Phoebe Crum v. Benjamin Crum

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: July 20, 2023
• Docket: 2022 CA 001449
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-1449-MR

PHOEBE CRUM APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE KIMBERLY BLAIR WALSON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 16-CI-50536

BENJAMIN CRUM APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND KAREM, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Phoebe

Crum (“Appellant”) appeals from an order of the Madison Circuit Court finding

that she agreed with Benjamin Crum (“Appellee”) to divide the cost of a vehicle

for the use of the parties’ children including reasonable maintenance expenses.

Appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering the parties

to divide the cost of the vehicle, as the decision is not supported by evidence of

record. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order on appeal. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties were married on April 13, 2002, and divorced by way of a

decree of dissolution entered on September 25, 2017. Shortly before the decree

was entered, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement (“the Agreement”)

which resolved various custody, support, and property issues. The Agreement was

incorporated into the decree. The marriage produced two children.

On March 15, 2021, the parties entered into an agreed order on

timesharing, support, and the children’s expenses. The agreed order was read into

the record at a case management conference on that date, and subsequently filed

into the record on May 12, 2021. It stated at Paragraph 10,

[t]hat the parties shall equally divide the reasonable cost of the automobile insurance premium for the minor child, [Son’s1] Lexus ES 350 after such time as he has obtained his intermediate license. The parties shall also equally divide the reasonable cost of the automobile insurance premium for their minor child, [Daughter], at such time as she obtains her intermediate license. This is limited to the coverage of the children’s portion of the automobile insurance coverage.

Sometime thereafter, Son wrecked the Lexus automobile and

Appellee purchased a replacement vehicle for him. On June 9, 2022, Appellee

filed a motion for contempt, in which he sought reimbursement from Appellant for

one-half of the cost of the replacement vehicle. The motion was heard on July 11,

1 We will redact the children’s names because they are minors.

-2- 2022, at which time the court reviewed the video record from the March 15, 2021

case management conference to determine if an agreement had been reached as to

the costs of the children’s vehicle. After reviewing the March 15, 2021 video, the

court determined that the parties had agreed to split the cost of the children’s

vehicle. Appellant would later assert that she never agreed to split the cost of the

vehicle, either orally or memorialized in writing.

An additional hearing was conducted on August 22, 2022, after which

the court made a docket entry that the parties had agreed to split the cost of Son’s

vehicle and should discuss a vehicle for Daughter. On November 29, 2022, the

circuit court entered an order finding that the parties had agreed to divide the cost

of a vehicle for the children, including maintenance and damage repair if any. This

appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the terms of a settlement

agreement are enforceable as contract terms. Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)

403.180(5). “The construction and interpretation of a contract is a matter of law

and is reviewed under the de novo standard. Absent an ambiguity in the contract,

the parties’ intentions must be discerned from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence.” Cagata v. Cagata, 475 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Ky.

App. 2015), review denied (Dec. 10, 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations

-3- omitted). When a contract is not ambiguous, a court will interpret its terms “by

assigning language its ordinary meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence.”

Frear v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky. 2003) (footnote and citation

omitted).

As to the agreed order, we review the trial court’s findings of fact

pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01, and will not disturb

those findings unless clearly erroneous. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.

Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). Findings of fact are not clearly

erroneous if supported by substantial evidence. Kentucky State Racing

Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972). Substantial evidence is

that evidence which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient

probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Id.

ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the Madison Circuit Court erred in finding that

she agreed to divide with Appellee the cost of a vehicle for the children, including

maintenance and repairs. She asserts that this finding is not supported by the

record; therefore, it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Appellant contends that the

circuit court made an unsupported oral finding that she agreed to divide the cost of

a vehicle, but that Appellant never assented to this conclusion and the court

effectively imposed it on her. She also argues that the trial court’s decision is

-4- unreasonable based on the fact that automobiles for minor children are not a

fundamental right. The focus of Appellant’s argument is that the record does not

support the circuit court’s conclusion that Appellant agreed to divide the cost of a

vehicle for the children; that absent any support in the record for this finding, it is

arbitrary; and, that the order on appeal containing the erroneous finding must be

reversed.

Pursuant to KRS 403.180(5), Cagata, and Owens-Corning Fiberglas

Corporation, supra, we will consider de novo the question of whether Appellant

agreed to divide the cost of a vehicle for the children. Paragraph 6 of the agreed

order states that “the parties shall equally divide the children’s expenses[.]” This

paragraph does not expressly address the children’s vehicles. The question then

becomes whether the parties contemplated a vehicle for the children as a children’s

expense as included in Paragraph 6. We must answer this question in the

affirmative. Paragraph 10, quoted above, provides that the parties shall equally

divide the cost of automobile insurance for the children. Since the parties

contemplated automobile insurance for the children, and expressly addressed

“[Son’s] Lexus ES 350” in Paragraph 10, we believe the agreed order is properly

interpreted to include a child’s vehicle as a children’s expense.

Appellant correctly notes that neither the Agreement nor the agreed

order expressly addresses the purchase of a vehicle for the children nor the

-5- associated maintenance costs. This is her strongest argument in favor of her

contention that the circuit court improperly interpreted the agreed order as binding

her to half the costs associated with the vehicle. However, since the children’s

vehicles were expressly addressed in Paragraph 10, and as Paragraph 6 is broadly

worded to include an equal division of the children’s expenses, we cannot conclude

that the Madison Circuit Court erred in finding that Appellant agreed to a division

of costs associated with a child’s vehicle. Ultimately, Appellant’s Agreement to

“equally divide the children’s expenses” resolves the matter in favor of Appellee

on this issue. The Madison Circuit Court properly so concluded.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Madison Circuit

Court finding that Appellant agreed to divide the cost of a vehicle for the children.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

James A. Baechtold Nanci M. House Richmond, Kentucky Winchester, Kentucky

-6-