1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEFFREY PHILLIPS et al., Case No.: 19-CV-102-AJB(WVG)
12 Plaintiffs, REPORT AND 13 v. RECOMMENDATION RE: ENFORCING SETTLEMENT 14 PILGRIM CREEK ESTATES AGREEMENT AND ENTERING HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 15 JUDGMENT Defendant. 16 [Doc. No. 29.] 17 18 After, having reached agreement to settle this case and placed the material terms on 19 the record before this Court, pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey Phillips has continuously attempted to 20 quibble and alter the settlement terms he clearly agreed to be bound by on multiple 21 occasions. Although this Court has extensively discussed these issues with the parties for 22 multiple hours over multiple in-person conferences and teleconferences, Phillips persists 23 in obstructing the finalization of settlement in this case by refusing to sign a draft settlement 24 agreement that all other parties agree accurately reflects the oral settlement on the record. 25 Defendant now moves to compel enforcement of the settlements, and co-Plaintiff June 26 Phillips—Jeffrey’s own mother—joins Defendant’s motion. As explained below, this 27 Court RECOMMENDS that the Court grant Defendant’s motion without an evidentiary 28 hearing, impose sanctions, award attorneys’ fees, enter final Judgment, and close the case. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Defendant Pilgrim Creek Estates Homeowners Association is a planned 3 development, consisting of 203 single-family homes. Defendant is a senior citizen housing 4 community that requires that one occupant of each lot is a senior citizen who is 55 years of 5 age or older. All other occupants must be a qualified permanent resident or a permitted 6 health care resident, as those terms are defined in the Second Restated Declaration of 7 Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. 8 Plaintiff Jeff Phillips is the trustee of the Phillips Family Trust, the owner of a home 9 within Defendant. In mid-2015, Jeffrey Phillips’s father, who resided with Plaintiff June 10 Phillips passed away. Later in 2015, Jeffrey Phillips moved into the home, presumably to 11 assist his mother, co-Plaintiff June Phillips. 12 Since 2016, Plaintiffs have requested that a reasonable accommodation be made to 13 allow them to park vehicles overnight on the street. After failed mediation attempts, 14 Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging three causes of action for (1) Violation of the Fair 15 Housing Act, (2) Violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act and (3) 16 Violation of California. 17 June and Jeffrey Phillips were initially represented by the same attorney until August 18 8, 2019, when the Court granted their counsel’s motion to withdraw as Jeffrey’s attorney 19 and to continue representing June. (Doc. No. 22.) Since then, Jeffrey has proceeded pro 20 se in this matter and continues to do so. Prior to August 8, counsel represented Jeffrey 21 during two settlement conferences on March 18, 2019 and May 9, 2019. 22 The March 18, 2019 settlement conference was in-person and all parties attended. 23 The parties—including Jeffrey—negotiated a partial settlement of the case, agreeing to 24 certain non-monetary terms. The Court placed the terms of that settlement on the record, 25 the transcript of which appears on the docket as entry number 10. The specific non- 26 monetary terms of the settlement were: 27 1. “‘An order forcing the Homeowners Association to grant plaintiffs’ request 28 for a reasonable accommodation to park Plaintiff Jeff Phillips’ vehicle on the street at their 1 home.’ The accommodation that the Homeowners Association has provided is to park on 2 Pilgrim Way next to the pool and the clubhouse, the third parking spot.” The parking spot 3 would be designated “reserved” for Plaintiffs by having “‘reserved’ painted in the parking 4 space area.” Defendant agreed to complete this project within 10 days of March 18, 2019. 5 (Doc. No. 10 at 3-4.) 6 2. Although Defendant’s representatives did not admit to past retaliatory 7 activities, they agreed to “‘[a]n order to cease and desist from all retaliatory actions, such 8 as fines and citations.’” However, if Plaintiff’s violated the HOA’s CC&Rs, then the HOA 9 board could take appropriate enforcement action. (Id. at 4-5.) 10 3. “‘An order restoring plaintiffs’ access to all common areas.’” This included 11 returning to Plaintiffs their keys to common areas. (Id. at 5-6.) 12 4. “‘An order compelling the Homeowners Association to rescind any fines or 13 citations, and correcting homeowner records to remove such entries.’” This provision also 14 required Defendant to “refund fine money that has been previously paid.” (Id. at 6-7.) 15 5. “‘[A]n order compelling the Homeowners Association to remove any 16 derogatory credit remarks [to the extent any such remarks existed].’” (Id. at 8.) 17 6. “‘An order to adopt written policies and procedures to handle reasonable 18 accommodation requests.’” (Id. at 8.) 19 7. “‘An order requiring training of Homeowners’ management personnel.’” (Id. 20 at 9.) 