Phillipsburg Housing Authority v. Zalayah Hunt
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2424-25
PHILLIPSBURG HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION July 23, 2026 v. APPELLATE DIVISION
ZALAYAH HUNT,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Argued June 8, 2026 – Decided July 23, 2026
Before Judges Sumners, Susswein and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Warren County, Docket No. LT-000666-25.
Zalayah Hunt, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf.
David Fiori, III argued the cause for respondent (Florio, Perrucci, Steinhardt, Cappelli & Tipton, LLC, attorneys; David Fiori, III, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SUSSWEIN, J.A.D. This case raises novel questions under the New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act
(the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, concerning the enforceability of a
settlement agreement that purports to place a tenant "on probation." By leave
granted on her emergent application, self-represented defendant Zalayah Hunt
appeals the March 19, 2026 1 Special Civil Part order enforcing a previously
issued judgment for possession to plaintiff Phillipsburg Housing Authority
(PHA) and a warrant for her removal from the apartment she shares with her
four-year-old daughter.
The dispute between PHA and Ms. Hunt has been simmering for several
years. It culminated in PHA's September 2025 dispossess action to address its
longstanding frustration with what it deemed to be her recurring
procrastination and lack of cooperation with its efforts to conduct annual and
interim reexaminations of her eligibility for federal housing assistance. In
November 2025, the parties executed a settlement that incorporated a
"probation agreement" (Probation Agreement). The legal efficacy and
enforceability of that agreement is at the heart of this appeal.
1 The order was initially issued on March 18 but the court sua sponte issued a revised order on March 19 to correct the erroneous inclusion of inapposite text.
A-2424-25 2 Ms. Hunt has been a tenant with PHA since December 2021, and has
been on "zero-income" status2 since at least October 1, 2023. The federal
subsidy program requires annual recertification of a tenant's eligibility based
on income and other financial documentation. As part of that process, a public
housing authority is required under federal law to convene periodic interviews
during which a subsidized tenant provides information and supporting
documentation. The record shows that over the course of the five-and-a-half-
year-old tenancy, there have been a number of disputes between PHA and Ms.
Hunt regarding her obligation—under the lease and PHA rules—to meet in
person with PHA staff to provide information and documents. The dispossess
complaint alleges that in 2025, as in prior years, she failed to keep interview
appointments and provide certain documents PHA needed to confirm that she
was still eligible for zero-income assistance. That was the straw that broke the
camel's back, prompting PHA to file an eviction complaint in September 2025.
In November 2025, the parties agreed to a settlement that placed Ms.
Hunt "on probation" for a six-month term. The Probation Agreement provides
in pertinent part that during the probationary term, she must, as a condition of
2 The zero-income subsidy program is administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and provides financial assistance to eligible low-income tenants. HUD provides federal aid to local housing authorities, like PHA, which use those funds to manage the housing for low-income tenants.
A-2424-25 3 probation, "attend all required [PHA] meetings" and "provide a reason" if she
needs to reschedule. The agreement further provides that "[i]f tenant fails to
comply with the above provisions," PHA "may file a certification of breach
with the court, on notice to the Tenant. The court may then enter a [j]udgment
for [p]ossession and a [w]arrant of [r]emoval may issue." The agreement
additionally states that "[n]o [j]udgment for possession shall enter in this
matter, unless and until the tenant fails to comply with the probationary terms
of this agreement," suggesting that failure to comply would be a basis upon
which the court might order her removal. The agreement makes no mention of
Ms. Hunt's alleged prior failures to attend meetings and provide required
documents, or whether those failures constitute good cause for eviction under
the Act.
A threshold question before us is whether and in what circumstances a
landlord and tenant can agree that noncompliance with the terms of a probation
agreement constitutes sufficient grounds and good cause to evict under the
Act. This question raises important policy considerations because a so -called
probation agreement can be beneficial to both parties; it serves a housing
authority's interests by inducing the tenant to henceforward comply with its
rules, while providing a tenant who otherwise might be subject to immediate
eviction a last chance to salvage the tenancy. We must address these policy
A-2424-25 4 considerations, however, without the benefit of explicit legislative instruction.
Other than a reference to criminal law probation not relevant here, 3 the text of
the Act makes no mention of "probation" or a "probationary term." Nor do any
published cases expressly address the validity and enforceability of a landlord-
tenant probation agreement.
PHA contends that Ms. Hunt breached the Probation Agreement through
what it characterizes as a pattern of noncompliance. The trial court agreed,
and on that basis entered a judgment for possession and warrant for removal,
as purportedly authorized by the agreement. After reviewing the record in
light of the governing legal principles, on these distinctive facts, we reverse
and vacate the judgment for possession and warrant of removal. We do so for
two independent reasons.
First, we emphasize that while a landlord and tenant are free to enter into
a settlement that imposes conditions regarding future conduct, as a matter of
law and public policy, any such probation agreement cannot authorize an
eviction unless that remedy is authorized by the Act. The Act contains two
features that are critical to our analysis. First, it provides that a landlord
cannot remove a residential tenant "except upon establishment of one of the
[statutorily enumerated] grounds as good cause." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.
3 See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 (n), (p).
A-2424-25 5 Second, and to underscore the importance of the good cause prerequisite, the
Act expressly precludes a landlord and tenant from agreeing to waive the good
cause standard, stating, "Any provision in a lease whereby [a covered tenant]
agrees that [their] tenancy may be terminated or not renewed for other than
good cause as defined in [the Act] . . . shall be deemed against public policy
and unenforceable." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4.
We read these two provisions together as establishing an absolute rule
that precludes a court from entering a judgment for possession or issuing a
warrant for removal unless there has been a judicial finding of good cause
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2424-25
PHILLIPSBURG HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION July 23, 2026 v. APPELLATE DIVISION
ZALAYAH HUNT,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Argued June 8, 2026 – Decided July 23, 2026
Before Judges Sumners, Susswein and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Warren County, Docket No. LT-000666-25.
Zalayah Hunt, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf.
David Fiori, III argued the cause for respondent (Florio, Perrucci, Steinhardt, Cappelli & Tipton, LLC, attorneys; David Fiori, III, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SUSSWEIN, J.A.D. This case raises novel questions under the New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act
(the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, concerning the enforceability of a
settlement agreement that purports to place a tenant "on probation." By leave
granted on her emergent application, self-represented defendant Zalayah Hunt
appeals the March 19, 2026 1 Special Civil Part order enforcing a previously
issued judgment for possession to plaintiff Phillipsburg Housing Authority
(PHA) and a warrant for her removal from the apartment she shares with her
four-year-old daughter.
The dispute between PHA and Ms. Hunt has been simmering for several
years. It culminated in PHA's September 2025 dispossess action to address its
longstanding frustration with what it deemed to be her recurring
procrastination and lack of cooperation with its efforts to conduct annual and
interim reexaminations of her eligibility for federal housing assistance. In
November 2025, the parties executed a settlement that incorporated a
"probation agreement" (Probation Agreement). The legal efficacy and
enforceability of that agreement is at the heart of this appeal.
1 The order was initially issued on March 18 but the court sua sponte issued a revised order on March 19 to correct the erroneous inclusion of inapposite text.
A-2424-25 2 Ms. Hunt has been a tenant with PHA since December 2021, and has
been on "zero-income" status2 since at least October 1, 2023. The federal
subsidy program requires annual recertification of a tenant's eligibility based
on income and other financial documentation. As part of that process, a public
housing authority is required under federal law to convene periodic interviews
during which a subsidized tenant provides information and supporting
documentation. The record shows that over the course of the five-and-a-half-
year-old tenancy, there have been a number of disputes between PHA and Ms.
