UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SOLON PHILLIPS on behalf of, REMUS ENTERPRISES 1, LLC
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-200 (RDM) v.
YONI NASI,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action, asserting claims of
malicious use of process and abuse of process relating to Defendant’s filing of an allegedly
“bogus, nonsensical lawsuit” against Plaintiff in the “Circuit Court in Montgomery County.”
Dkt. 1 at 1 (Compl.). Plaintiff has yet to serve Defendant, and, on March 6, 2025, he moved for
leave to provide “alternative service” because “Defendant [was] obviously avoiding service of
process.” Dkt. 5 at 1. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion because he had not “adequately
explained and documented his efforts to locate and to serve the Defendant before moving for
alternative service.” Min. Order (Mar. 6, 2025). Two months have now passed, but Plaintiff still
has failed to provide the Court with either proper support for his request to provide alternative
service or proof of service, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
Notwithstanding these failings, the Court will sua sponte extend Plaintiff’s deadline to
effectuate service until May 20, 2025. If Plaintiff does not effectuate service on or before that
date or demonstrate good cause to further extend the deadline, the Court will dismiss the action
without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) for failure to timely serve. A.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant sued him “for a number of causes of action in
Maryland and recorded a number of lis pendenses on Plaintiff’s properties in the District of
Columbia.” Dkt. 5 at 1. Plaintiff, in turn, countersued Defendant, and the matter was set for trial
on February 18 and 19, 2025. Id. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and in October 2024,
the Maryland court granted that motion and dismissed the Defendant’s complaint. Id.
According to Plaintiff, the Maryland court also directed Defendant to “cancel all of the recorded
lis pendenses on Plaintiff’s properties.” Id. But, on Plaintiff’s telling, his countersuit in the
Maryland action “remained.” Id.
Once the recorded lis pendenses were cancelled, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, alleging
that Defendant engaged in malicious prosecution in the Maryland litigation. Id. at 2. After
Plaintiff filed this case, Defendant’s counsel in the Maryland case filed a “motion with the
Maryland court requesting a Hebrew interpreter for Defendant for the February 18-19 Trial.” Id.
Plaintiff then “emailed Defendant’s attorney a copy of this Court’s summons and complaint and
the waiver request” and “alerted Defendant’s attorney that he would have a process server at the
February [2025] Trial to serve Defendant this Court’s summons.” Id. (emphasis added).
But on the day that the Maryland trial was scheduled to commence, Defendant did not
“show up.” Id. According to Plaintiff, when asked to explain Defendant’s absence, Defendant’s
counsel “gave some sort of excuse that still does not make sense to this day.” Id. As relevant
here, Plaintiff states that he attempted to serve Defendant’s attorney with a “copy of the
summons and complaint” in this case but that Defendant’s counsel “appears to not have accepted
service on Defendant’s behalf.” Id. Plaintiff “simply does not know because Defendant’s
attorney has ignored all correspondence regarding service.” Id.
2 Given that series of events, Plaintiff asked this Court for permission to serve Defendant
“by electronic mail when other means have been attempted and when it is clear that Defendant is
attempting to avoid service.” Id. at 2–3. In the alternative, he requested permission to effectuate
service on Defendant’s “attorney who is actively representing him in the sister case in
Maryland.” Id. The Court denied that motion on the ground that Plaintiff had failed “adequately
[to] explain[] and [to] document his efforts to locate and to serve Defendant before moving for
alternative service.” Min. Order (March 6, 2025). Nothing has occurred in this case in the two
months that have passed since then.
B.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides the time limits for service and the
consequences of failing to provide proper service. It states:
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.
To properly serve an individual, a copy of the summons and the complaint must be delivered to
him personally, left at his dwelling or place of abode, or delivered to one of his agents, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2), or the summons must be served in accordance with state law where the district
court is located or where service is made, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Under D.C. law, one method
of service is “by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed
receipt.” D.C. Code § 13-431(a). If the defendant is a “corporation, . . . partnership or other
unincorporated association,” service must be effectuated in the manner for serving an individual
or “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or
general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h); see also D.C.
Code § 29-104.12(c) (“Service may be made by handing a copy of the process, notice, or
3 demand to an officer of the entity, a managing or general agent of the entity, or any other agent
authorized by designation or by law to receive service of process for the entity[.]”); D.C. Sup. Ct.
Civ. R. 4(h). “With respect to either individuals or corporations, service on counsel is proper
only when counsel is an agent authorized to receive service.” Johnson-Richardson v. Univ. of
Phoenix, No. 18-3016, 2020 WL 7318004, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2020) (noting that “[m]ultiple
decision in this district have recognized that counsel of record is not an authorized agent simply
by virtue of representing the defendant in the lawsuit”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that Defendant has authorized his counsel
in the Maryland litigation to accept service in this case. The Court is unpersuaded that, “simply
by virtue of representing” Defendant in the Maryland lawsuit, Defendant’s counsel became his
authorized agent for purposes of accepting service of process in other cases. Johnson-
Richardson, 2020 WL 7318004, at *2.
Neither the federal rules nor the D.C. rules, moreover, authorize service of the summons
and complaint by electronic mail. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4; D.C.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SOLON PHILLIPS on behalf of, REMUS ENTERPRISES 1, LLC
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-200 (RDM) v.
YONI NASI,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action, asserting claims of
malicious use of process and abuse of process relating to Defendant’s filing of an allegedly
“bogus, nonsensical lawsuit” against Plaintiff in the “Circuit Court in Montgomery County.”