21 After listing these non-monetary terms, the Court confirmed that all parties 22 understood the terms and agreed to be bound by them. Specifically, Jeffrey stated he 23 understood and agreed to be bound by the terms. (Id. at 12:2-8.) However, given that this 24 was only a partial settlement, the Court ordered the parties to appear for a second in-person 25 settlement conference. 26 The Court convened the second settlement conference on May 9, 2019 with all 27 parties present again, including Jeffrey Phillips. Although the parties did not reach 28 agreement on a monetary amount to resolve the case, they addressed issues that had come 1 up with the delayed implementation of some of the terms from the first settlement 2 conference. The parties negotiated further resolution of these terms, and the Court placed 3 the clarified terms on the record. (See Doc. No. 16.) Specifically, Defendant had calculated 4 that the total fine amount that it previously agreed to reimburse Plaintiffs was $1,800; the 5 parties agreed that the “reserved” spot painting could wait until after a third party repaved 6 the property’s roads and parking lots, which included the reserved parking spot; and 7 Defendant agreed there would be no further rules violations notices issued for potted plants 8 on Plaintiffs’ property. There were no new agreements placed on the record—just 9 refinements and clarifications of terms reached at the first settlement conference. Jeffrey 10 Phillips expressed his understanding and agreement on the record. (Doc. No. 16 at 7-8.) 11 The Court convened the third in-person settlement conference on September 10, 12 2019, and all parties, including Jeffrey Phillips, were again present. (See Doc. No. 25.) At 13 this conference, the parties agreed to monetary terms to finally complete the resolution of 14 this case. Specifically, Defendant agreed to the following two additional terms (numbering 15 continued from the list above): 16 8. Defendant agreed to compensate Plaintiffs the amount of $70,000; and
17 9. The compensation would be apportioned as follows: (a) $25,000 paid to 18 Steven Derby and/or his firm Derby, McGuinness & Goldsmith and (b) $45,000 paid to Plaintiff June Phillips. 19
20 (Id. at 4.) As part of the process of confirming the terms of the global settlement, this Court 21 addressed Jeffrey specifically to confirm that he understood the terms of the monetary 22 terms above, that the global settlement included the non-monetary terms reached in the two 23 prior settlement conferences, that he agreed to be bound by all of these terms, and that by 24 agreeing to these terms the litigation would be concluded. (Id. at 5-6.) In each instance, 25 Jeffrey stated that he understood and agreed, thus once again agreeing to be bound by the 26 non-monetary terms from the prior settlements. (Id.) 27 Unfortunately, the litigation did not conclude there, as Jeffrey has refused to sign a 28 settlement agreement with the above terms and has continued to attempt to modify the 1 agreement. Since the third settlement conference, this Court has held two settlement 2 disposition conferences on October 29, 2019 and November 18, 2019 during which the 3 Court spent nearly two hours attempting to resolve the stalemate between the parties in 4 signing a settlement agreement. 5 At the October 29, 2019 settlement disposition conference, the Court’s aim was to 6 determine what the holdup was in finalizing settlement and filing a joint motion to dismiss 7 the case. The Court learned that the holdup was Jeffrey Phillips’s continuing quibbling 8 about minutia and attempting to alter the terms of the settlement. However, both defense 9 counsel and June Phillips’s counsel agreed that the settlement agreement defense counsel 10 had drafted accurately set forth all the terms of the settlement. (See Doc. No. 39 at 9:6- 11 10.) To resolve the holdup, defense counsel had proposed attaching the transcripts of the 12 three settlements to the settlement agreement—a proposal that was abandoned later on the 13 teleconference in favor of adding to the agreement an attachment with the terms laid out in 14 list format. (Id. at 30-31.) In this regard, to simplify and delineate the terms of the 15 settlement, defense counsel had created an “attachment A” to the settlement that set forth 16 the following nine terms: 17 1. Defendant PILGRIM CREEK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (“HOA”) shall permit Plaintiff JUNE PHILLIPS to park a single car in her 18 garage at her residence as a reasonable accommodation for her disability; 19 2. HOA shall provide Plaintiff JEFF PHILLIPS with a single parking stall 20 marked “Reserved” in reflectorized paint on the spot and with a sign at the 21 head of the spot stating “Reserved” with no other information. The spot shall be located on Pilgrim Way next to the pool; 22
23 3. HOA agrees to cease and desist from any retaliatory actions against Plaintiffs now or in the future. However, HOA reserves the right to enforce 24 the CC&R’s in a fair and even-handed manner; 25 4. HOA will restore, to the extent not already restored, Plaintiffs’ access 26 to all common areas; 27 28 1 5. HOA has rescinded all fines and citations and has corrected homeowner records to remove such entries; 2