Hunt regarding her obligation—under the lease and PHA rules—to meet in
person with PHA staff to provide information and documents. The dispossess
complaint alleges that in 2025, as in prior years, she failed to keep interview
appointments and provide certain documents PHA needed to confirm that she
was still eligible for zero-income assistance. That was the straw that broke the
camel's back, prompting PHA to file an eviction complaint in September 2025.
In November 2025, the parties agreed to a settlement that placed Ms.
Hunt "on probation" for a six-month term. The Probation Agreement provides
in pertinent part that during the probationary term, she must, as a condition of
2 The zero-income subsidy program is administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and provides financial assistance to eligible low-income tenants. HUD provides federal aid to local housing authorities, like PHA, which use those funds to manage the housing for low-income tenants.
A-2424-25 3 probation, "attend all required [PHA] meetings" and "provide a reason" if she
needs to reschedule. The agreement further provides that "[i]f tenant fails to
comply with the above provisions," PHA "may file a certification of breach
with the court, on notice to the Tenant. The court may then enter a [j]udgment
for [p]ossession and a [w]arrant of [r]emoval may issue." The agreement
additionally states that "[n]o [j]udgment for possession shall enter in this
matter, unless and until the tenant fails to comply with the probationary terms
of this agreement," suggesting that failure to comply would be a basis upon
which the court might order her removal. The agreement makes no mention of
Ms. Hunt's alleged prior failures to attend meetings and provide required
documents, or whether those failures constitute good cause for eviction under
the Act.
A threshold question before us is whether and in what circumstances a
landlord and tenant can agree that noncompliance with the terms of a probation
agreement constitutes sufficient grounds and good cause to evict under the
Act. This question raises important policy considerations because a so -called
probation agreement can be beneficial to both parties; it serves a housing
authority's interests by inducing the tenant to henceforward comply with its
rules, while providing a tenant who otherwise might be subject to immediate
eviction a last chance to salvage the tenancy. We must address these policy
A-2424-25 4 considerations, however, without the benefit of explicit legislative instruction.
Other than a reference to criminal law probation not relevant here, 3 the text of
the Act makes no mention of "probation" or a "probationary term." Nor do any
published cases expressly address the validity and enforceability of a landlord-
tenant probation agreement.
PHA contends that Ms. Hunt breached the Probation Agreement through
what it characterizes as a pattern of noncompliance. The trial court agreed,
and on that basis entered a judgment for possession and warrant for removal,
as purportedly authorized by the agreement. After reviewing the record in
light of the governing legal principles, on these distinctive facts, we reverse
and vacate the judgment for possession and warrant of removal. We do so for
two independent reasons.
First, we emphasize that while a landlord and tenant are free to enter into
a settlement that imposes conditions regarding future conduct, as a matter of
law and public policy, any such probation agreement cannot authorize an
eviction unless that remedy is authorized by the Act. The Act contains two
features that are critical to our analysis. First, it provides that a landlord
cannot remove a residential tenant "except upon establishment of one of the
[statutorily enumerated] grounds as good cause." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.
3 See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 (n), (p).
A-2424-25 5 Second, and to underscore the importance of the good cause prerequisite, the
Act expressly precludes a landlord and tenant from agreeing to waive the good
cause standard, stating, "Any provision in a lease whereby [a covered tenant]
agrees that [their] tenancy may be terminated or not renewed for other than
good cause as defined in [the Act] . . . shall be deemed against public policy
and unenforceable." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4.
We read these two provisions together as establishing an absolute rule
that precludes a court from entering a judgment for possession or issuing a
warrant for removal unless there has been a judicial finding of good cause
based on one of the enumerated grounds for eviction set forth in the Act. In a
contested case, that critical finding can be established in either of two ways:
the court may find grounds for eviction after a trial, or the tenant may admit to
the ground(s) for eviction and good cause as part of a consent judgment or
settlement agreement. See Pine Ridge Realty Assocs., LLC v. A.O., 483 N.J.
Super. 487, 493 (App. Div. 2026) (reaffirming that a judgment for possession
"may only be entered in three ways:" (1) "by default judgment, [R.] 6:6-
3[(b)];" (2) "by consent, [R.] 6:6-4;" or (3) "by the court after a trial, [R.] 6:6-
5"). Stated another way, while the good cause requirement is unalienable and
cannot be waived by agreement, the parties can agree that the good cause
threshold has been satisfied. At bottom, the Act guarantees that in a contested
A-2424-25 6 landlord-tenant case, at some point before a Sheriff comes knocking to execute
a court-issued warrant of removal, a neutral and detached judge must find by
competent evidence, or by accepting a voluntary admission by the tenant, that
the tenant committed the violation(s) alleged by the landlord and that those
violation(s) are eviction-worthy under the Act.
In this instance, there has been no such judicial finding or
acknowledgement by the tenant of good cause as to authorize an eviction. So
far as the record before us shows, 4 the trial court never found that Ms. Hunt's
violations were "substantial"—a required element of both statutory grounds for
eviction cited in PHA's eviction complaint. Indeed, PHA acknowledged at oral
argument that the issue of whether the alleged breaches were substantial for
purposes of the Act was not raised before the trial court.
As to the alternate means for establishing the lawful basis for eviction—
a voluntary admission by the tenant that good cause exists—it is clear that Ms.
Hunt never agreed or admitted that her conduct amounted to a substantial
violation of the lease or that there was good cause to evict by reason of any
such substantial violation. Notably, the parties' settlement agreement did not
include an affidavit by PHA "stat[ing] the facts establishing the jurisdictional
4 A hearing was held on March 18, but the hearing transcript is not in the record on appeal because Ms. Hunt's request for the transcript at public expense was denied. See R. 2:5-3(d)(3).
A-2424-25 7 good cause for eviction" as required by Rules 6:6-4 and 6:6-3(b). Nor does it
include an admission by Ms. Hunt that good cause exists to justify her
eviction.
We hold as a matter of law that in the absence of either a judicial finding
or a tenant's voluntary admission that the alleged conduct constitutes a
violation that amounts to good cause to evict, a settlement agreement,
regardless of its label, cannot enlarge the list of authorized grounds for
eviction, excuse the need for the landlord to establish all of the material
elements of at least one such enumerated ground, shift the burden of proof
from the landlord to the tenant, delegate to the landlord the unilateral authority
to decide whether a breach of the settlement agreement occurred that warrants
the remedy of eviction, or otherwise weaken or displace the good cause and
substantial violation prerequisites set forth in the Act. The point simply is that
when, as in this case, the parties dispute the enforceability of a probation
agreement, a tenant's post-agreement noncompliance cannot support an
eviction unless the trial court finds, based on the totality of relevant
circumstances—i.e., the tenant's conduct before and/or after the agreement—
that the landlord has established a statutory ground for eviction and good
cause. That did not happen here.
A-2424-25 8 Our second reason for vacating the eviction is that even were we to
assume for the sake of argument that Ms. Hunt substantially violated her
obligations under the lease and/or Probation Agreement with respect to the
latest round of reexamination interview appointments and document requests,
she was denied an opportunity to cure the noncompliance prior to enforcement
of the judgment for possession and warrant of removal. As we explain, this is
not one of those situations recognized in the case law where a cure is
unavailing because it comes too late and the harm is done. While the
circumstances in this case are not directly addressed in any published
precedent cited to us, applying the spirit if not the letter of the limitations on
what a landlord and tenant can agree to, set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4, we
do not accept the notion that Ms. Hunt impliedly waived the opportunity
afforded under the Act to cure a violation just because she entered into the
Probation Agreement and a violation occurred thereafter. Here, the record
indicates that she was prepared to meet with PHA staff and provide the
documents it requested as of February 18, 2026—a month before the March
18, 2026 order to show cause hearing. But PHA declined to meet with her and
refused to accept her outstanding documents. Although we do not agree with
Ms. Hunt's contention that PHA acted in bad faith, we conclude that in these
distinctive circumstances, she should have been permitted to cure the violation.
A-2424-25 9 I.
Facts and Procedural History
We discern the following pertinent facts and procedural history from the
record.
The Lease and Applicable Policies
Ms. Hunt has been a "zero-income" tenant with PHA since at least
October 1, 2023, paying the minimum PHA rent of $50 per month. Her zero -
income housing is subsidized by HUD, and PHA administers the public
housing through its contractual relationship with HUD. See 42 U.S.C. §
1437a(b)(1).
Ms. Hunt's lease requires her to recertify her zero-income status each
year. Specifically, the lease provides that once a year, the tenant will "submit
a signed application for continued occupancy [and] furnish accurate
information to [PHA] as to family income, employment and composition, for
use by [PHA] in determining whether . . . [the] tenant is still eligible for low
rent housing."
The lease also requires Ms. Hunt to report "[a]ny increase or decrease in
family income" to PHA "immediately (within 10 days)." The lease provides:
If . . . the tenant has misrepresented to [PHA] the facts upon which his rent is based or it is found that the tenant has failed to report to [PHA] any specified change in family circumstances which would warrant
A-2424-25 10 a rental increase in accordance with [f]ederal rules and regulations so that the rent he is paying is less than he should have been charged . . . [PHA] may institute dispossess proceeding[s] because of said misrepresentation.
In the same section, the lease also incorporates by reference applicable
federal rules and regulations, 5 as well as PHA's "Admission and Continued
Occupancy Policy" (ACOP). The ACOP, in turn, contains requirements
governing both annual and interim reexaminations for tenants paying income -
based rent. Section 9-I.B of the ACOP ("Scheduling Annual Reexaminations")
provides, in relevant part:
Families generally are required to participate in an annual reexamination interview.
....
If the family is unable to attend a scheduled interview, the family should contact the PHA in advance of the interview to schedule a new appointment. In all circumstances, if a family does not attend the scheduled interview the PHA will send a second notification with a new interview appointment time.
5 24 C.F.R. § 960.259(a)(2) states, "[t]he family must supply any information requested by the PHA or HUD for use in a regularly scheduled reexamination or an interim reexamination of family income and composition in accordance with HUD requirements." 24 C.F.R. § 960.257 requires PHA to conduct an annual income reexamination, as well as an interim reexamination if PHA "becomes aware that the family's adjusted income . . . has changed by an amount that [PHA] estimates will result in an increase of ten percent or more in annual adjusted income."
A-2424-25 11 If a family fails to attend two scheduled interviews without PHA approval, the family will be in violation of their lease and may be terminated in accordance with the policies in Chapter 13.
A different section of the ACOP—Section 9-III.C ("Changes Affecting
Income or Expenses")—provides for interim reexaminations. Specifically, if a
family has reported zero income, "the PHA will conduct an interim
reexamination every three months as long as the family continues to report that
they have no income." ACOP also provides:
Generally, the family will not be required to attend an interview for an interim reexamination. However, if the PHA determines that an interview is warranted, the family may be required to attend.
Pursuant to this provision, Ms. Hunt was required to attend a "zero-income
review appointment" every ninety days and to submit documentation
supporting her continued zero-income status.
Additionally, Section 13-III.C ("Other Authorized Reasons for
Termination") provides that the PHA
will terminate the lease for the following reasons.
Failure to furnish such information and certifications regarding family composition and income as may be necessary for the PHA to make determinations with respect to rent, eligibility, and the appropriateness of the dwelling unit size.
A-2424-25 12 Alleged Lease Violations
PHA asserts that throughout the course of her tenancy, Ms. Hunt has
repeatedly failed to report changes in income, provide required income
documentation, and attend scheduled reexamination meetings. PHA issued
various notices to cease and quit to her in 2022, 2024, and 2025 before filing
an eviction complaint in September 2025.
Sometime around November 2022, Ms. Hunt allegedly "failed to report
[her] employment at Ulta Salon Cosmetics Fragrance/Ulta Beauty," as required
under the lease. PHA issued a November 29, 2022 notice to cease and a
December 21, 2022 notice to quit. The record does not indicate how or
whether this issue was resolved. It is not disputed, however, that PHA
renewed the tenancy.
The record does not indicate there were any problems in 2023. Problems
relating to missed or rescheduled appointments resurfaced in 2024. According
to PHA's certifications submitted to the trial court, Ms. Hunt was scheduled for
an appointment on February 14, 2024, and after several rescheduled and
missed meetings, she eventually attended on March 25, 2024. She was
scheduled for another appointment on April 29, 2024, which was rescheduled
several times, missed once, and eventually occurred on May 9, 2024. On July
15, 2024, PHA issued a notice to cease, alleging that Ms. Hunt "failed to
A-2424-25 13 appear on three different occasions for [her] [ninety]-day [z]ero [i]ncome
review appointment and provide copies of the required documents as requested
by July 10, 2024, with extensions given to July 11, 2024, and July 15, 2024."
PHA's certifications state that "this pattern of behavior has been continuous
throughout [Ms. Hunt]'s tenancy," but do not provide further specific
examples. However, once again, the record indicates that she remained a
tenant with PHA, and it is not disputed that PHA continued to receive subsidy
payments from HUD.
That brings us to 2025. In February and March 2025, Ms. Hunt
allegedly failed to provide several requested documents: (1) verification that
she "did not work at Ralph Lauren," which was allegedly requested by
February 10, 2025 and extended several times until April 1, 2025; (2) a
notarized statement describing a period in which she was not living in her unit
and the reason for her absence; and (3) two recent financial statements. PHA
issued a February 26, 2025 notice to cease, a March 11, 2025 notice to quit, a
March 18, 2025 notice to cease, an April 17, 2025 notice to quit, and a May 6,
2025 notice to quit.
Grievance Hearings, Eviction Action, and Settlement/Probation Agreement
Ms. Hunt challenged the May 6, 2025 notice to quit, and in accordance
with PHA policy, an informal grievance hearing was held on June 19, 2025.
A-2424-25 14 PHA's summary of that hearing stated: "[Ms. Hunt] stated no excuse for why
she did not provide [the requested documents] as required per PHA policy. A
lot of times it was because she was procrastinating, and it caused more
problems than she thought it would." PHA decided to uphold the notice to
quit.
Ms. Hunt then requested a formal grievance hearing, which was held on
July 16, 2025. PHA's summary of that hearing stated that she "continued to
provide no valid excuse" for not providing the requested documentation. The
summary also noted that Ms. Hunt "has claimed that she has not been able to
check her mail for notices because she has been in Newark helping her ill
aunt." Finally, the summary stated that as of the date of the hearing, she "has
failed to provide information required to fulfill her zero income certification
requirement (every 90 days)." PHA again decided to uphold the notice to quit,
and provided the following additional statement of reasons:
While the current [n]otice to [q]uit dated May 6, 2025, reflects a limited scope, there is a four-and-a-half-year history of failure to provide and/or report required information in a timely manner. The amount of time it takes the PHA to process changes for the account is drastically longer than the average due to the number of requests and [l]ease actions trying to gather the information needed for the change.
On September 3, 2025, PHA filed an eviction complaint against Ms.
Hunt, citing two grounds for eviction specified in the Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18 -
A-2424-25 15 61.1(d) (continued, substantial violation of landlord's rules and regulations)
and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61-1(e) (continued, substantial violation of covenants or
agreements in the lease). A hearing was scheduled for November 14, 2025.