Dkt. 1 at 1 (Compl.). Plaintiff has yet to serve Defendant, and, on March 6, 2025, he moved for
leave to provide “alternative service” because “Defendant [was] obviously avoiding service of
process.” Dkt. 5 at 1. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion because he had not “adequately
explained and documented his efforts to locate and to serve the Defendant before moving for
alternative service.” Min. Order (Mar. 6, 2025). Two months have now passed, but Plaintiff still
has failed to provide the Court with either proper support for his request to provide alternative
service or proof of service, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
Notwithstanding these failings, the Court will sua sponte extend Plaintiff’s deadline to
effectuate service until May 20, 2025. If Plaintiff does not effectuate service on or before that
date or demonstrate good cause to further extend the deadline, the Court will dismiss the action
without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) for failure to timely serve. A.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant sued him “for a number of causes of action in
Maryland and recorded a number of lis pendenses on Plaintiff’s properties in the District of
Columbia.” Dkt. 5 at 1. Plaintiff, in turn, countersued Defendant, and the matter was set for trial
on February 18 and 19, 2025. Id. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and in October 2024,
the Maryland court granted that motion and dismissed the Defendant’s complaint. Id.
According to Plaintiff, the Maryland court also directed Defendant to “cancel all of the recorded
lis pendenses on Plaintiff’s properties.” Id. But, on Plaintiff’s telling, his countersuit in the
Maryland action “remained.” Id.
Once the recorded lis pendenses were cancelled, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, alleging
that Defendant engaged in malicious prosecution in the Maryland litigation. Id. at 2. After
Plaintiff filed this case, Defendant’s counsel in the Maryland case filed a “motion with the
Maryland court requesting a Hebrew interpreter for Defendant for the February 18-19 Trial.” Id.
Plaintiff then “emailed Defendant’s attorney a copy of this Court’s summons and complaint and
the waiver request” and “alerted Defendant’s attorney that he would have a process server at the
February [2025] Trial to serve Defendant this Court’s summons.” Id. (emphasis added).
But on the day that the Maryland trial was scheduled to commence, Defendant did not
“show up.” Id. According to Plaintiff, when asked to explain Defendant’s absence, Defendant’s
counsel “gave some sort of excuse that still does not make sense to this day.” Id. As relevant
here, Plaintiff states that he attempted to serve Defendant’s attorney with a “copy of the
summons and complaint” in this case but that Defendant’s counsel “appears to not have accepted
service on Defendant’s behalf.” Id. Plaintiff “simply does not know because Defendant’s
attorney has ignored all correspondence regarding service.” Id.
2 Given that series of events, Plaintiff asked this Court for permission to serve Defendant
“by electronic mail when other means have been attempted and when it is clear that Defendant is
attempting to avoid service.” Id. at 2–3. In the alternative, he requested permission to effectuate
service on Defendant’s “attorney who is actively representing him in the sister case in
Maryland.” Id. The Court denied that motion on the ground that Plaintiff had failed “adequately
[to] explain[] and [to] document his efforts to locate and to serve Defendant before moving for
alternative service.” Min. Order (March 6, 2025). Nothing has occurred in this case in the two
months that have passed since then.
B.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides the time limits for service and the
consequences of failing to provide proper service. It states:
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.
To properly serve an individual, a copy of the summons and the complaint must be delivered to
him personally, left at his dwelling or place of abode, or delivered to one of his agents, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2), or the summons must be served in accordance with state law where the district
court is located or where service is made, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Under D.C. law, one method
of service is “by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed
receipt.” D.C. Code § 13-431(a). If the defendant is a “corporation, . . . partnership or other
unincorporated association,” service must be effectuated in the manner for serving an individual
or “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or
general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h); see also D.C.
Code § 29-104.12(c) (“Service may be made by handing a copy of the process, notice, or
3 demand to an officer of the entity, a managing or general agent of the entity, or any other agent
authorized by designation or by law to receive service of process for the entity[.]”); D.C. Sup. Ct.
Civ. R. 4(h). “With respect to either individuals or corporations, service on counsel is proper
only when counsel is an agent authorized to receive service.” Johnson-Richardson v. Univ. of
Phoenix, No. 18-3016, 2020 WL 7318004, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2020) (noting that “[m]ultiple
decision in this district have recognized that counsel of record is not an authorized agent simply
by virtue of representing the defendant in the lawsuit”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that Defendant has authorized his counsel
in the Maryland litigation to accept service in this case. The Court is unpersuaded that, “simply
by virtue of representing” Defendant in the Maryland lawsuit, Defendant’s counsel became his
authorized agent for purposes of accepting service of process in other cases. Johnson-
Richardson, 2020 WL 7318004, at *2.
Neither the federal rules nor the D.C. rules, moreover, authorize service of the summons
and complaint by electronic mail. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4; D.C. Code § 13-431. The D.C. Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure do authorize the judges of that court to permit a plaintiff to serve
a defendant using an alternative method of service, including electronic mail, but only after
determining that the plaintiff made diligent efforts to effect service through the regularly
prescribed means and only after the plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant has used the
proposed email account for correspondence in the past 6 months. See D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P.
4(e)(3). Because Plaintiff has failed to make either showing, the Court remains unpersuaded that
this is a case in which service by email is warranted.
4 C.
Service is now more than 90 days overdue, which might justify dismissing the action
without prejudice. The Court will, however, sua sponte extend Plaintiff’s deadline to effectuate
service until May 20, 2025. If Plaintiff does not effectuate service on or before that date or does
not demonstrate good cause to further extend the deadline, the Court will dismiss the action,
without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) for failure to effect service
in a timely manner. See Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge
Date: May 6, 2025