3 6. HOA has returned the sum of $1,800 to homeowners representing fines levied for “potted plant” citations; 4
5 7. HOA represents that there are no derogatory credit remarks owing to fines or citations issued by them but if any such should be discovered, HOA 6 will have them removed or reversed upon Plaintiffs’ written request within 30 7 days of such request;
8 8. HOA has adopted written policies and procedures (attached as Exhibit 9 “B”) which have already been implemented and will continue to be adhered to by HOA; and 10
11 9. HOA will annually train all HOA Board members and management personnel on these written policies and procedures. 12
13 (“Attachment ‘A’ to Settlement Agreement and Release Agreement,” Ex. 1 to Burfening 14 Decl., Doc. No. 29-1 at 17.)1 June Phillips’s attorney concurred that this attachment 15 accurately reflected the material terms of the settlement that had been placed on the record. 16 The Court reviewed each of these terms on the record and likewise confirmed that the 17 attachment’s accurate recitation of the terms reached before this Court. (Id. at 35-39.) The 18 Court discussed other matters at length and set a second deadline to file a joint motion to 19 dismiss and scheduled another settlement disposition conference. 20
21 1 The only difference between this nine-point list and the seven terms this Court set forth 22 on the record and summarized herein above is the inclusion of item 1 and item 6 in the 23 attachment. However, these were not additional terms not contemplated by the parties. Item 1 simply makes explicit that the HOA agreed to provide the Phillips household a 24 reserved parking spot (Item 2), which was necessary to allow parking of one car inside the 25 Phillips garage rather than two cars. Item 1 is not an additional term; it is simply a requisite predicate to item 2. Item 1 was contemplated by all parties and is not in dispute. 26 Item 6 was combined in the Court’s recitation of terms as term 4—that the HOA 27 would rescind any fines and citations and then refund any fines already paid. While the Court combined these two in its recitation, defense counsel separately listed them in the 28 1 At the second settlement disposition conference on November 18, 2019, the Court 2 yet again queried why a joint motion to dismiss had not been filed. Despite the Court’s 3 efforts at the last teleconference, Jeffrey continued to quibble and seek unnecessary 4 clarification about matters that didn’t need to be clarified. Jeffrey informed the Court the 5 parties were close to signing the settlement agreement and just had two more points to 6 clarify. (Doc. No. 20 at 4.) However, as the Court had repeatedly stated on the first 7 teleconference, the terms of the settlement—as itemized in defense counsel’s “attachment 8 A”—were clear, unambiguous, and accurate. June Phillips’s counsel again stated that the 9 settlement agreement defense counsel had drafted was acceptable to June. (Id.; id. at 16.) 10 However, Jeffrey wanted to “clarify” whether the HOA’s agreement to restore his access 11 to the common RV parking lot included allowing him to park three non-RV vehicles that 12 he had previously parked in that lot in violation of the HOA rules. The revisions to the 13 settlement agreement that he had proposed inserted this additional provision, which, as 14 defense counsel correctly noted, was never discussed as part of the settlement of this case. 15 (Id. at 14:18-22.) Defense counsel also reassured Jeffrey that this settlement does not bar 16 any future claims—only past claims—and appeared confident the parties could sign the 17 settlement agreement with these two items removed. The teleconference ended with this 18 Court’s heart full of hope . . . . 19 . . . . only to have those hopes dashed. Instead of a joint motion to dismiss, Defendant 20 filed the instant motion to compel enforcement of the settlement. Plaintiff June Phillips 21 joins Defendant’s motion. (Doc. No. 37.) 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A district court has the inherent power to enforce settlement agreements entered into 24 by the parties in cases pending before it. In re City Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 25 957 (9th Cir. 1994); Marks-Foreman v. Reporter Publ’g Co., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 26 (S.D. Cal. 1998). This inherent authority applies to settlement agreements entered on the 27 record but later reneged on by one party. See Henderson v. Yard House Glendale, LLC, 28 456 F. App’x 701, 702 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in 1 enforcing the settlement agreement after [Plaintiff] entered into it on the record in open 2 court, but later refused to execute a formal agreement to dismiss the action. . . .”); Ewing 3 v. K2 Prop. Dev., LLC, No. 16CV678-LAB(AGS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172810, at *6 4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2018). 