That day, PHA and Ms. Hunt, represented by counsel, entered into a settlement
agreement and the Probation Agreement attached to it which is at the crux of
this appeal. The settlement agreement provided:
No [j]udgment for [p]ossession is entered. The parties understand that if the tenant breaches this agreement, the landlord may file a certification of breach with the court, on notice to the [t]enant. The court may then enter a [j]udgment for [p]ossession and a [w]arrant of [r]emoval may issue.
The settlement agreement further provided that it would remain in force
until tenant "satisfied the terms set forth" in the attached Probation Agreement.
The Probation Agreement provided, in relevant part:
Tenant shall be placed on probation with the PHA for a period of six months from 11/14/2025 to 5/14/2026.
During this probationary period, [t]enant agrees to comply with and attend all required meetings. In the event tenant needs to reschedule any meetings with the PHA required under tenant's lease, tenant must 1) communicate the fact that she must reschedule the appointment; 2) provide a reason for rescheduling, and 3) when possible, provide documentation supporting the reason given for the need to reschedule, which tenant shall make a good faith effort to attain.
A-2424-25 16 If tenant fails to comply with the above provisions, the PHA may take steps to allege there was a breach of this agreement. Before filing any court paperwork, the PHA shall provide tenant with seven days['] notice of the alleged breach, in writing.
Upon the conclusion of the probationary period, this agreement shall no longer be enforceable, and the complaint shall be automatically dismissed on 5/31/2026.
No [j]udgment for possession shall enter in this matter, unless and until the tenant fails to comply with the probationary terms of this agreement.
While the settlement agreement—which used the model agreement
found in an appendix to the Court Rules 6—stated that a "Certification by
Landlord and the Certification of Landlord's Attorney (if the Landlord has an
attorney) are attached hereto," the record indicates that no such certifications
were attached to the agreement.
Alleged Breaches of Probation Agreement
PHA claims that Ms. Hunt breached the Probation Agreement five times,
by either failing to attend a required meeting or failing to provide a reason for
rescheduling a meeting. Ms. Hunt contends that each alleged breach was
either "manufactured" by PHA, de minimis, or not actually a breach based on
her substantive, good faith compliance with the Probation Agreement.
6 See Settlement Agreement (Tenant Remains), Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix XI-V (2026).
A-2424-25 17 Ms. Hunt's first alleged breach was her failure to contact PHA by
January 16, 2026, in order to schedule a meeting to provide her "Zero Income
Checklist & Worksheet." The parties agree that she did not schedule this
meeting by January 16, but dispute whether she had received a January 12
letter instructing her to schedule it. PHA contends that this letter was hand
delivered to her apartment on January 12, and it submitted to the trial court:
(1) a copy of the letter, (2) an affidavit from PHA employee Kashmir Beaton
in which Beaton states that he delivered "Housing Authority mail" to Ms. Hunt
on January 12 and (3) a copy of a completed PHA work order indicating that
Beaton "[d]elivered all mail" that day. In her appeal brief, Ms. Hunt maintains
that she was home all day on January 12, and the letter was never delivered.
On January 29, PHA sent Ms. Hunt a letter stating that she had failed to
contact PHA by January 16, and also failed to return a signed and dated lease
amendment that was due on January 19. The January 29 letter stated that if
she failed to arrange and attend a meeting within seven days, PHA would file a
certification of breach with the court. Ms. Hunt promptly contacted PHA and
scheduled an appointment for January 30, at 3:00 p.m.
In the second alleged breach, Ms. Hunt contacted PHA at 1:13 p.m. on
January 30 and asked to reschedule her 3:00 p.m. appointment to 4:00 p.m.
Both parties agree that she ultimately appeared for this meeting at 4:30 p.m.
A-2424-25 18 Before the January 30 meeting, Ms. Hunt emailed PHA and stated that
she would be in Newark beginning on February 2 and most likely would not be
back in Phillipsburg until February 16. At the January 30 meeting, however,
she signed a form indicating that she would call PHA on February 2 to
schedule an appointment for that same day. Then, immediately after the
meeting, Ms. Hunt stated she was "not able to confirm [February 2] as an
appointment." According to PHA, Ms. Hunt breached the Probation
Agreement because she "failed to provide a reason for rescheduling" her
presumptive February 2 appointment.
PHA then advised Ms. Hunt that she was required to schedule an
appointment for February 3, 4, or 5, and she replied that she could meet on
February 16, as indicated in her January 30 email. PHA contends that this
response was a "failure to comply with required meetings" in breach of the
Probation Agreement.
In response to her request for a February 16 meeting, PHA told Ms. Hunt
that it could not meet that day (Presidents' Day) and informed her that her
meeting would be February 17, at 8:30 a.m., ostensibly without confirming
that this day and time was acceptable to her. Ms. Hunt failed to appear at this
time, although she emailed and called PHA several times that day to try to
A-2424-25 19 schedule a time to meet and complete her zero-income form. PHA contends
her failure to appear at 8:30 a.m. was a breach of the Probation Agreement.
Certification of Breach, Order to Show Cause, and this Appeal
On February 18, 2026, PHA notified Ms. Hunt that it intended to certify
her breach with the court and seek a judgment for possession. On February 27,
PHA sent a letter and certification of breach to the court, requesting entry of a
judgment for possession and warrant of removal. The court granted a
judgment for possession on February 27, and a warrant of removal on March 3.
On March 6, before the warrant of removal was executed, Ms. Hunt filed an
application for an order to show cause. PHA filed opposition on March 9, and
Ms. Hunt replied on March 10. On March 11, the court granted Ms. Hunt's
application for an order to show cause and scheduled a return hearing for
March 18. A hearing was held on March 18, but the hearing transcript is not in
the record on appeal because Ms. Hunt's request for the transcript at public
expense was denied. See R. 2:5-3(d)(3).7
7 The Court Rules restrict the provision of transcripts at public expense to criminal or quasi-criminal appeals, Division of Child Protection and Permanency termination of parental rights cases, Title 9 abuse and neglect cases, certain adoptions, and involuntary civil commitments. R. 2:5-3(d)(3). Indigent appellants facing potential eviction do not qualify.
A-2424-25 20 At the conclusion of the March 18 hearing, the court entered an order
denying Ms. Hunt's application for an order to show cause and ordering
enforcement of the judgment for possession and warrant of removal on March
30 at 9:00 a.m., "unless [Ms. Hunt] is able to post the entire amount of rent
arrears due," in which case "[she] may stay the eviction." On March 19, the
court entered an amended order that omitted the inapposite provision allowing
her to stay the eviction by paying her rent arrears. 8
On March 20, we granted permission for Ms. Hunt to file an emergent
motion for leave to appeal, seeking an interim stay of the warrant of removal.
She filed her motion on March 24 and PHA filed opposition on March 26. On
March 30, we granted Ms. Hunt's motion for leave to appeal, specifically
directing the parties to address the following question: "Is the breach of a
'probationary' settlement agreement a lawful basis for eviction under the Anti -
Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1, where the tenant purports to have cured the
lease violations originally giving rise to the eviction action under N.J.S.A.
2A:18-61.1(d)?"
8 The record indicates that there are no rent arrearages in this case.
A-2424-25 21 II.
Parties' Arguments
Because the parties raise numerous arguments and counterarguments in
their appellate submissions, we reproduce verbatim the point headings from
their respective briefs.
Ms. Hunt raises the following contentions for our consideration in her
initial appeal brief:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT BECAUSE [PHA] WAIVED THE ALLEGED BREACH BY RETAINING MARCH RENT FOR EIGHTEEN DAYS.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY ISSUING AN AMENDED ORDER SUA SPONTE WITHOUT NOTICE OR HEARING.
