Philly, LLC v. Hood River County Assessor

CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedNovember 19, 2025
DocketTC-MD 240189G
StatusUnpublished

This text of Philly, LLC v. Hood River County Assessor (Philly, LLC v. Hood River County Assessor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Philly, LLC v. Hood River County Assessor, (Or. Super. Ct. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT MAGISTRATE DIVISION Property Tax

PHILLY, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 240189G ) v. ) ) HOOD RIVER COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) ) Defendant. ) DECISION

Plaintiff appealed the 2023–24 real market value of a health club undergoing renovations

as of the assessment date.1 Plaintiff was represented at trial by Alex Robinson of CKR Law

Group and called Owen Bartels, MAI, as a witness. Defendant was represented by Dominic

Carollo and Julie Poage of Carollo Law Group and called Anne Pulis-Tappouni, PhD (Critical

Studies), MAI, as a witness. The two experts’ appraisal reports were admitted as Plaintiff’s

Exhibit 1 (PE 1-126) and Defendant’s Exhibit A (DE 1-127).

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The subject account (subject) is the southern of two adjacent tax lots on which the Hood

River Athletic Club is sited. (PE 20-22.) It contains the improvements value for the entire club

building, as well as its own land value. The parties’ appraisers agreed in valuing the subject by

subtracting the northern lot’s land value from the total value of both lots together.2 Plaintiff

purchased the subject and the adjacent northern lot in December 2021 for $2,500,000 in a “cash,

arm’s-length, off-market transaction.” (DE 33; PE 11.)

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1 The property at issue is identified as Account 9453 in Defendant’s records. 2 Dr. Tappouni’s appraisal assignment did not distinguish the two tax accounts; she stated her agreement with Mr. Bartels’s method of deducting land value at trial.

DECISION TC-MD 240189G 1 of 19 A. Physical Features and Renovations

The subject has been owner-occupied and operated as a health club since it was built in

1985. (DE 33; PE 24.) The club is housed in two connected structures totaling about 53,146

square feet:3 the tennis center (about 60 percent of the square footage) and the main building

(about 40 percent). (PE 24-25, 29; DE 38-42.) The tennis center is “an open-span, metal framed

warehouse building” without windows, heat, or air conditioning, looked over by a mezzanine

with an observation deck and a childcare room. (PE 29-30; DE 39-42.) The main building is

constructed around a grassy courtyard and contains workout rooms, locker rooms, and a lobby

area with a café and commercial kitchen. (PE 25-30, DE 38-42.) The club is served by a

parking lot with 52 or 55 spaces.4 (PE 32; DE 37.) As of the assessment date, its pool and hot

tub had been decommissioned and were slated for removal.

The main building was undergoing renovations on the assessment date. Work done from

2022 to 2023 included the addition of a new main entry façade, new lighting, upgraded flooring,

cabinets, and countertops in the lobby and kitchen areas, and conversion of racquetball and

squash courts into general fitness areas. (PE 24-28; DE 42.) Significantly, the renovations

included decommissioning and removing the subject’s swimming pool and hot tub, which “had

been causing moisture penetration problems throughout the structure.” (PE 24; DE 10.) The

renovations had mainly been completed by the assessment date, with the exception of removing

the decommissioned pool and converting the space into another workout room. (DE 42.) The

total contracted cost for the renovations, including work yet to be completed on the assessment

date, was $1,589,701.79. (DE 64.)

3 The court accepts Plaintiff’s square footage because Defendant’s “approximately 49,025 square feet” is taken from floor plans that “do not represent ‘as-builts.’” DE 38. 4 Mr. Bartels lists 55 spaces; Dr. Tappouni lists 52.

DECISION TC-MD 240189G 2 of 19 The appraisers divided on how much value the renovations added to the subject.

According to Mr. Bartels, many of the renovations were remedial to correct moisture damage,

and the loss of the swimming pool diminished the subject’s utility as a health club. He valued

the subject as if the renovations were 100 percent complete, because the data did not support

dividing the renovation costs between remedial and nonremedial work. Dr. Tappouni, in

contrast, concluded that all of the renovation costs added value because removing the swimming

pool freed the subject for other uses. She therefore reduced her final value by the contracted

costs of the renovations remaining on the assessment date (about $356,000). (DE 64-65.)

B. Appraisers’ Reports

Mr. Bartels prepared an appraisal report for Plaintiff, and Dr. Tappouni prepared an

appraisal report for Defendant. The two experts’ concluded values differed dramatically:

Mr. Bartels valued the subject at $2,750,000, while Dr. Tappouni valued it at $7,470,000 as 100

percent complete before making a $356,000 downward adjustment for projected remaining

renovation costs. (PE 72; DE 65.) The appraisers’ differences in chosen comparables and

approaches to value are rooted in their differing highest and best use conclusions.

1. Highest and best use

The subject’s commercial zoning allows for “commercial uses, industrial uses incidental

and essential to an on-site commercial use, parking lots, multi-family dwellings, professional

offices, and hostels.” (DE 43.) Manufacturing is allowed if the manufactured goods are “sold on

a retail basis out of the commercial use which is the storefront for such sale.” (Id.) Use as a

health club “is generally considered a commercial use and is therefore * * * legally permitted per

zoning.” (Id.)

DECISION TC-MD 240189G 3 of 19 Setting aside the subject’s current improvements, the subject site would support the

above uses “on a moderate scale.” (DE 43.) Mr. Bartels and Dr. Tappouni agree that if the

subject were vacant, its highest and best use would be as mixed-use commercial rather than as a

health club of the existing type. (PE 37; DE 43.) However, given the subject’s current

improvements, the appraisers’ conclusions vary.

Mr. Bartels concluded that the subject’s highest and best use as improved was continued

use as a health club. (PE 38.) He testified that conversion to an alternative use was not

“realistic” given parking and access issues. Vehicles entering the subject from the north-south

artery to the east must cross the neighboring property. (See PE 21; DE 36.) Mr. Bartels testified

that arrangement is by oral agreement between Plaintiff and the neighboring owner; he doubts

the agreement would be extended to allow truck access needed for larger commercial or

industrial use. Mr. Bartels further testified that elements of the renovation—such as the café and

commercial kitchen—would be superfluous for light industrial use. He concluded the subject’s

most probable buyer was another local or regional health club operator because the subject “does

not fit with brand standards for larger chains.” (PE 38.)

Dr. Tappouni determined that the subject’s highest and best use as improved was

“continued commercial use – either as a health club or other large-scale commercial use or

mixed use.” (DE 45.) She expands upon potential uses in her report:

“Ultimately it appears that continued use as a health club is potentially financially feasible, but may require some adjustment in business plan in order to be maximally productive. Alternative uses that may be productive could include large-scale retail outlet, a mixed commercial/manufacturing use such as brewery with retail area and tasting room, or other manufacturing business headquarters with commercial showroom space open to the public.

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Yarbrough v. Dept. of Rev.
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Philly, LLC v. Hood River County Assessor, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/philly-llc-v-hood-river-county-assessor-ortc-2025.