5 To enforce a settlement agreement, two elements must be satisfied. Marks- 6 Foreman, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. First, the settlement agreement must be complete. Id. 7 (citing Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994); Doi v. Halekulani 8 Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002)). Second, the settlement agreement must be 9 the result of an agreement of the parties or their authorized representatives concerning the 10 terms of the settlement. Marks-Foreman, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (citing Harrop v. Western 11 Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 1977), Doi, 276 F.3d at 1137-38). Where 12 parties raise objections after the parties agree to a settlement, the court may rightfully deny 13 such objections. Harrop, 550 F.2d at 1144. 14 “Assessing the validity of a settlement agreement . . . is a question of state contract 15 law.” Golden v. Cal. Emergency Physicians Med. Grp., 782 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 16 2015) (“Typically, the construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are 17 governed by principles of local law which apply to interpretation of contracts generally.” 18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Under California law, a valid contract 19 requires parties capable of contracting, consent, a lawful object, and consideration. Cal. 20 Civ. Code § 1550; Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1230 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). “[U]nless a writing is required by the statute of frauds, oral settlement 22 agreements are enforceable in the same manner as oral agreements in general.”2 Nicholson 23 v. Barab, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1671, 1681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); see id. at 1682 (listing 24 25
26 2 Here, California’s statute of frauds, California Civil Code section 1624, is not applicable 27 because the alleged oral agreement is not one of the seven types of contracts listed in section 1624 as “invalid” without a writing. Thus, the oral agreement on the record is 28 1 California cases in which out-of-court oral settlement agreements were found to be 2 enforceable). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 A. The Terms of the Settlement Entered on the Record Should Be Enforced and 5 Judgment Should be Entered 6 There is no question that all parties to this case resolved this matter on the terms set 7 forth on the record and as reflected in the settlement agreement and its “attachment A.” 8 There is also no question that they did so knowingly, voluntarily, and with full knowledge 9 of the facts and circumstances necessary to enter into settlement. Accordingly, the 10 settlement should be enforced and final judgment should be entered. The Court now 11 addresses each of the elements of a binding contract under California Civil Code section 12 1550, which requires a valid contract to have parties capable of contracting, consent, a 13 lawful object, and consideration. 14 1. Parties Capable of Contracting 15 Pursuant to California Civil Code section 1556, all persons are capable of 16 contracting “except minors, persons of unsound mind, and persons deprived of civil rights.” 17 None of these exceptions apply here. 18 2. Mutual Assent 19 “Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward 20 manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words 21 and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.” Serafin v. Balco 22 Properties Ltd., LLC, 235 Cal. App. 4th 165, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (citations and 23 internal quotations omitted). 24 Applying this objective standard, the Court finds the parties mutually manifested 25 assent to settle this case on the terms put on the record before this Court on three separate 26 occasions. On March 18, 2019, both Plaintiffs, Defendant, and their attorneys participated 27 on a teleconference before this Court and memorialized the non-monetary terms of the 28 settlement. (See Doc. No. 10.) This Court recited the essential non-monetary terms of the 1 settlement, and all parties and counsel stated they understood those terms. All parties, 2 including Jeffrey Phillips, then expressly and unequivocally agreed to be bound by those 3 terms to settle this case. 4 On May 19, 2019, all parties and their attorneys appeared in person for a second 5 Early Neutral Evaluation conference. After arms-length negotiations before this Court, the 6 parties agreed to additional settlement terms, which were then placed on the record before 7 this Court. (See Doc. No. 16.) These terms included a final calculation of $1,800 in past 8 fees that would be reimbursed to Plaintiffs, an agreement that the HOA would no longer 9 issue violation notices for potted plants or trees on Plaintiffs’ property, that there would be 10 no future retaliation by the HOA, and that the HOA could enforce its rules in the future as 11 it would against any other homeowner who violated the rules. Plaintiffs both confirmed 12 they understood and were satisfied with these clarified terms. 