POINT III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADOPTING [PHA]'S SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND OVERLOOKING DOCUMENTED ACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SABOTAGE.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO SCRUTINIZE [PHA]'S
A-2424-25 22 ADMITTED OBSTRUCTION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CURE. POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON "PUBLIC POLICY" TO UPHOLD A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT REACHED THROUGH BAD-FAITH CONDUCT IS MISPLACED. POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR REGARDING STATUTORY PROTECTIONS. POINT VII THE JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION CONSTITUTES A MANIFEST MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE, CAUSING IRREPARABLE HARM TO A VULNERABLE MINOR. PHA responds:
THE QUESTION POSED BY THE HONORABLE RONALD SUSSWEIN, J.A.D.
A. Appellant's Attempts to Comply After-The- Fact Were Not a Cure of the Underlying Lease Violations.
B. Appellant Was Required to Cure a Pattern of Non-Compliance and Failed.
C. Repeated Non-Compliance with Substantial Terms of a Landlord's Rules and Regulations Is a Lawful Basis for Eviction Under the Anti- Eviction Act.
A-2424-25 23 POINT II
APPELLANT'S EVICTION IS PROPER UNDER THE ENFORCEABLE PROBATION AGREEMENT AND THE ANTI-EVICTION ACT.
A. The Probationary Agreement Is a Binding Agreement.
B. Appellant Agreed to the Entry of a Judgment for Possession if She Breached the Agreement.
C. Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement is Supported by the Anti-Eviction Act.
D. The Trial Court Rejected Appellant's Purported Cure.
E. The Trial Court was Not Required to Validate Appellant's Purported Cure.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LACK JURISDICTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE ANY OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS BY AMENDING ITS MARCH 18 ORDER.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED BOTH PARTIES' ACTIONS.
A-2424-25 24 POINT VI
WHAT THE TRIAL COURT RELIED UPON IS NOT PRESENTLY UNDER REVIEW.
POINT VII
APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS REGARDING "STATUTORY PROTECTIONS" ARE NOT UNDER REVIEW. POINT VIII
THE INSTANT EVICTION IS NOT FOR "BUREAUCRATIC CONVENIENCE" IT IS TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL MANDATES. Ms. Hunt asserts the following additional contentions in her reply brief:
[PHA]'S RELIANCE ON MAYO9 IS A FRAUD UPON THE RECORD AS THE PHA INTENTIONALLY OBSTRUCTED APPELLANT'S ATTEMPTS TO CURE PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION OF BREACH.
THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER APPLIES REGARDLESS OF THE LANDLORD'S INTENT; THE EIGHTEEN-DAY RETENTION OF MARCH RENT STRIPPED THE TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION.
9 Housing and Redevelopment Authority of the Township of Franklin v. Mayo, 390 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 2007).
A-2424-25 25 POINT III
THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO CURE UNDER N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(d) IS ABSOLUTE AND CANNOT BE CONTRACTED AWAY BY A PROBATIONARY AGREEMENT.
III.
General Principles
We begin our analysis by acknowledging certain basic legal principles
that govern this appeal. As a general proposition, we apply a deferential
standard in reviewing a trial court's factual findings in a bench trial. Balducci
v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020); State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271
(2019). In an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate courts "give deference to
the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and
made reasoned conclusions." Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239,
254 (2015). Accordingly, reviewing courts "do not disturb the factual findings
and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [the reviewing courts] are
convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests
of justice." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011)
(quoting In re Tr. Created By Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson,
194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, the
deference we accord to a trial court's findings in a bench trial presupposes the
A-2424-25 26 court made factual findings to support its legal conclusions, based on its
assessment of the testimony and documentary evidence presented by the
parties. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J.
328, 342 (2010) ("[T]he trial court must state clearly its factual findings and
correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." (quoting Curtis v.
Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980))).
Furthermore, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995)). This appeal hinges on an interpretation of the Act and the legal
consequences that flow from the parties' decision to enter into the Probation
Agreement. See G.G.S. v. A.C.B., ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2026)
(slip op. at 14) ("[W]e do not accord deference to legal conclusions, such as
interpretations of a statute, which we review de novo." (citing C.R. v. M.T.
(C.R. II), 257 N.J. 126, 139 (2024))). We consider the enforceability of that
agreement to be a question of statutory interpretation and application of
legislative policy—issues we view with fresh eyes.
At the risk of stating the obvious, the statute is entitled the Anti-Eviction
Act for a reason. It protects tenants' rights by imposing burdens on the
A-2424-25 27 landlord in a dispossess proceeding. As our Supreme Court explained in 447
Associates v. Miranda, it is remedial legislation whose purpose was set out in
the statement attached to the Act when it was proposed to the Assembly:
At present, there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the reasons a landlord may utilize to evict a tenant. As a result, residential tenants frequently have been unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from housing quarters in which they have been comfortable and where they have not caused any problems. This is a serious matter . . . . This act shall limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to reasonable grounds . . . .
[115 N.J. 522, 527 (1989) (quoting Sponsors' Statement to A. 1586 (Apr. 16, 1974)).]
We recently reaffirmed that the Act should "be liberally construed to protect
the rights of tenants, with all doubts resolved in favor of the tenant." Fairkings
Partners, LLC v. Daniels, 482 N.J. Super. 520, 530 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting
Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 336 (2015)), certif. denied, 264 N.J. 152 (2026).
Turning to substantive legal principles, the Act establishes several rights
that are at the heart of this appeal. Notably, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 makes clear
that a landlord cannot remove a residential tenant "except upon establishment
of one of the [enumerated] grounds as good cause." The Act specifies —and
thus limits—the grounds upon which a landlord may remove a residential
tenant. See Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 447 (2013) ("[T]he clear
purpose and spirit of the Anti-Eviction Act [is] to ensure that evictions are
A-2424-25 28 based on 'reasonable grounds[.]'" (second and third alteration in original)
(quoting 447 Associates, 115 N.J. at 529)). These grounds include, among
others, failure to pay rent, disorderly behavior, or destruction or damage to the
premises. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 (a), (b), (c).
PHA's eviction complaint specified two statutorily defined grounds. The
first, set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(d), permits eviction when the tenant
has continued, after written notice to cease, to substantially violate or breach any of the landlord's rules and regulations governing said premises, provided such rules and regulations are reasonable and have been accepted in writing by the tenant or made a part of the lease at the beginning of the lease term.
The second, set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(e)(1), permits eviction
when the tenant
has continued, after written notice to cease, to substantially violate or breach any of the covenants or agreements contained in the lease for the premises where a right of reentry is reserved to the landlord in the lease for a violation of such covenant or agreement, provided that such covenant or agreement is reasonable and was contained in the lease at the beginning of the lease term.
Each statutory ground includes material elements that must be proved,
much like the elements of a criminal offense. It is not enough that some but
not all elements embodied in a statutorily specified ground have been
established to the requisite level of proof—preponderance of the evidence.
A-2424-25 29 See 279 4th Ave. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Mollett, 386 N.J. Super. 31, 37 n.3 (App.
Div. 2006) ("[T]he plaintiff-landlord must prove all elements of the statutory
ground alleged." (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
Here, the plain language of both grounds cited in the dispossess
complaint requires the landlord not only to prove a violation of its rules and
regulations (or of a covenant or agreement in the lease), but also to establish
that the violation has continued and is substantial. See Diaz v. Perez-Tamayo,
251 N.J. Super. 513, 515 (Law. Div. 1991) ("There must be a substantial
violation of the rules. That is, a considerable or significant breach—not a
minor or trivial transgression." (emphasis in original)). Stated another way,
when, as in this case, the ground cited for eviction in the complaint is N.J.S.A.
2A:18-61.1(d) or N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(e)(1), the substantiality of the alleged
violation(s) must either be proved at trial or by stipulation incorporated into
the settlement agreement.
