Phillips v.Eastman Kodak Co.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Phillips v.Eastman Kodak Co.

204 A.D.2d 979, 613 N.Y.S.2d 68, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6785

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 27, 1994

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 204 A.D.2d 979 (Phillips v.Eastman Kodak Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Phillips v.Eastman Kodak Co., 204 A.D.2d 979, 613 N.Y.S.2d 68, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6785 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. While working on construction of a sewer tunnel 80 feet below the surface of defendant’s parking lot, plaintiff was struck by a wooden board that fell from a work site in a shaft approximately 60 feet above him. Defendant, as the grantor of an easement for construction of that tunnel, remained the fee owner, and thus, was an "owner” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) (see, Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 560; Celestine v City of New York, 86 AD2d 592, 593, affd 59 NY2d 938; Kerr v Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 113 AD2d 412, 416). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Galloway, J.—Partial Summary Judgment.) Present—Green, J. P., Pine, Balio, Callahan and Boehm, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Order unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. While working on construction of a sewer tunnel 80 feet below the surface of defendant’s parking lot, plaintiff was struck by a wooden board that fell from a work site in a shaft approximately 60 feet above him. Defendant, as the grantor of an easement for construction of that tunnel, remained the fee owner, and thus, was an "owner” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) (see, Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 560; Celestine v City of New York, 86 AD2d 592, 593, affd 59 NY2d 938; Kerr v Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 113 AD2d 412, 416). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Galloway, J.—Partial Summary Judgment.) Present—Green, J. P., Pine, Balio, Callahan and Boehm, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

204 A.D.2d 979, 613 N.Y.S.2d 68, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6785, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phillips-veastman-kodak-co-nyappdiv-1994.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack