellant contends that by offering to give Appellant

oral sex in exchange for money, Moreno committed a violation of law and any evidence

obtained by her unlawful act is inadmissible against Appellant.

A person commits the offense of solicitation of prostitution if the person knowingly

agrees to pay a fee to another person for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with

that person or another. Id. § 43.021(a). Evidence obtained by an officer or other person

in violation of the law shall not be admitted in evidence against an accused in the trial of

any criminal case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a). Article 38.23(a) is usually applied

to cases in which confessions were unlawfully obtained and claims that objects, such as

contraband, were obtained by unlawful searches and seizures. Watson v. State, 10

S.W.3d 782, 784 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.).

Article 38.23 prohibits any evidence obtained in violation of law from being

admitted against the accused in a criminal trial. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a). The

purposes underlying article 38.23(a) are the same as those underlying the federal

exclusionary rule: “to protect a suspect’s privacy, property, and liberty rights against

overzealous law enforcement,” and the primary purpose “is to deter unlawful actions

which violate the rights of criminal suspects in the acquisition of evidence for prosecution.”

Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 458–59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Article 38.23(a) may

not be invoked for statutory violations unrelated to the purpose of the exclusionary rule or

to the prevention of the illegal procurement of evidence of crime.” Id.; see Watson, 10

3 S.W.3d at 784 (collecting cases where article 38.23(a)’s exclusionary rule not applied to

statutory violations and refusing to apply it to violation of prostitution statute). Here,

because Moreno did not violate Appellant’s rights, Appellant lacks standing to complain

that the evidence against him was unlawfully obtained. Aikman v. State, No. 07-20-

00317-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 2648, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 22, 2022, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Palumbo v. State, No. 01-13-01072-CR,

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3831, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Watson, 10 S.W.3d at 784; see Chavez

v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (appellant lacked standing

to challenge legality of seizure because her rights were not violated).

We note that Appellant’s construction of article 38.23(a) would lead to an absurd

result. Article 38.23(a) treats “state action” and “private action” the same or on equal

footing. Chavez, 9 S.W.3d at 820. Under Appellant’s construction, since article 38.23(a)

applies to the acts of an “other person,” a criminal defendant could successfully argue

that the testimony of a real prostitute who offered to perform a sexual act with the

defendant for a fee to which he agreed would be inadmissible because the prostitute

violated the law. Watson, 10 S.W.3d at 784; see also Chavez, 9 S.W.3d at 821 (Keller,

J., concurring) (construction advanced by Appellant would require exclusion of all

accomplice testimony). We may not construe a statute in a manner that would lead to

absurd results. Wright v. State, 201 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Finally, the exclusionary rule found in article 38.23 contemplates that a crime has

already been committed, that evidence of that crime exists, and that officers violated the

law in attempting to obtain evidence of the previously committed crime. Day v. State, 614 4 S.W.3d 121, 128–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). To be covered by article 38.23, “the officers

must act illegally in obtaining existing evidence of an offense.” Id. at 129. Since evidence

of Appellant’s criminal wrongdoing could not have been “obtained” prior to his commission

of the crime, the evidence that Appellant committed the offense was not obtained as the

result of Moreno’s unlawful acts. Id.; Lu v. State, No. 05-22-00235-CR, 2023 Tex. App.

LEXIS 3701, at *19–20 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).

We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Judy C. Parker Chief Justice

Publish.