In sum, regardless of which enumerated eviction ground is relied on, the
landlord must establish that the proven ground provides "good cause" for
dispossession. See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 (a tenant cannot be removed "except
upon establishment of one of the [enumerated] grounds as good cause"
(emphasis added)). Absent a judicial finding that all elements have been
A-2424-25 30 established, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 flatly precludes a court from issuing a
judgment for possession or warrant of removal.
IV.
Legal Effect of the Probation Agreement and a Violation Thereof
We next consider the legal impact of the settlement and Probation
Agreement in this case. That inquiry is critical because the trial court's
February 27, 2026 written order explicitly states that the judgment for
possession was entered "for failure to comply with the terms of the parties'
settlement agreement." The question, then, is whether and in what
circumstances the failure to comply with a probation agreement is eviction -
worthy conduct under the Act—that is, meets the irreducible prerequisite for
eviction, which is "establishment of one of the [enumerated] grounds as good
cause." N.J.S.A. 2C:2A:18-61.1.
We begin by reemphasizing that under the Act, no agreement can relieve
PHA of its burden to establish that a breach, or pattern of breaches, is
sufficiently substantial to establish good cause to evict. That is made clear by
the provision in the Act that states, "Any provision in a lease whereby [a
covered tenant] agrees that [their] tenancy may be terminated or not renewed
for other than good cause as defined in [the Act] . . . shall be deemed against
public policy and unenforceable." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4.
A-2424-25 31 By logical extension, the prohibition against waiving the good cause
requirement in an agreement codified in the text of the lease also prohibits the
parties from agreeing to disregard the good cause standard in a settlement
agreement. Both the lease and Probation Agreement, after all, are types of
contracts, and both thus necessarily include "provisions" on which the parties
"agree" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4. We would hardly be
construing the act "liberally . . . with all doubts resolved in favor of the
tenant," Daniels, 482 N.J. Super. 520 (quoting Bello, 223 N.J. at 336), if we
were to hold that the Act's explicit limitations on what a landlord and tenant
can agree to by way of waiving statutory protections could be circumnavigated
through the artifice of a probation agreement incorporated into a settlement.
See Cmty. Realty Mgmt., Inc. for Wrightstown Arms Apartments v. Harris ,
155 N.J. 212, 227 (1998) ("[E]ntry of a consent judgment is inappropriate and
the judgment itself is unenforceable when the agreement it encompasses or the
relief it grants is illegal." (citations omitted)); Sacks Realty Co. v. Shore, 317
N.J. Super. 258, 269 (App. Div. 1998) ("It is well settled that the dictates of
public policy may require invalidation of private contractual arrangements
where those arrangements directly contravene express legislative policy
. . . .").
A-2424-25 32 However, while the good cause requirement cannot be waived by
agreement, we do not mean to suggest that a settlement/probation agreement,
properly drafted, cannot satisfy the good cause requirement under the Act.
Incorporating conditions of "probation" into a settlement agreement can be
mutually beneficial, and can work in a tenant's best interests by forestalling an
all-but-certain judgment for possession. Accordingly, and consistent with the
principle of construing the Act liberally in favor of tenants, the Act should not
be interpreted to discourage much less categorically ban such agreements. See
Nolan by Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (recognizing that
"settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy" and that courts should
generally not vacate a settlement agreement "absent compelling
circumstances" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
As we have noted, in a contested case, 10 a landlord's burden of
establishing good cause can be satisfied in either of two ways. First, good
cause can be established by testimony or documentary evidence introduced by
the landlord that proves all the material elements of one or more grounds for
eviction alleged in the complaint. Alternatively, good cause can be established
10 We do not address in this opinion the circumstances in which a judgment for possession may issue, consistent with the Act, when the tenant fails to respond or appear.
A-2424-25 33 by an agreement of the parties that is ratified by the trial court. In this
instance, that agreement would have required Ms. Hunt to explicitly
acknowledge that her conduct substantially violated a lease provision or duly
promulgated rule, and that the violation establishes good cause to order her
The Special Civil Part Rules already contain certain safeguards to ensure
that consent or settlement-based judgments for possession are supported by
good cause. Under Rules 6:6-4 and 6:6-3(b), any (1) consent judgment for
possession or (2) settlement agreement that provides for entry of a judgment
for possession must be accompanied by an affidavit of the landlord that
"state[s] the facts establishing the jurisdictional good cause for eviction
required by the applicable statute." R. 6:6-3(b).11 These provisions were
added to the Rules in 2001 following Harris, in which our Supreme Court
expressed concern with the Rules at the time allowing tenants to enter consent
judgments for possession without an affidavit or other factual stipulation that
good cause under the Act had been satisfied. See 155 N.J. at 240. The Court
11 Additionally, Rule 6:6-3(b) states, "If the basis for eviction requires service of a notice to quit, the landlord's affidavit must have a copy of all required notices attached, and the affidavit must state that the notices were served as required by law and that the facts alleged in the notices are true." Rule 6:6- 4(a) also requires that settlement agreements and consent judgments for possession against unrepresented tenants be approved and signed by the court.
A-2424-25 34 noted that a tenant's mere assent to a consent judgment "provides the court
with little or no meaningful assurance that [the Act's] jurisdictional conditions
have been satisfied." Ibid.
As noted above, the settlement and Probation Agreement in the record
before us do not include any affidavit or certifications setting forth the facts
establishing good cause under the Act, and PHA does not contend that any
affidavit was attached to the agreement when it was approved by the court.
That defect alone is fatal to the judgment for possession and warrant of
removal in this case.
Given the lack of express guidance in the text of the Act or interpretive
case law on how to enforce a probation agreement like the one at issue here,
we deem it appropriate to discuss the validity and enforceability of such
agreements. We begin by noting that the Act has no provision expressly
authorizing a court to place a tenant on probation or authorizing the parties to
agree to probationary terms as part of a settlement agreement entered by the
court.12 Nor does the Act expressly authorize a process or proceeding
analogous to the probation violation/revocation hearings well established in
12 The word "probation" only appears in the Act to refer to probation in the criminal context, in provisions not relevant to this appeal. See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 (n), (p).
A-2424-25 35 the criminal justice system. Cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1 (authorizing a court
following a conviction to suspend the imposition of sentence) and N.J.S.A.
2C:45-3(a)(4) (authorizing a court to revoke or suspend probation and sentence
or resentence a defendant who has "inexcusably failed to comply with a
substantial requirement imposed as a condition of" probation). In the criminal
justice setting, probation is a sentencing option or alternative that subjects the
actor's conduct to heightened scrutiny during the probationary term, but is only
imposed after there has been a trial verdict or guilty plea. With due regard to
Lewis Carroll's satirical comment on judicial arbitrariness in Alice's
Adventures in Wonderland,13 a court should not impose a sentence, or suspend
a sentence, until guilt has been established. 14 We do not mean to imply by this
13 "Sentence first—verdict afterwards" is the Queen of Hearts' famously inverted ruling made during the trial of the Knave of Hearts. Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 187 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1866). 14 We add that the structure of the present Probation Agreement is also similar in some respects to another criminal law feature—pretrial intervention (PTI). When a defendant is admitted to PTI, a charge is held in inactive status pending termination of the period of supervisory treatment, N.J.S.A. 2C:43 - 13(b), and upon successful completion of supervisory treatment, the charge may be dismissed with prejudice, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(d). Here, the Probation Agreement in like fashion provides that "[u]pon the conclusion of the probationary period, this agreement shall no longer be enforceable, and the [eviction] complaint shall be automatically dismissed."
But there is a significant distinction between PTI and the Probation Agreement before us. In the PTI setting, if the court finds after a summary
A-2424-25 36 analogy that a landlord-tenant civil action for violation of a lease requirement
to attend meetings and provide documents is comparable to a criminal
prosecution. We do believe, however, that as a matter of statutory
interpretation and rudimentary due process, the Act requires a judicial finding
(or an explicit tenant admission) of an eviction-worthy violation before the
breach of a probation agreement can be the legal basis for a court-issued
judgment for possession. See Harris,155 N.J. at 240 (noting that a tenant's
mere assent to a consent judgment "provides the court with little or no
meaningful assurance that [the Act's] jurisdictional conditions have been
satisfied").
The required judicial finding that there has been an eviction-worthy
violation can be made before a probation agreement is entered, incorporated
hearing that the defendant violated a condition of supervisory treatment, the charges that were placed on inactive status may be reactivated. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(e). That means the prosecution returns to square one, not that defendant is immediately sentenced upon the finding of a violation. In cases involving certain serious crimes, admission to PTI is conditioned on the defendant entering a guilty plea, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(3), and if the defendant is found to have violated a condition of supervisory treatment, the case may proceed to sentencing because guilt of the underlying offense has already been established.
The key point is that under the PTI program, as with probation, a person cannot be sentenced upon a violation absent a finding of guilt, whether by trial verdict or guilty plea. So too in the present context, we hold that a tenant cannot be evicted unless and until there has been a judicial finding (or tenant admission) that the tenant committed an act warranting that remedy.
A-2424-25 37 into the agreement, or made by a court afterwards in what would be the
functional equivalent of a probation revocation hearing. But the critical
principle we adhere to is that a judicial finding that the tenant committed an
eviction-worthy violation—that is, a violation establishing good cause under
the Act—must be made and placed on the record before a judgment for
possession can be entered and a warrant of removal executed. That principle is
unalienable and, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4 and "general considerations
of public policy," cannot be waived. Sacks Realty Co., 317 N.J. Super. at 269.
Here, the record indicates that there was no meeting of the minds with
respect to the legal significance of Ms. Hunt's conduct pertaining to the
reexamination/recertification process. Ms. Hunt vigorously contested PHA's
allegations of lease violations through PHA's informal and formal grievance
processes, and to this day, there is no indication she ever admitted to
substantially violating lease rules or covenants. Indeed, nothing in the text of
the settlement agreement or incorporated Probation Agreement indicates that
Ms. Hunt acknowledged she had breached the lease in any way, much less
committed "continued," "substantial" violations that would constitute good
cause to evict her. Tellingly, the model settlement agreement the parties used
in this case includes a clause stating, "The tenant shall pay to the landlord
$___, which the tenant admits is now due and owing." Settlement Agreement
A-2424-25 38 (Tenant Remains), Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix
XI-V (2026) (emphasis added). Because the dispute here does not involve rent
arrears, the parties crossed out this clause. However, they failed to replace it
with an analogous provision in which Ms. Hunt admits to committing
continued, substantial violations of lease rules or covenants. For that reason,
the settlement and Probation Agreement, standing alone, cannot support a
judgment for possession.
Nor does the record show that the trial court found the violations were
substantial within the meaning of the two grounds cited in the dispossess
complaint.15 PHA does not contend that the trial court made any explicit
substantiality findings, and, in fact, as we have noted, PHA confirmed at oral
argument that the issue of whether Ms. Hunt's alleged breaches were
15 We note in the interest of completeness that the governing federal regulations expressly prohibit the termination of a tenancy in a subsidized project except in the case of, in relevant part: "(1) [m]aterial noncompliance with the rental agreement, [or] (2) [m]aterial failure to carry out obligations under any state landlord and tenant act . . . ." 24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a). The federal regulations provide some guidance on when one or more substantial violations of the rental agreement, repeated minor violations of the rental agreement, or failure to supply required information on time constitute "material noncompliance" that would permit the termination of a tenancy. See 24 C.F.R. § 247.3(c); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., HUD Handbook No. 4350.3, Occupancy Requirements of Subsidized Multifamily Housing Programs § 7-8(D) (rev. Nov. 2013) (describing the landlord's rights and obligations when a tenant's untimeliness causes delays in the recertification process).
A-2424-25 39 substantial for purposes of the Act was not even raised before the trial court.
That acknowledgement is fatal to the judgment for possession before us
considering that PHA carries the burden to establish the legal basis to evict
under the Act.
In sum, we hold that under both the Act and the governing Court Rules,
the settlement/Probation Agreement is missing a key component needed to
make it an independently sufficient basis upon which to order Ms. Hunt's
eviction. It failed to include an acknowledgment or admission by Ms. Hunt
that her conduct satisfied the elements set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(d)
and/or (e)(1) as to constitute good cause within the meaning of the Act.
Accordingly, even accepting for the sake of argument that she breached the
terms of the Probation Agreement, any such violation of the agreement, 16
standing alone, is insufficient to justify a judgment for possession absent a
judicial finding or ratification that Ms. Hunt at some point committed a
substantial violation or violations constituting good cause to evict.
16 We note that in this instance, the settlement agreement did not prescribe a rent or back-rent payment schedule, as none was needed. So far as the record reflects, there are no rent or subsidy arrearages in this case. This case, in other words, does not involve Ms. Hunt's failure to pay rent, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a), or habitual late payment of rent, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(j). Rather, it involves what PHA describes as habitual failure to keep interview appointments and tender required documents.
A-2424-25 40 V.
Opportunity to Cure Violations
As we noted in our introduction, there is an independent basis upon
which to vacate the judgment for possession and warrant of removal in this
case. For that reason, there is no need to remand for the trial court to make
further findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether Ms. Hunt
committed a substantial violation under the Act constituting good cause to
evict.
Ms. Hunt argues that PHA acted in bad faith by "obstruct[ing]" her right
to cure violations. While we do not agree that PHA acted in bad faith, we
conclude that even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that Ms.
Hunt committed substantial lease violations constituting good cause to evict,
PHA—and the trial court—impermissibly denied her an opportunity to cure
those violations. We emphasize that Ms. Hunt did not simply ignore PHA's
efforts to arrange a meeting or its requests for documents. There was
significant communication between the parties. The record shows that a month
before the March 18, 2026 order to show cause hearing, Ms. Hunt informed
PHA that she was prepared to attend its required meeting and provide required
documents. Ms. Hunt maintains she had these documents prepared and
A-2424-25 41 attempted to submit them on February 18, 2026, but PHA refused to meet with
her or accept them.
In addressing the question of whether, in these circumstances, Ms. Hunt
was entitled under the Act to cure the claimed violations and thereby forestall
eviction, we find helpful guidance in our decision in Housing and
Redevelopment Authority of the Township of Franklin v. Mayo, 390 N.J.
Super. 425 (App. Div. 2007). In that case, a federally funded public housing
authority sought to evict a tenant for permitting several unauthorized relatives
to reside in her apartment, contrary to the lease. Id. at 426-27. The authority
served notices to cease and quit, a demand for possession, and termination of
the lease. The tenant ignored the notices and continued to allow her relatives
to live with her. Id. at 427, 429. A month after the eviction complaint was
filed and just two days before trial, the unauthorized relatives vacated the
apartment. Id. at 427. The trial court then dismissed the complaint, holding
that the tenant had cured the violation. Id. at 427. The authority appealed,
arguing that the Act does not permit a tenant to cure this particular lease
violation on the eve of a scheduled trial, and that if the Act does allow it, it is
preempted by federal law. Id. at 430.
On appeal, we reversed the dismissal of the complaint and remanded the
matter to the trial court "to determine whether an adequate cure for the breach
A-2424-25 42 has occurred or can be established." Id. at 427. We began our analysis by
noting that, unlike unpaid rent—which a tenant can cure even after trial by
paying outstanding arrears—"not all causes for eviction can be completely
cured." Id. at 433. For example, we noted, "[I]t would be absurd to rule that a
tenant who knocks the landlord to the ground or threatens his life may not be
evicted unless he does it again after receiving [notice]." Ibid. (first alteration
in original) (quoting Muros v. Morales, 268 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div.