13 On September 10, 2019, this Court convened a teleconference on which all parties 14 and their attorneys appeared.3 Defense counsel recited the essential monetary terms of the 15 settlement and clarified details of certain non-monetary terms. All parties and counsel then 16 stated they understood those terms, and the parties—including Jeffrey Phillips—agreed to 17 be bound by those terms to settle this case. (Doc. No. 25 at 5-6.) Notably, the terms placed 18 on the record during the prior two conferences were incorporated by references into this 19 third conference, and this Court expressly confirmed Jeffrey (1) understood that the terms 20 were being incorporated, (2) that he understood those prior terms, and (3) that he once 21 again agreed to be bound by those prior terms. (Id. at 5:14-25.) Jeffrey affirmatively and 22 unequivocally answered all three of these inquiries. (Id. at 5:20, 5:22, 5:25.) 23 Briefly stated, there can be no clearer objective manifestation of assent than what 24 transpired here: a party stating on the record on multiple occasions that he understood terms 25 26 27 3 At the time of the first two settlements on the record, attorney Derby represented both June and Jeffrey Phillips. However, counsel for June Phillips had previously withdrawn 28 1 and agreed to be bound by them. There can be no doubt that Jeffrey expressly and 2 objectively manifested his assent to all of the non-monetary terms. 3 Jeffrey now contends this settlement should not be enforced because the terms he 4 agreed to are not reasonable accommodations that remedy the ADA issues raised in the 5 complaint. This argument is simultaneously false and a red herring. Jeffrey’s argument is 6 false because the specific accommodation he references—the reserved parking space he 7 claims is too far from his mother’s house—in fact accommodates the Phillips household 8 by allowing the parking of a single car in a two-car garage, which in turn allows June 9 Phillips the ability to more comfortably enter and exit a car in the garage. Defendant 10 granting the Phillips household its own reserved parking spot directly relates to the 11 Complaint’s allegation that “[o]n November 1, 2016, Plaintiff JUNE PHILLIPS provided 12 a doctor’s note via email to the HOA asking for reasonable accommodation to park one of 13 the vehicles on the street.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 11.) As Plaintiffs explained to this Court 14 during settlement discussions, the reason an outside-of-the-garage parking spot was needed 15 was to allow for June to enter and exit a car inside the garage with ease. The reserved 16 parking spot directly addresses and fulfills this need and allegation. Jeffrey, however, is 17 now displeased with the distance the parking space is from his mother’s home, where he 18 has lived for several years. That distance, however, was a readily-available fact he was 19 fully aware of during settlement discussions since he knew where his mother’s house was 20 located in relation to the proposed parking spot. He agreed to the settlement term knowing 21 full well the distance between his mother’s home and the proposed parking spot. 22 Jeffrey’s argument is also a red herring for two reasons. First, settlement terms need 23 not necessarily tie directly to the gravamen of a complaint. Parties can come to any 24 mutually-agreeable terms to settle and resolve a case without further litigation. Jeffrey’s 25 contrived argument now is simply a result of his ex-post facto dissatisfaction about not 26 extracting everything he wanted from Defendant. That, however, is no reason to invalidate 27 such a clearly-binding settlement. Second, the distance of the parking spot from the house 28 is wholly irrelevant. The parking spot term is in fact a reasonable accommodation for June 1 Phillips because it allows her to park one car in her home’s garage and thus provides her 2 the ability for easier entry and exit of that car. Accordingly, regardless of where the 3 reserved parking spot is located, June Phillips—the only person the Complaint hints needs 4 accommodation—has been accommodated. Jeffrey may not enjoy the walk to his new 5 reserved parking spot, but that is irrelevant since the Complaint never alleged he was in 6 need of such an accommodation. (See Doc. No. 1 ¶ 11.)4 7 Because the parties clearly expressed their mutual assent before this Court and on 8 the record, there is no doubt they each expressly manifested their assent to settle this case 9 and that the above terms were the essential and material terms to which both parties 10 assented. 11 3. Lawful Object 12 The object of the settlement is lawful as it requires Defendant to make a settlement 13 payment and agree to various non-monetary terms in exchange for Plaintiffs’ release of 14 their claims against Defendant in the instant case. See Madani v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 2019 15 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16736, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2019) (settlement payment in exchange 16 for release of claims is a lawful object of settlement agreement). 17 4. Consideration 18 Finally, the settlement is supported by consideration. Consideration is satisfied 19 when a party (1) confers or agrees to confer a benefit on a party not entitled to that benefit, 20 or (2) suffers or agrees to suffer a prejudice that a party is not legally bound to suffer. Cal. 21 Civ. Code § 1605; see 1 Witkin, Summary 11th Contracts § 202 (2018) (“Consideration 22 may be an act, forbearance, change in legal relations, or a promise.”). Here, the settlement 23 requires Defendant to pay Plaintiffs a settlement payment. Plaintiffs have also secured 24
