Phillips v. Ennis

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Phillips v. Ennis

902 So. 2d 976, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 9101, 2005 WL 1336282

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJune 8, 2005

DocketNo. 4D04-3431

StatusPublished

This text of 902 So. 2d 976 (Phillips v. Ennis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Phillips v. Ennis, 902 So. 2d 976, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 9101, 2005 WL 1336282 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is a purported appeal from an order of the trial court which set aside an earlier agreed order granting prevailing parties’ attorney’s fees. Because the agreed order granting attorney’s fees did not establish amount, it was a non-final, non-appealable order. See Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So.2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Therefore, the motion to set aside the order was in fact a motion for re-consideration directed at an interlocutory order, and the trial court’s order setting aside the agreed order, although styled as an order granting relief under Rule 1.540(b), was itself an interlocutory order, for which appellant has shown no jurisdictional basis for review. See Dawkins, Inc. v. Huff, 836 So.2d 1062, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (interlocutory orders are not within the restrictions provided in Rule 1.540 and such orders remain within the inherent power of the trial court to modify or set aside during the progress of the case prior to final judgment). For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Winkelman.

Dismissed.

STEVENSON, SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

This is a purported appeal from an order of the trial court which set aside an earlier agreed order granting prevailing parties’ attorney’s fees. Because the agreed order granting attorney’s fees did not establish amount, it was a non-final, non-appealable order. See Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So.2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Therefore, the motion to set aside the order was in fact a motion for re-consideration directed at an interlocutory order, and the trial court’s order setting aside the agreed order, although styled as an order granting relief under Rule 1.540(b), was itself an interlocutory order, for which appellant has shown no jurisdictional basis for review. See Dawkins, Inc. v. Huff, 836 So.2d 1062, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (interlocutory orders are not within the restrictions provided in Rule 1.540 and such orders remain within the inherent power of the trial court to modify or set aside during the progress of the case prior to final judgment). For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Winkelman.

Dismissed.

STEVENSON, SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

902 So. 2d 976, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 9101, 2005 WL 1336282, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phillips-v-ennis-fladistctapp-2005.

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