1993)).
We then determined that the breach at issue—permitting unauthorized
persons to reside in one's apartment—"is somewhere between the failure to pay
rent, which can be retroactively cured, and the examples we cited in Muros17
where no cure should be permitted." Id. at 434. Specifically, we reasoned that
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, "after months of unauthorized
lodging, frustrates the federal purpose of limiting scarce public housing to
those that are truly eligible" and that "[s]imply vacating the premises does not
erase the lengthy period of unauthorized lodging." Id. at 433-34. We added
that "fraud by a public housing tenant, which constitutes material
17 In Muros, the tenant had stolen electricity from the landlord. 268 N.J. Super. at 597. The Muros court held that certain grounds for eviction— including destruction or damage to the premises, assaultive or threatening behavior toward the landlord, and using or dispensing controlled dangerous substances (CDS)—are "not curable." Id. at 596.
A-2424-25 43 noncompliance with the lease, may not be cured by mere discontinuance." Id.
at 433 (citing Edward Gray Apartments/Region Nine Housing Corp. v.
Williams, 352 N.J. Super. 457, 466 (App. Div. 2002)).
We also addressed the authority's contention that even if the Act permits
a tenant to cure violations, federal law precludes a cure because federal
interests were impaired by the violation. We rejected that argument, reasoning
that federal law permits a tenant of federally funded public housing to rely on
state law governing eviction procedures where such law provides the tenant
procedural rights in addition to those provided by federal law. Id. at 432
(citing 24 C.F.R. § 247.6(c)). "Thus, federal public housing tenants can rely
on this State's additional procedural protections, found in New Jersey's Anti -
Eviction Act." Ibid.
Although we overturned the trial court order dismissing the authority's
eviction complaint, we noted that the tenant could still adequately cure the
breach by, for example, providing proof that the unauthorized residents were
in fact eligible for public housing and would not have increased the unit's
approved rent, or by reimbursing the authority for the losses and expenses that
resulted from the unauthorized tenancy. Id. at 434. We therefore remanded
the matter to the trial court to determine whether the tenant could provide "an
adequate cure, which does not impair federal interests." Ibid.
A-2424-25 44 Applying the reasoning in Mayo to the case before us, we believe Ms.
Hunt was entitled to an opportunity to cure any outstanding violations of lease
requirements related to her reexamination for zero-income housing. The
present circumstances are significantly different from the situation in Mayo.
In contrast to the Mayo tenant's "lengthy period of unauthorized lodging," id.
at 434, nothing in the record indicates that Ms. Hunt spent even one day in the
apartment as an unqualified recipient of housing assistance. Furthermore, in
Mayo, we "emphasize[d]" that the authority had established a proper ground
for eviction. Ibid. Here, in stark contrast, as we stressed in the preceding
Section, there has been no such judicial finding.
More broadly, even accepting PHA's allegations that Ms. Hunt violated
lease rules by missing meetings and failing to provide documents on time, that
conduct is a far cry from the examples offered in Mayo and Muros where "no
cure should be permitted." Id. at 434. Here, there was no proof of fraud, cf.
Edward Gray, 352 N.J. Super. at 466, and as in past lease terms, we see no
reason why PHA and the trial court could not have allowed Ms. Hunt to cure
the missed meetings and deadlines by producing documents that demonstrate
her eligibility for zero-income housing. That would have served—not
impaired—the federal goal of verifying that she remains eligible for the zero -
income subsidy.
A-2424-25 45 We also embrace the holding in Mayo that federal law "permits [a]
tenant of federally funded public housing to rely on State law governing
eviction procedures where such law provides the tenant procedural rights in
addition to those provided by federal law." Id. at 432 (citing 24 C.F.R. §
247.6(c)). Applying that principle, we are unpersuaded by PHA's federal
preemption arguments, as federal law permits Ms. Hunt to exercise her right
under the Act to cure lease violations in appropriate circumstances.
PHA nonetheless suggests that Ms. Hunt's last and only opportunity to
cure the violations was by strictly complying with the Probation Agreement.
We disagree for the reasons explained in the preceding Section. The strict
compliance requirement that PHA proposes might be tenable if the trial court
found that PHA had proved Ms. Hunt previously committed a substantial
violation constituting good cause. But it did not.
Relatedly, PHA argues that its claim is analogous to an eviction action
for habitual late payment of rent, see N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(j), where an
"established pattern" of late payment may be sufficient grounds for eviction
even if each payment is eventually made. That may be so, but we are unmoved
by this analogy where Ms. Hunt's alleged lease violations have never cost PHA
a subsidy, and where Mayo—which concerns the cause of action at issue
here—suggests that she was entitled to a cure.
A-2424-25 46 In sum, we conclude that allowing Ms. Hunt to cure her noncompliance
a month before the hearing would not have impaired PHA's or HUD's interests
and would have advanced the rights safeguarded by the Act. That is especially
so considering that Ms. Hunt—a single mother of a four-year-old—has a
compelling interest in remaining in her apartment, and that in past years, PHA
consistently permitted her to cure any breaches/violations with respect to
attending meetings and producing documentation. Cf. NC Roseville Senior
2016 UR LLC v. Howard, 483 N.J. Super 113, 126 (App. Div. 2026)
(reaffirming that when a landlord renews a tenant's lease and accepts rent
under that new lease, it waives its right to terminate the tenancy based on the
tenant's nonpayment of rent in the prior lease term).
VI.
Conclusion
Finally, we call attention to Ms. Hunt's resolute assertion that she is a
tenant, not an inmate. We find that to be a poignant and insightful
observation. It goes without saying that public housing facilities are homes,
not prisons where vigorous enforcement of even minor rules sends a general
deterrence message needed to maintain order and discipline. 18 When, as in this
18 We do not mean to suggest that compliance with the federal regulations, PHA rules, and lease provisions at issue here is not important. Those
A-2424-25 47 case, rent and subsidies have been paid and the rights of other tenants have not
been jeopardized, courts should not impose the ultimate sanction of eviction
reflexively when alternatives remain available under the Act that would ensure
a proportionate response—one that balances and ultimately safeguards the
interests of a housing authority, HUD, and a low- or zero-income tenant. See
Daniels, 482 N.J. Super. at 530 (reaffirming that the Act is "'remedial
legislation' and should 'be liberally construed to protect the rights of tenants,
with all doubts resolved in favor of the tenant.'" (quoting Bello, 223 N.J. at
336)). Applying these foundational principles, we are constrained to reverse
and vacate the judgment for possession and warrant of removal. We do so
mindful that unless the pattern is broken, the parties may be back in court for
the next reexamination/recertification cycle. We offer no opinion on whether
Ms. Hunt is eligible for zero-income housing assistance.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed them, any remaining
arguments made by the parties are either rendered moot by our resolution of
requirements serve the critical federal purpose of "limiting scarce public housing to those that are truly eligible." Mayo, 390 N.J. Super. at 433. In serving the interests of justice, however, courts must acknowledge the distinction between means and ends. While keeping scheduled appointments, for example, is an important part of the reexamination/recertification process, that requirement is not an end unto itself but rather a means to ensure that only qualified tenants receive public housing assistance.
A-2424-25 48 the central issues or else lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Reversed and remanded for the trial court to vacate the judgment for
possession and warrant of removal. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-2424-25 49
Phillipsburg Housing Authority v. Zalayah Hunt (Phillipsburg Housing Authority v. Zalayah Hunt) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.