25 4 Yes, Paragraph 10 of the Complaint loosely alleged that “Plaintiffs” made written requests 26 for the parking accommodation, but Paragraph 11 is the only allegation that references who 27 actually needed that accommodation. To this day, this Court is unclear what the basis for Jeffrey’s need for any accommodation is, and the Complaint certainly does not contain any 28 1 various non-monetary benefits they sought and vigorously fought for. In exchange, 2 Plaintiffs will dismiss the case. Therefore, the settlement is supported by consideration. 3 Madani, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16736, at *24 (settlement supported by consideration 4 where it required settlement payment in exchange for dismissal of lawsuit). 5 B. The Settlement Agreement is Complete; An Evidentiary Hearing is Not 6 Required or Necessary Under the Circumstances Here 7 The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that district courts “may enforce only complete 8 settlement agreements.” Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987). “A complete 9 agreement is “one where the parties have manifested their mutual assent to all the material 10 terms.” Lee v. Retail Store Emple. Bldg. Corp., No. 15CV4768-LHK, 2018 U.S. Dist. 11 LEXIS 5707, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018) (citation and quotations omitted). “Where 12 material facts concerning the existence or terms of an agreement to settle are in dispute, 13 the parties must be allowed an evidentiary hearing.” Callie, 829 F.2d at 890 (citations 14 omitted). The Court must hold an evidentiary hearing “[w]here material facts concerning 15 the existence or terms of an agreement to settle are in dispute . . . .” Callie v. Near, 829 16 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original). 17 Here, there can be no dispute what the material terms of the agreement were or 18 whether the parties assented to them. Unlike other cases where settlement is reached out 19 of court and a dispute exists over what exactly the parties agreed to, there can be no such 20 dispute here. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131 (9th 21 Cir. 2002) is directly on point: 22 In the typical case when one party seeks to enforce a settlement agreement against another, parties exchange phone calls and e-mails, and 23 perhaps even drafts of a settlement agreement, outside of court. At some 24 point in the process, one party concludes that a final agreement has been reached; the other party, however, disagrees. We can understand how a party 25 could dispute having made a binding agreement in such a case. 26 This, however, is not the typical case. Rather, here, the plaintiff made 27 a binding settlement agreement in open court: when read the terms of the 28 agreement, and asked if she agreed with them, Doi simply responded, “yeah.” 1 At a time where the resources of the federal judiciary, and this Circuit especially, are strained to the breaking point, we cannot countenance a 2 plaintiff’s agreeing to settle a case in open court, then subsequently 3 disavowing the settlement when it suits her. The courts spend enough time on the merits of litigation; we need not (and therefore ought not) open the 4 flood gates to this kind of needless satellite litigation. 5 Thus, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by 6 finding that Doi’s response in open court, after the terms of the settlement 7 agreement were recited, constituted a binding agreement to settle. 8 Doi, 276 F.3d at 1141. When both the terms of the settlement and the parties’ mutual 9 assent thereto is clear, an evidentiary hearing is not required. Id. at 1139 (“[T]here was no 10 need for an evidentiary hearing on whether an agreement existed, or what its terms were: 11 the parties dispelled any such questions in open court.”). 12 Here, as in Doi, both the terms of the settlement and the parties’ mutual assent to 13 those terms are crystal clear and on the record before this Court on multiple occasions. 