Phillips v. Town of Clifton Park Water Authority

243 A.D.2d 911, 662 N.Y.S.2d 867, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10123
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedOctober 16, 1997
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 243 A.D.2d 911 (Phillips v. Town of Clifton Park Water Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Phillips v. Town of Clifton Park Water Authority, 243 A.D.2d 911, 662 N.Y.S.2d 867, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10123 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

Peters, J.

Appeal from an amended judgment of the Supreme Court (Ferradino, J.), entered June 21, 1996 in Saratoga County, which, inter alia, partially granted petitioners’ application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul the source and storage fees charged by respondent Town of Clifton Park Water Authority.

All facts relevant to this proceeding were fully set forth by us in our prior decision (215 AD2d 924). Therein, petitioners had sought and obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Town of Clifton Park Water Authority from terminating its service and seizing their bond. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 and 7804 (f), to deny the preliminary injunction and to vacate the temporary restraining order. Supreme Court, sua sponte, converted the proceeding into an action for a declaratory judgment and proceeded to review the merits of all contentions, ultimately annulling the source and storage fees in issue (see, id., at 925-926). Upon our review, we found that the court’s failure to notify the parties that it intended to treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment warranted a reversal of its annulment of the source and storage fees (see, id., at 926-927). Hence, we remitted the proceeding to Supreme Court “for a hearing on the preliminary injunction” (id., at 927).

Upon our remittal and prior to witnesses being called, counsel for both sides acknowledged and clarified that the purpose of the hearing was to address the application for the [912]*912preliminary injunction. At the conclusion of all testimony, Supreme Court enjoined the imposition of source and storage fees “against the petitioners” on constitutional grounds. However, in the judgment (denominated an order), the court granted the petition to the extent of enjoining the Water Authority from imposing these fees and then annulled the source and storage fees in their entirety.

By order to show cause, respondents moved to resettle the order on the ground, inter alia, that it did not comport with its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of facts specifically prohibited respondents from imposing source and storage fees against petitioners whereas the order rendered prohibited the blanket imposition of source and storage fees. By letter decision, the court informed the parties that it was, sua sponte, amending the findings of fact and conclusions of law to enjoin the imposition of source and storage fees against all similarly affected users rather than just against petitioners. That amended judgment (denominated an order)

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Related

Phillips v. Town of Clifton Park Water Authority
286 A.D.2d 834 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
243 A.D.2d 911, 662 N.Y.S.2d 867, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phillips-v-town-of-clifton-park-water-authority-nyappdiv-1997.