Phillips v. Detroit

19 F. Cas. 509, 4 Ban. & A. 347

This text of 19 F. Cas. 509 (Phillips v. Detroit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Phillips v. Detroit, 19 F. Cas. 509, 4 Ban. & A. 347 (circtedmi 1879).

Opinion

BROWN, District Judge.

I have felt much embarrassed in the consideration of this case by the decision of Judge Emmons sustaining the validity of this patent in a suit brought by the complainants against the city of Cincinnati. Upon a motion for a preliminary injunction, this decision was accepted as practically conclusive, and a writ was granted without much examination into the merits. I have hesitated whether I ought not now to treat his determination as decisive of the case, upon the grounds stated by Judge Emmons himself in Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. "Willis [Case No. 5,603], But, as three most important exhibits, claimed to be in anticipation of complainants’ patent, have been introduced in this case which were not before the circuit judge at Cincinnati, it is proper at least that their bearing upon the validity of the patent should be considered. It is, perhaps, true that if the case had been an original one I should have reached the conclusion that the patent was invalid from the disclaimer in the specification itself; but it is at least possible that the circuit judge might have reached a different conclusion, in that case, if these exhibits had been laid before him. It is difficult for me to determine the exact point, whether the new testimony itself would authorize a different conclusion, and, if the case is to be reconsidered at all, I think the only satisfactory way is to consider it de novo upon the whole testimony. The magnitude of the interests involved renders it more than probable that the case will be appealed. The defendant is abundantly able to respond to any decree that can be obtained against it, and, upon the whole, it has seemed to me better that the record should go to the supreme court with a candid statement of my own views, rather than an apology for deciding against them.

The real question in this case is not whether this patent might have been valid if wooden blocks, in their natural state, laid vertically, had never before been used, nor yet whether any of the prior patents are in terms anticipatory of this, but whether, considering the state of the art in 1869. as evidenced by the various exhibits here offered, there is any in-[510]*510veution in the result embodied in this patent. Invention has been justly described as a mental process, but it is often exceedingly difficult to draw the line between those devices which are the result of thought, ingenuity and labor, and the products of such judgment or skill as a mechanic ordinarily makes use of in the performance of his daily work, and which are confessedly not patentable.

Great stress is laid in this case upon the superiority of this pavement over any other heretofore used, and it is claimed as almost, if not quite, decisive of the right of complainants to their patent. While the value and utility of a device and the fact that it has superseded others previously employed for analogous uses is undoubtedly entitled to weight in considering the question of patent-ability (Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 486), it is, after all, a somewhat uncertain criterion. If the dervice be, in fact, novel, it furnishes an additional reason why the inventor should receive the reward of his ingenuity; but, if it involved no exercise of the inventive faculty, its very, utility is’ an aggravation of the wrong done by the patentees in seizing and appropriating that which properly belongs to the public. If, for example, a person should succeed in obtaining a patent for painting the names of streets upon the gas-lamps, it would be a very insufficient answer to the defence of non-pat-entability to say that it was a very useful device and one which had superseded the ancient method of painting the names upon the walls of the corner houses.

The patent under consideration is of the simplest description. It consists of blocks of wood cut from the trunks or blanches of trees in their natural form, the bark only being removed, laid vertically upon a bed of gravel or sand, which is also used as a filling-in to keep the blocks in position. The result is a smooth pavement of greater durability than any other wooden pavement known.

All the pavements to which my attention has been called consist of three distinct parts: First. A superstructure of stone or wóod, in blocks of different shapes and sizes; sometimes, if of wood, connected by pegs or dowel-pins, but oftener laid separately. In some cases the wood is treated by dipping it in tar, asphalt or other material to keep out the water. These preparations, however, have been found to increase the tendency to dry-rot caused by the inability of the sap to escape. Second. A foundation of sand, gravel, broken stone or brick. In some instances, as in the Nicholson pavement, a board is laid between the superstructure and the foundation. Third. A filling of sand or gravel, fibres of wood or concrete, sometimes mixed with tar, asphalt, or pitch, and sometimes not.

For a long time, it was supposed that the durability of wooden pavements was increased by saturating the blocks in tar or asphalt; but that theory seems to be now exploded, and the special excellence of the Phillips pavement is attributed to the entire omission of these preparations.

Comparing this pavement with the various antedating devices, we find that it differs from the cobble-stone or bowlder pavement only in the substitution of wood in its natural form for stone. If wooden blocks in their natural form had never been used, undoubtedly this change would be patentable, for an entirely different result is produced; but, it being conceded that wooden blocks have been used before, and used for paving purposes, it is, at least, questionable whether this is not a mere change of material, and, therefore, falling within the rule laid down in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. [52 U. S.] 248. There is undoubtedly another result produced by the change of wood for stone, but it can hardly be called a new result,' since the same result had previously been produced by the use of like wooden blocks. The fact that cobble-stones are ordinarily somewhat rounded and touch each other only in the centre, and that the wooden blocks are of uniform thickness, is only saying that the natural shape of wooden blocks differs somewhat from the natural shape of cobble-stone; but.it does not change the fact that, in both cases, the blocks are laid in their natural form. I do not, however, put my decision upon this ground.

While it is true that none of the patents offered in evidence exhibit the exact combination of complainants’, there are several which approximate very closely to it, so closely that I think the variation in complainants’ is a matter of judgment rather than of invention.

The English patent to Parkin of 1839 provides for blocks of wood of any convenient figure, with the grain either vertical or inclined, and, among the drawings annexed to his patent, is one showing the blocks in their natural form. The foundation is of sand, ashes, or saw-dust, saturated with tar or bituminous substances, the filling of sand, pulverized chalk, brick-dust or other earthy matter united with pitch or other bituminous substances or suitable cement. Practically, the only difference between this patent and complainants’ consists in the saturation of the sand used for the filling and the foundation with pitch, tar or other bituminous substances.

The patent to Stead of 1839 includes wooden blocks so shaped and placed as to support each other in a close and compact manner, always having the fibres in a vertical position.

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Related

Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co.
93 U.S. 486 (Supreme Court, 1877)

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Bluebook (online)
19 F. Cas. 509, 4 Ban. & A. 347, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phillips-v-detroit-circtedmi-1879.