14 Accordingly, there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing here. 15 C. Judgment Should Be Entered Instead of Ordering Signing of the Agreement 16 Defendant requests an Order from the Court compelling Jeffrey Phillips to sign the 17 settlement agreement submitted as exhibit 1 to Burfening’s declaration in support of 18 Defendant’s motion. (Doc. No. 29-1 at 10-17.) However, given this Court’s extensive 19 experience with Jeffrey Phillips, it is abundantly clear that requiring him to sign a 20 settlement agreement will only lead to further unjustified, frustrating delay as he continues 21 to quibble about immaterial matters and conjure up further obstacles to resolution of this 22 case. Instead, this Court respectfully urges the Court to reduce the settlement agreement 23 to judgment, enter the judgment, and terminate this case. Other courts have entered 24 judgment upon enforcing settlement agreements. 25 Most notably, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court’s entry of 26 judgment in a case starkly on all fours with the instant case. In Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 27 276 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2002), the parties had entered into a settlement before the district 28 1 court, and the terms were orally placed on the record. The plaintiff then refused to sign the 2 settlement agreement. Without first holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court 3 eventually found that the settlement agreement was binding and enforceable. The district 4 court also found sanctions and attorneys’ fees were in order. And the court ultimately 5 entered judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit upheld the 6 district court’s order in its entirety. Doi is directly on point—all of the circumstances that 7 led to the district court’s actions there are present in this case. As the district court did in 8 Doi, the Court here should enter judgment as well. In addition to the district court in Doi, 9 other courts have entered judgment upon enforcing settlement agreements. See, e.g., 10 Shandong Wanbao Grp. Co. v. reRubber LLC, No. 16CV765-VAP-DTBx, 2019 U.S. Dist. 11 LEXIS 152453 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2019) (finding the parties had entered into a binding 12 settlement agreement to have judgment entered for $5,000,000 and reducing the agreement 13 to judgment after the defendants failed to make a payment); Above the Ceiling, LLC v. W. 14 Architectural Servs., No. 15CV1766-JAD-GWF, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118290 (D. Nev. 15 June 27, 2019) (recommending granting the plaintiff’s motion to enforce a settlement 16 agreement and reducing to judgment a $275,000 settlement secured via e-mail 17 communications between the parties), adopted by Above the Ceiling, LLC v. W. 18 Architectural Servs., No. 15CV1766-JAD-GWF, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117839 (D. Nev. 19 July 16, 2019); Holabird v. Kagin, No. 14CV262-HDM-CBC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20 223634, at *30 (D. Nev. Dec. 18, 2018) (finding the defendants had breached the settlement 21 agreement and that the breach had caused $499,210.10 in damages and recommending that 22 judgment be entered in this amount in favor of the plaintiffs), adopted by Holabird v. 23 Kagin, No. 14CV262-HDM-CBC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66546 (D. Nev. Apr. 17, 2019); 24 United States v. Bauer, No. CV-17-08049-PCT-JJT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174327 (D. 25 Ariz. Oct. 10, 2018) (finding the parties had entered into a binding settlement and reducing 26 the settlement agreement to judgment.); Timmon v. Invest Inself, L.L.C., No. 17CV11035, 27 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92864 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2018) (recommending reduction to 28 judgment of an oral settlement agreement made on the record), adopted by Timmon v. 1 Invest Inself, Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 17-11035, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90632 (E.D. Mich. May 2 31, 2018) (imposing sanctions and attorneys’ fees and reducing both to judgment). 3 Entry of judgment here is warranted because Plaintiff Jeffrey Phillips has failed to 4 act in good faith in executing the written settlement agreement and allowing the parties to 5 proceed to file a joint motion to dismiss. Ordering Jeffrey Phillips to sign the settlement 6 agreement is highly likely to lead to his failure to do so and will only lead to future wasteful 7 proceedings before the Court. This Court has now held three settlement conferences and 8 then spent multiple additional hours in teleconferences attempting to convince Jeffrey to 9 cooperate with a settlement that he very clearly entered. These efforts have been to no 10 avail and have consistently been met by Jeffrey’s refusal to listen to logic and acknowledge 11 reality. Compelling him to sign a settlement agreement is not likely to be a successful path 12 forward. Accordingly, the Court has the following two options. 13 First, the Court could append the settlement agreement and its attachment A to any 14 judgment. See, e.g., Harris v. JT Hosp., Inc., No. 16CV4392-BLF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15 82255, at *8-15 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2018). Although the settlement agreement attached to 16 the judgment in Harris had been executed by the parties here, everyone (except Jeffrey 17 Phillips)—Defendant, Plaintiff June Phillips, and this Court—agrees that the proposed 18 settlement agreement and its attachment accurately reflect the terms of the oral settlements 19 on the record. And although the parties did not specifically place the remaining terms in 20 the proposed settlement on the record, those terms are standard, uncontroversial provisions 21 included in nearly all written settlement agreements. These were precisely the 22 circumstances in Doi, where the district court enforced the written settlement agreement 23 that the plaintiff refused to sign after entering an oral agreement on the record. Doi v. 24 Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit affirmed after 25 finding that the written settlement agreement contained no provisions that were contrary to 26 the oral settlement. Id. 27 Second, and in the alternative, the Court could enter judgment on the nine terms 28 placed on the record before this Court as enumerated on pages 2 through 4 of this R&R. 1 However, this route would result in injustice, as it would divest Defendant and Plaintiff 2 June Phillips of the benefits and full force of the written settlement agreement and would 3 reward Jeffrey Phillips for his unjustified obstinance. Given that the first option above has 4 been sanctioned by the Ninth Circuit, that option is seemingly far superior to entering 5 judgment on only the oral settlement. 6 D. Sanctions 7 Both sides have requested sanctions. Defendant seeks $3,150 “for the extraordinary 8 delay caused by Pro Se Plaintiff Jeffrey Philips” and $1,260 in attorneys’ fees for having 9 to bring the instant motion. (Doc. No. 29 at 2.) Seemingly mimicking Defendant’s efforts, 10 Plaintiff Jeffrey Phillips seeks $8,000 in sanctions and $8,000 for fees. Jeffrey’s requests 11 are patently baseless and untethered to reality, as his obstinance is the sole reason 12 Defendant was forced to spend so many needless hours attending additional settlement 13 talks and to bring a plainly meritorious motion to enforce the settlement. Jeffrey’s request 14 for sanctions is so ludicrous that it deserves no further discussion. 15 Defendant’s requests, however, are more than justified and warranted. This was not 16 a complicated case, but it was made unduly contentious and burdensome solely because of 17 Jeffrey Phillips’s manipulation and hijacking of the settlement process. He has at every 18 turn quibbled over minutiae, delayed, and frustrated the resolution of this case, and his 19 ultimate act of obstinance has been his steadfast refusal to sign a clearly accurate settlement 20 agreement and now his demand that that same agreement be nullified. But-for Jeffrey’s 21 conduct, this simple case should have—and would have—been terminated pursuant a joint 22 motion to dismiss months ago. Accordingly, Jeffrey’s conduct warrants sanctions and an 23 award of the modest attorneys’ fees Defendant requests. See Doi v. Kelekulani Corp., 276 24 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s award of $1,000 in sanction for 25 the plaintiff’s “unreasonable failure to sign the written [settlement] agreement.”); Timmon 26 v. Invest Inself, Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 17-11035, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90632 (E.D. Mich. 27 May 31, 2018) (imposing sanction and attorneys’ fees and reducing both to judgment). 28 1 || The Court should find that defense counsel’s hourly rate and the time necessitated to bring 2 || the instant motion in response to Jeffrey’s Phillips’s antics are eminently reasonable. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 In sum, the parties here entered into a complete setthement agreement after arms- 5 ||length negotiations while represented by counsel.> They then clearly memorialized their 6 || understanding of—and consent to—those terms on the record before this Court. At that 7 point, they entered into a binding contract. This Court accordingly RECOMMENDS 8 ||enforcing the settlement, imposing sanctions against Plaintiff Jeffrey Phillips, awarding 9 || attorneys’ fees to Defendant, and entering final Judgment as recommended above. 10 IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 19, 2020 any party to this action may 11 || file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 12 || be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to objections shall be filed with the 14 Court and served on all parties no later than March 31, 2020. The parties are advised that 15 failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 16 || objections on appeal. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 DATED: March 2, 2020 NS 20 Hon. William V. Gallo 21 United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 Sa 27 ||° Jeffrey Phillips was represented by counsel at the time he agreed to the non-monetary 0g terms. He was not represented by counsel when the monetary terms were placed on the record, but those terms are not in dispute.